Young v. United States
Decision Date | 02 February 1942 |
Docket Number | No. 86,86 |
Citation | 86 L.Ed. 832,315 U.S. 257,62 S.Ct. 510 |
Parties | YOUNG v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Charles Fahy, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Mr. Fred Patterson, of Honolulu, Hawaii, for petitioner.
Petitioner, a practicing physician, was convicted on eight counts of an indictment charging violation of Section 6 of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act as amended.1 That section, so far as here material, provides:
'That the provisions of this Act shall not be construed to apply to the manufacture, sale, distribution, giving away, dispensing, or possession of preparations and remedies which do not contain more than two grains of opium * * * in one fluid ounce * * *: Provided, That such remedies and preparations are manufactured, sold, distributed, given away, dispensed, or possessed as medicines and not for the purpose of evading the intentions and provisions of this Act: Provided further, that any manufacturer, producer, compounder, or vendor (including dispensing physicians) of the preparations and remedies mentioned in this section lawfully entitled to manufacture, produce, compound, or vend such preparations and remedies, shall keep a record of all sales, exchanges, or gifts of such preparations and remedies * * *.'
The evidence is undisputed that petitioner gave the preparations in the quantities charged in the indictment to patients whom he personally attended. He kept no records. His defense, that the second proviso of Section 6 is not an independent and affirmative requirement but merely a condition precedent to the exemption created by that section, was rejected by the court below which took the position that the second proviso is an unconditional requirement that all vendors of exempt preparations keep records.2
The Government confessed error and we brought the case here. 314 U.S. 595, 62 S.Ct. 59, 86 L.Ed. —-.
The public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent. But such a confession does not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed is entitled to great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to examine independently the errors confessed. See Parlton v. United States, 64 App.D.C. 169, 75 F.2d 772. The public interest that a result be reached which promotes a well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceeding. That interest is entrusted to our consideration and protection as well as that of the enforcing officers. Furthermore, but judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties. Cf. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr, 2527, 2551, 98 Eng.Rep. 327; State v. Green, 167 Wash. 266, 9 P.2d 62.
The Government's confession of error was originally two-fold: first, that while the second proviso of Section 6 was subject to two possible constructions, the administrative construction had been that it was not an independent penal provision, and therefore the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of petitioner; and, secondly, that the second proviso, even if it be regarded as an independent penal provision, does not apply to a physician who administers exempt preparations solely to patients whom he personally attends. Upon reconsideration the Government has withdrawn its first ground of confession of error. We put to one side that question since we are of opinion that there must be a reversal on the second ground.
Assuming, without deciding, that the second proviso of Section 6 is an independent penal provision, it requires that records be kept only by 'any manufacturer, producer, compounder, or vendor (including dispensing physicians)'. We think that Congress, by the use of the words 'dispensing physicians', meant to exclude physicians administering to patients whom they personally attend.
That not all physicians are required to keep records is manifest from the use of the qualifying adjective 'dispensing'. And, the physician must be one who manufactures, produces, compounds, or vends, or possibly only one who vends if the parenthetical phrase applies only to 'vendor', the drugs. These are not appropriate words to describe the function of a physician who administers exempt preparations to patients whom he personally attends.
This construction is borne out by a consideration of the Act as a whole. The word 'administer' more appropriately describes the activities of a doctor in personal attendance than does the word 'dispense'. Admittedly the words 'dispense' and 'dispens...
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