Young v. United States

Decision Date15 April 2014
Docket NumberNo. 2:11-cv-08,No. 2:06-cr-20(4),2:11-cv-08,2:06-cr-20(4)
PartiesCONNIE J. YOUNG, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Judge Greer

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Acting pro se, Connie J. Young ["petitioner" or "Young"] filed this motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and a supporting brief, [Doc. 475 and 476].1 In his pleading and accompanying brief, Young alleges, as grounds for relief: (1) that his counsel gave him in effective assistance and (2) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Pending before the Court is the United States's response to the motion to vacate, supported by the affidavit of petitioner's counsel, Wayne Stambaugh, and Young's reply to that response, [Docs. 544, Attachment 1, and 545]. For the reasons which follow, petitioner's motion to vacate will DENIED.

I. Procedural Background

In Count one of a fourteen-count superseding indictment returned by the federal grand jury on June 13, 2006, [Doc. 9], Young was charged, along with multiple co-defendants, with conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and § 846. Young and two of his co-defendants proceeded to a jury trial, where he was convicted of Count one and sentenced to serve a life term, as mandated by statute. Young unsuccessfully appealed his conviction andsentence. United States v. Young, 347 Fed. Appx. 182, 2009 WL 3073164 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 957 (Feb. 22, 2010).

Thereafter, petitioner submitted a plethora of filings to this Court and to the Sixth Circuit. The first batch of submissions consisted of a motion for a new trial, an amended motion for a new trial, [Docs. 460 and 463], and a petition for a writ of mandamus, [Docket Entry of April 4, 2011 and Doc. 484]. The motions for a new trial were denied, [Doc. 486], and Young filed both a notice of appeal from the order denying his motions for a new trial, [Doc. 488], and a motion to alter or amend that judgment order under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [Doc. 491]. Petitioner's Rule 59(e) motion was denied, [Doc. 492], and Young appealed that order also, [Doc. 493]. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit denied both Young's petition for a writ of mandamus and his appeal of the denial of his motions for a new trial, [Docs. 495 and 508].

On January 6, 2011, after his direct appeal was denied, but in the midst of filing the above motions and pleadings, Young submitted the instant § 2255 motion and supporting memorandum brief.

II. Standard of Review

This Court must vacate and set aside Young's conviction upon finding that "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

When a defendant files a § 2255 motion, he must set forth facts which entitle him to relief. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 1961). "Conclusions, not substantiated by allegations of fact with someprobability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a hearing." Green, 454 F.2d at 53; O'Malley, 285 F.2d at 735 (citations omitted). A motion that merely states general conclusions of law without substantiating allegations with facts is without legal merit. Loum v. Underwood, 262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 167, 171 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).

To warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because of constitutional error, the error must be one of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citation omitted) (§ 2254 case); Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F. 3d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Brecht to a § 2255 motion). A petitioner must prove that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of evidence. Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006).

Under Rule 8(a) of the Governing Rules, the Court is to review the answer, any transcripts, and records of prior proceedings and any material submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted. If the motion to vacate, the answer, and the records of the case show conclusively that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2255, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 92 (6th Cir. 1986). The Court FINDS no need for an evidentiary hearing in the instant case.

III. Factual Background

The facts are drawn from the Sixth Circuit's opinion on direct review of Young's conviction. See United States v. Young, 347 Fed. Appx. at 182, 184. According to proof presented at trial, Rickey Story was at the helm of a conspiracy to sell considerable amounts of cocaine and cocaine base in the Eastern District of Tennessee. The conspiracy ultimatelyinvolved fourteen people, eleven of whom pleaded guilty. Story would receive the drugs from two sources: (1) a source called "Carlos," who was never apprehended, and (2) a source in South Carolina. Evidence at trial indicated that Young was the source of the drugs in South Carolina.

Story would go to South Carolina several times a week, accompanied by another co-defendant and would return with nine to eighteen ounces of cocaine at a time. After they cooked some of the cocaine into crack cocaine, Story would give it and powder cocaine to other co-defendants and other individuals to sell in and around eastern Tennessee.

IV. Discussion

In his § 2255 motion, Young offers various purported misdeeds on the part of his counsel to illustrate his claims that he received ineffective assistance. According to the face of the motion, petitioner was represented by Carey C. Taylor at his arraignment and plea, Wayne Stambaugh at trial and sentencing, and Robert Vogel on his direct appeal. Most, if not all, of the claimed errors are attributed to Attorney Stambaugh. Petitioner also asserts, as his final claim, that in several instances the prosecutor engaged in misconduct.

A. Ineffective Assistance
1. Relevant Law

The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right not just to counsel, but to "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for evaluating claims of ineffective of counsel:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors soserious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a break down in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

466 U.S. at 687. As with any other claim under § 2255, the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the movant. Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985).

In considering the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland, the appropriate measure of attorney performance is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A petitioner asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must "identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The evaluation of the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance must be made "from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Moreover, counsel's conduct is strongly presumed to fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

The second prong of the Strickland test requires the petitioner show counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Thus, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. The petitioner must show "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. The Strickland Court emphasized that both prongs mustbe established in order to meet the claimant's burden, and if either prong is not satisfied the claim must be rejected, stating:

Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.

Id. at 697.

2. Analysis

At the outset, the list of ineffective...

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