Young v. Valentine

• Decision Date: 09 February 1904
• Citation: 177 N.Y. 347,69 N.E. 643
• Parties: YOUNG et al. v. VALENTINE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

177 N.Y. 347

69 N.E. 643

YOUNG et al.

v.VALENTINE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 9, 1904.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by William B. Young and others, executors of Marie A. Valentine, deceased, against Benjamin E. Valentine. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (79 N. Y. Supp. 536) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Parker, C. J., and O'Brien and Vann, JJ., dissenting.

David B. Hill and B. E. Valentine, for appellant.

Charles E. Hughes and George D. Beattys, for respondents.

MARTIN, J.

While other relief was demanded in this action when commenced, after the death of Mrs. Valentine it was continued and tried as an action for an accounting by the defendant for the moneys, securities, and property which came into his hands as her attorney or fiduciary agent; all other matters being practically withdrawn. Although a great number of transactions were investigated on the trial and passed upon by the referee, but a single question remains open, as all others have been finally disposed of by the unanimous affirmance of the judgment entered upon the referee's report, and by the stipulation of the parties that his decision should be and remain final, except that portion which related to the payments to Mrs. Valentine or to her bank account by the checks of the defendant. The decision of the referee, being in the short form, is to be treated as a general verdict; and we are bound to assume, not only that all the facts alleged by the plaintiffs bearing upon the question involved were sustained by the evidence, but also that all facts alleged by the defendant and not found by the referee have been rejected or expressly negatived. Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 231,63 N. E. 969,57 L. R. A. 529;Hutton v. Smith, 175 N. Y. 375, 378,67 N. E. 633;Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N. Y. 39, 45,54 N. E. 726,46 L. R. A. 694.

The defendant was a lawyer, practicing his profession in the city of Brooklyn. His family consisted of himself, his wife, and four daughters, who lived with their parents, and were being educated at some of the best available schools; and the family was maintained without extravagance, and in a manner befitting their position in the community. The defendant's wife had no separate estate until 1892. The defendant, from 1888, drew his checks and deposited them in the Brooklyn Trust Company to the credit of his wife, to furnish her the money with which to pay the necessary household and family expenses. His wife drew her checks against such deposits, and used them to pay the various persons with whom she dealt in supplying the necessaries for the household, and this practice continued until the commencement of this action. The defendant well knew that the family expenses were paid out of the checks and funds thus turned over to his wife, and that he was not to keep accounts with or directly pay the various tradesmen who supplied the family with necessaries. The amount of such checks from March, 1892, to December, 1898, was more than $30,000. The defendant had several bank accounts-one as administrator, another as individual, and still another as attorney; the last, however, containing his individual funds. The defendant drew 75 checks in all on these accounts for household expenses, of which 10 were as administrator, 12 as attorney, and the remainder as an individual; and several of the amounts paid by the 10 checks were carried into the account presented by the defendant as ‘cash deposited,’ thus raising the presumption that such checks were not drawn or delivered to Mrs. Valentine, but were drawn to ‘cash’ or ‘self,’ and the proceeds deposited to her credit. There is no evidence showing that Mrs. Valentine knew the source of any such funds, nor in what manner her own funds were deposited. When such deposits were made, the family were all living together at 21 Monroe Place, sometimes on the Storrs farm, and occasionally at Woodsburg, L. I. Mrs. Valentine owned the Storrs farm and the house at 21 Monroe Place, and the defendant owned the place at Woodsburg. On the accounting the defendant presented a schedule of accounts showing his dealings with his wife's estate, in which he charged her and credited himself with all the funds and checks deposited in the Brooklyn Trust Company and used in paying the necessary living expenses of the family, thereby casting upon her the entire burden of maintaining the whole family out of her separate estate. There was no contract, agreement, or understanding between the defendant and his wife whereby she agreed to relieve him from his legal obligation to support his family during any portion of the time covered by the accounting, and the funds and checks turned over by the defendant to pay household expenses were his own, and were furnished by him to discharge his obligation to furnish his family with proper support becoming their situation and condition in life, and he knew that they were for that purpose.

Briefly stated, the foregoing were the facts found by the learned referee as to the matters referred to and included in the plaintiffs' sixteenth exception to the defendant's account, as set forth in the referee's memorandum of opinion. The effect of the stipulation between the parties was to make the memorandum opinion a part of the record, so far as the questions involved in the sixteenth exception are concerned. That the checks and cash furnished by the defendant were actually used in paying the household and family expenses of the defendant and his family, including himself, his wife, and four daughters, and that the same methods had been employed since 1888, is conclusively established, and not denied. The chief issue between the parties in relation to that question was whether, under the proof, it was the duty of the defendant to support his own family, or whether that obligation devolved upon his wife. There is no doubt that in this state, as between husband and wife, the primary obligation to provide for the support of his wife and their children rests upon the husband, and that the wife is not bound to maintain her husband and children, even though she may have a separate estate. Yet, if the income of the wife has, under and by virtue of a sufficient and valid agreement, been applied to the maintenance of the family, in equity she cannot make a claim for reimbursement out of her husband's estate; but to bar such a claim the agreement between the husband and wife must be plainly and definitely established, and must be fair, reasonable, and just, or it will not be enforced.

As we have seen, the learned referee found that there was no contract, arrangement, or conduct with or on the part of Mrs. Valentine by which she became liable to bear or pay the household expenses with which she was sought to be charged by the defendant. The evidence plainly discloses that she repeatedly and continuously refused to assume any such liability, and there is little, if any, reliable evidence to the contrary. The record in this case will be examined in vain to find, even in the great volume of testimony given by the defendant himself, any direct or sufficient proof of a valid and binding agreementor understanding which would relieve him from the legal obligation to support himself, his wife, and family. The defendant's testimony relating to this subject was somewhat evasive and contradictory. Substantially all the evidence from which it is claimed that the liability of Mrs. Valentine arose related to transactions testified to by the defendant which were entirely within his knowledge, and discloses that many, if not most, of his dealings with her property were hidden from her, were devious, and well calculated to keep from her any knowledge as to her property, or the disposition made of it by him, and were not such as an agent or trustee should perform as to the property of his principal or cestui que trust. If, upon the whole record, the transactions of the defendant as to his wife's property were not disclosed with desirable certainty, it can be attributed only to his conduct and the nature of his testimony. His account of his stewardship and of the property which came into his hands as such agent or trustee is not of a character to elicit the fullest credence, or from which it can be fairly implied or understood that his wife ever agreed or knowingly consented to the use of her estate for the support of her husband and his family. From the evidence the learned referee was clearly justified in finding that the defendant was under legal obligation to support his own family, and that his wife did not consent to the application of her property to that purpose, or thus apply it with a knowledge that the checks and cash furnished therefor by her husband were a part of her own property, and that she never intended to apply any part of her own estate to that purpose. No one can read the...