Young v. Warden of Perry Corr. Inst.

• Decision Date: 13 May 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:20-cv-03974-RMG-MGB
• Parties: Cleveland E. Young, #141241, Petitioner, v. Warden of Perry Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Cleveland E. Young, #141241, Petitioner, v. Warden of Perry Correctional Institution,¹ Respondent.

Case No. 2:20-cv-03974-RMG-MGB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

May 13, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Cleveland E. Young, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the petition and submit a recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. As discussed in greater detail below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust available state remedies.

BACKGROUND

In July 2015, Young was indicted by a Union County grand jury for criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree (2015-GS-44-00501) and criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the third degree (2015-GS-44-00913).² Young was tried in March 2016 and found guiltyof all charges, resulting in consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Young filed a timely notice of appeal, which the South Carolina Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed on June 28, 2017. (Case No. 2016-000770.)

On or around March 19, 2018, Young filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (Case No. 2018-CP-44-00122.) The PCR court denied Young's application with prejudice by order dated February 7, 2020, and Young filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court on September 28, 2020. (Case No. 2020-000367.) In filing said petition, Young's court-appointed counsel indicated that, in her opinion, the appeal was without legal merit and therefore moved to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Johnson v. State, 294 S.C. 310 (1988). Young did not file a response to his attorney's motion to be relieved as counsel within the time period prescribed by the court. On November 24, 2020, the South Carolina Supreme Court transferred Young's PCR appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. Based on the current appellate docket, it appears the Court of Appeals has yet to issue a ruling on the denial of Young's application, such that the PCR appeal remains under consideration.³

It is against this procedural background that Young now attempts to challenge his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Specifically, Young claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the two indictments where there was insufficient evidence to charge Young and the "prosecuting agency" was the sole witness before the grand jury. (Dkt.No. 1 at 6; Dkt. No. 1-3.) Young asks the Court to vacate his sentence and grant him relief from the underlying state court judgment. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Young's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"); and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).

The narrow question before the Court is whether it "plainly appears" that Young is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the Warden must respond. Id. Because Young is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.

DISCUSSION

I. Recharacterization of Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that Young seems to challenge the validity of his state conviction and sentence by means of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ("Form AO 242"). (Dkt. No. 1.) Young's claims, however, clearly fall under thepurview of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Indeed, it is well-established in this District that, "regardless of how they are styled, federal habeas petitions of prisoners who are in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court should be treated as applications under section 2254." In Re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 779 (4th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Morgan, 473 F. Supp. 3d 544, 546 (D.S.C. 2020) (noting the longstanding practice of classifying pro se pleadings from prisoners according to their contents, without regard to their captions). Accordingly, the undersigned construes Young's petition as one raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.⁴

II. Failure to Exhaust

It is well-settled that state prisoners must exhaust all available state-court avenues for challenging their convictions before they seek habeas relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Indeed, § 2254 generally forbids federal courts from granting collateral relief until prisoners have "fairly presented" their claims in each appropriate state court. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 27 (2004); see also Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) ("The exhaustionrequirement . . . serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights."); Stewart v. Warden of Lieber Corr. Inst., 701 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (D.S.C. 2010) (noting that "a federal habeas court may consider only those issues that have been properly presented to the highest state courts with jurisdiction to decide them"). To satisfy his burden, the petitioner must therefore show that both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles were presented to the highest state court. Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196, 201 (4th Cir. 2015).

Here, Young's PCR appeal appears to be ongoing, as the matter is still pending before the South Carolina Court of Appeals. And because appellate review of the PCR court's decision is necessary to show exhaustion in South Carolina, Young's federal habeas claims are unexhausted and premature at this stage. See Braveboy v. James, No. 8:20-cv-03486-TMC-JDA, 2020 WL 8713682, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 10, 2020), adopted, 2021 WL 423410 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2021) (explaining that if a petitioner's PCR application is denied by a court of common pleas, the petitioner must seek appellate review in the state courts); Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that state prisoners must invoke "one complete round of the State's established appellate review process"). The undersigned therefore recommends that Young's habeas petition be dismissed so that he may exhaust his state-court remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). See, e.g., Goss v. Williams, No. 2:18-cv-2938-BHH, 2020 WL 502635, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2020), appeal dismissed, 814 F. App'x 776 (4th Cir. 2020) (dismissing pro se § 2254 petition for failure to exhaust state remedies where PCR application was still pending before state court); Braveboy, 2020 WL 8713682, at *3 (same); Washington v. Cartledge, No. 4:08-cv-04052-PMD, 2010 WL 1257356, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2010) (same).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Young cannot cure the defects in his petition by mere amendment. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss Young's petition, without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return. Young can refile his § 2254 petition with the Court after he has exhausted his state court remedies. The undersigned again reminds Young to be mindful of the statute of limitations applicable to this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/_________

MARY GORDON BAKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

May 13, 2021

Charleston, South Carolina

The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4^th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

Post Office Box 835

Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727...