Young v. Wells Fargo Auto

Decision Date26 January 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 22-4509
PartiesAMY M. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO AUTO, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM

CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff Amy M. Young brings this action against Wells Fargo Auto (Wells Fargo). Plaintiff's Complaint appears to allege that Wells Fargo violated the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1635, that her vehicle was wrongfully repossessed in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(6) of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), that Wells Fargo violated her civil rights by causing her to make unlawful payments on a fraud, and that Wells Fargo violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1605. ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo's fully briefed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(6)(2) and 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court, finding it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant, will transfer this case to the District of New Jersey. As this Court finds Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court does not address Defendant's 12(b)(6) arguments, but rather leaves them for the District of New Jersey. An appropriate Order will follow.

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Pro se Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident. ECF No. 1 at 1. In October of 2021, Plaintiff purchased two vehicles from J&S Autohaus Six, LLC, which is located in New Jersey.

ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 5-3 at 2; ECF No. 5-4. Her purchase contracts for the two vehicles were later assigned to Wells Fargo. ECF No. 5-3 at 2. Plaintiff filed this suit on November 8, 2022. ECF No.

1. In her Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that: (1) Wells Fargo violated her rights under Section 1635 of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) for not disclosing Plaintiff's alleged recission right; (2) her vehicles were wrongly repossessed in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(6) of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (3) Wells Fargo violated her civil rights by causing her to make unlawful payments on a fraudulent contract; and (4) Wells Fargo violated 15 U.S.C §§ 1601, 1605. ECF No. 1. On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff seeks $80,000 “for federal violations and damages, [her] title to both vehicles sent to [her] place of abode . . . [and] the removal of these account reporting to my consumer/credit reports.” ECF No. 1 at 4.

On December 6, 2022, Defendant Wells Fargo filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 5. Plaintiff filed a Response on December 21, 2022. ECF No. 6. Defendant filed a Reply on January 10, 2023 and Plaintiff filed a Sur-reply on January 11, 2023. ECF Nos. 7, 8. The Motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for consideration.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging “the court's personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden ‘to come forward with sufficient facts to establish that jurisdiction is proper.' Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992)). [I]t is well established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiff's allegations as true, and is to construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) ([W]hen the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction[.]). Furthermore, because Plaintiff filed her Complaint Pro se, the Court will liberally construe the pleadings. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

“A federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state.” D'Jamoos ex rel. Est. of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir.1987)). Accordingly, a court sitting in Pennsylvania, must apply the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, which “gives its courts jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the maximum extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution.” Danziger & De Llano, 948 F.3d at 129 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b)). Thus, to determine whether this Court has personal jurisdiction, the Court must determine whether, under the Due Process Clause, Defendant has “certain minimum contact with [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Minimum contacts can be analyzed in the context of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.” Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 334.

A. General Jurisdiction

“A court may exercise general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). In Goodyear and Daimler, the Supreme Court explained that for corporations the “ ‘paradigm forums in which a corporate defendant is ‘at home' . . . are the corporation's place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924). “In rare instances general jurisdiction may arise in an ‘exceptional case . . . [where] a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.' Campbell v. Mars, Inc., 2016 WL 6901970, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2016) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19).

In Daimler, the Supreme Court gave “a single example of an ‘exceptional case': Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).” Anderjaska v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:19-CV-3057, 2021 WL 877558, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2021); see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19). In Perkins, the defendant was a Philippines mining corporation, which completely halted its mining operations during Japan's occupation of the Philippines during World War II. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447. During this time, the defendant corporation's owner temporarily relocated the company's principal place of business to Ohio, where he maintained an office, kept company files, and supervised “the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.” Id. at 447-48. “Given the wartime circumstances,” the Supreme Court found Ohio's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the company permissible because “Ohio could be considered a surrogate for the place of incorporation or head office.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 130 n.8 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

“In the years since Daimler, the ‘exceptional case' has been often discussed but rarely found.” Anderjaska, 2021 WL 877558, at *2. In fact, the Third Circuit has recognized that “it is ‘incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction [over a corporation] in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business.' Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added)). The general jurisdiction inquiry, the Supreme Court has explained “calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety” as [a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Tyrrell, 581 U.S. at 414 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (internal quotations omitted)).

Here, Defendant represents in its Motion to Dismiss that it is incorporated in the State of Delaware and that its principal place of business is in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. ECF No. 5-3 at 3. Therefore, neither of the forums for which Defendant is considered “at home” are in Pennsylvania. Additionally, this is not an exceptional case where the defendant corporation's activities in the forum are so substantial and of such a nature to render it at home in Pennsylvania. There is no doubt that Wells Fargo operates and conducts business in Pennsylvania. But simply transacting business in the state does not make a corporation “at home” there. See Gibbs v. Trans Union LLC, No. 2:21-CV-00667, 2021 WL 2375898, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2021) (finding Wells Fargo not subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. that registration as a foreign corporation does not provide general jurisdiction over a corporation. 266 A.3d 542, 571 (Pa. 2021). As explained in Mallory, Pennsylvania's “scheme of conditioning the privilege of doing business in the Commonwealth on the submission of the foreign corporation to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts strips foreign corporations of the due process safeguards guaranteed in Goodyear and Daimler. Legislatively coerced consent to general jurisdiction is not voluntary consent and cannot be constitutionally sanctioned.” Id.

Accordingly there is no basis for finding Defendant ...

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