Young v. Weston
| Citation | 192 F.3d 870 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-35377,98-35377 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 1999) ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DAVID WESTON, Superintendent of the Special Commitment Center, Respondent-Appellee |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Robert Boruchowitz, Defender Association, Seattle, Washington, for the petitioner-appellant.
Sarah Sappington, Assistant Attorney General, Seattle, Washington, for the respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-00480-JCC.
Before: Harry Pregerson and David R. Thompson, Circuit Judges, and Robert J. Kelleher, District Judge.1
The opinion filed May 20, 1999, is amended as follows:
Slip opinion page 4757, after the paragraph ending with footnote 4, insert:
Actual conditions of confinement may divest a facially valid statute of its "civil" label only upon a showing by the "clearest proof" that the statutory scheme is punitive in its "effect." Id. at 2082. As discussed below, we conclude that Young has alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, would constitute such "clear proof."
With this amendment, the petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.
This case involves the constitutionality of Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator Statute as applied to petitioner Andre Brigham Young. Young has been indefinitely confined pursuant to the statute since 1990. He appeals the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2253, 2 and we reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.
This is the second time that this case is before us.
The district court originally granted Young's petition on cross-motions for summary judgment on the ground that the statute, R.C.W. S 71.09 ("Washington statute" or "statute"), violated the United States Constitution. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) ("Young I "). When it granted the petition, the court ruled that the statute, on its face, violated (1) the substantive due process protections of the due process clause because it permits indefinite incarceration without a showing of mental illness, (2) the ex post facto clause because it is punitive and applies restrospectively, and (3) the double jeopardy clause because it imposes additional incarceration on a person who has already been punished for the commission of a criminal offense. See id. Because the court found the statute to be facially unconstitutional, it denied as unnecessary Young's request for a hearing.
Respondent appealed to this court. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997). In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that Kansas's involuntary commitment statute for sexually violent predators ("Kansas statute") did not violate the substantive due process, ex post facto, or double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution. Our court then remanded this matter to the district court for reconsideration in light of Hendricks. See Young v. Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Young II").
On remand, the district court received supplemental briefing on the impact of Hendricks. After oral argument, but without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Young's petition. See Young v. Weston, No. CV-9400480C (W.D. Wash. filed Feb 10, 1998) ("Young III"). Young timely appealed.
Young's challenge to his indefinite confinement raises numerous issues, which can be grouped into four general categories: (1) whether the Washington statute violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution, because the statute's effect is punitive; (2) whether the interpretation and implementation of the statute violates the substantive due process protections of the due process clause of the United States Constitution; (3) whether the statute, on its face and as interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court, violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution; and (4) whether Young's confinement is unlawful because (a) he was denied a constitutionally required probable cause hearing, and (b) the commitment trial court committed several trial errors.
The linchpin of this case is whether the Washington statute, as applied to Young, is punitive and thereby subject to the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution. The ex post facto clause "forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated." Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2086 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); U.S. Const., art. 1, S 10. The double jeopardy clause prevents the state from "punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense." Id. at 2085 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); U.S. Const., amend. 5. If the Washington statute is punitive, then it (1) imposes a new punitive measure--indefinite confinement--on Young for crimes he committed before the statute's enactment, and (2) punishes Young again, after he has already served his criminal sentences, for the same criminal offenses. Therefore, if Young's confinement pursuant to the Washington statute is punitive, then the statute, as applied to Young, violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that, because involuntary confinement pursuant to Kansas's civil commitment statute is not punitive, that statute's operation does not raise ex post facto or double jeopardy concerns. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2085-96. Because the Kansas statute was modeled on and is substantially similar to the Washington statute,3 Hendricks forecloses the claim that the Washington statute, on its face, violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses.
But Hendricks does not preclude the possibility that the Washington statute, as applied, is punitive. See id. at 2082. In fact, both the majority and concurring opinions in Hendricks turn repeatedly to the question whether the conditions of Hendricks's confinement rendered the Kansas statute punitive. See id. at 2082, 2085 (majority opinion); see also id. at2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Heeding Justice Kennedy's reminder that our concern is not "how long [Young] and others like him should serve a criminal sentence," but rather "whether it is the criminal system or civil system which should make the decision," id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring), we must determine whether Young's confinement is criminal rather than civil. And, following the dictates of Hendricks, we look to the conditions of Young's confinement when we make that determination.4
Actual conditions of confinement may divest a facially valid statute of its "civil" label only upon a showing by the "clearest proof" that the statutory scheme is punitive in its "effect." Id. at 2082. As discussed below, we conclude that Young has alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, would constitute such "clear proof."
Young has exhausted his claim that his conditions of confinement at the Special Commitment Center render the Washington statute, as applied to him, punitive. Not only did Young raise the "substance" of his claim to the Washington state courts, see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), but he repeatedly attempted to present to the state courts evidence of the conditions of his confinement and the quality of treatment at the Special Commitment Center. The fact that the state courts refused to receive this evidence does not render Young's claim unexhausted.
"An evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus petition is required whenever a petitioner's allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, and no state court trier of fact has, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts." Turner v. Marshall. 63 F.3d 907, 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reviewing the district court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, this court considers the following questions: (1) did Young allege facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, and (2) if so, did a state court reliably find the relevant facts.
We hold that Young alleged facts which, if proved, would establish the punitive nature of his confinement and would entitle him to relief. Young's initial allegations before the district court included the following:
-Young is subject to conditions more restrictive than those placed either on true civil commitment detainees or even those placed on state prisoners;5
-Young has been subject to such conditions for more than seven years;6
-The Special Commitment Center is located wholly within the perimeter of a larger Department of Corrections facility and relies on the Department of Corrections for a host of essential services, including library services, medical care, food, and security;7
-The conditions of confinement at the Special Commitment Center are not compatible with the Washington statute's treatment purposes;8
-The conditions and restrictions at the Special Commitment Center are not reasonably related to a legitimate non-punitive goal;9 and
-The conditions of confinement at the Special Commitment Center do not comport with substantive due process.10
In Young's motion to alter the district court's judgment denying his writ of habeas corpus, Young presented further allegations:
-Court-appointed Resident Advocate, psychologist Stanley Greenberg, concluded in his final report, "[b]ecause the SCC [Special Commitment Center] hasn't fundamentally changed over so many...
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