Young v. Wetzel
| Decision Date | 12 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 743 C.D. 2020,743 C.D. 2020 |
| Citation | 260 A.3d 281 |
| Parties | Dana YOUNG, Appellant v. John WETZEL and Department of Corrections |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Dana Young, Pro Se.
Joseph Fulginiti, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for Appellees.
BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON
Dana Young (Young), pro se , appeals from the July 2, 2020 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) sustaining preliminary objections filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) and its Secretary, John Wetzel (Wetzel) (collectively, Appellees), and dismissing Young's complaint with prejudice. Upon review, we affirm.
Young is an individual incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy. Original Record (O.R.), Complaint at 1, ¶ 1. In July 2018, the Department sent Young notice of an April 2018 data breach that may have compromised the security of his personal information, including his full name, driver's license number, home address, social security number and medical records. O.R., Complaint at 2, ¶ 4. The July 2018 notice identified Accreditation, Audit & Risk Management Security, LLC (AARMS), a vendor providing an online system utilized by the Department to conduct, manage and track audits and inspections related to accreditation and internal operations, as the target of the data breach. O.R., Complaint at 2, ¶ 6. Also in July 2018, Young's counselor1 requested the enrollment code from the notice and subsequently called a representative of the Department regarding identity protection for Young. O.R., Complaint at 2, ¶ 7. In August 2018, Young received confirmation of enrollment in MYIDcare identity protection. O.R., Complaint at 2, ¶ 8.
In April 2020, Young filed a complaint against Appellees in the trial court, alleging negligence by the Department in using AARMS as a vendor.2 O.R., Complaint at 2, ¶ 9. Young contended that the Department bore a duty to protect his personal and financial information, as such information constituted property in its care, custody and control; that the Department breached this duty by negligently and carelessly permitting AARMS to provide the online system utilized by the Department to conduct, manage and track audits and inspections related to its accreditation and internal operations; that the Department received actual knowledge and notice from AARMS of the data breach; and that the data breach has placed Young at increased and imminent risk of falling victim to the crimes of identity theft and fraud. O.R., Complaint at 3-4, ¶¶ 18-21. Young also asserted that the Department failed to safeguard his information and to prevent vulnerabilities in its computer systems—specifically, that the Department failed to properly encrypt data, establish adequate firewalls and implement adequate authentication protocols for the protection of information in its computer network. O.R., Complaint at 3, ¶¶ 11-12. Further, Young maintained that the criminal acts of a third party did not relieve the Department of its duty of care to protect his personal and financial information. O.R., Complaint at 3, ¶ 14. Young also contended that the Department's utilization of AARMS’ services constituted breach of implied contract. O.R., Complaint at 2, ¶ 9.3 Young averred that he utilized the inmate grievance system to attempt to resolve his complaint, resulting in a "final review" dated October 1, 2018. O.R., Complaint at 3, ¶ 15. Young sought damages in excess of $35,000 as well as litigation costs, exemplary damages to the extent permitted by law and such other relief as the trial court may deem just and proper. O.R., Complaint at 4.
In May 2020, Appellees filed preliminary objections to Young's complaint and requested dismissal thereof with prejudice. O.R., Preliminary Objections at 1 & 9 (citing Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(4) ).4 Appellees contended that Young's claim of negligence is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. O.R., Preliminary Objections at 1 & 3-5, ¶¶ 14-24. Appellees also asserted that Young failed to state a claim of breach of implied contract for failure to allege facts that would establish the existence of any contract between Young and the Department. O.R., Preliminary Objections at 5, ¶ 26. Further, Appellees maintained that, assuming arguendo Young established the existence of a contract between himself and the Department, such a contract would fall under the purview of the Board of Claims, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over contractual disputes between individuals and Commonwealth agencies pursuant to the Commonwealth Procurement Code, 62 Pa.C.S. §§ 101 - 2311. O.R., Preliminary Objections at 7, ¶¶ 33-35.
Appellees also objected to Young's complaint on the basis of lack of standing, contending that Young's assertions that his personal information may have been compromised and that the data breach could render him susceptible to potential identity theft and fraud fail to establish actual harm. O.R., Preliminary Objections at 7-8, ¶¶ 36-45.5
Young filed an answer to Appellees’ preliminary objections, asserting that his complaint contained specific allegations and averments of fact sufficient to enable Appellees to conduct discovery and to prepare a defense regarding Wetzel's responsibility and direct involvement in contracting with the third-party vendor that suffered the data breach. Answer to Preliminary Objections at 2, ¶ 21.
On July 2, 2020, the trial court issued an opinion and order sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissing Young's complaint with prejudice. Trial Court Op. at 1; Trial Court Order, 7/2/20. The trial court determined that sovereign immunity barred Young's negligence claim, that Young failed to plead any facts supporting the existence of a contract between himself and the Department, and that Young lacked standing to bring suit. O.R., Trial Court Op. at 3-6.6
Young thereafter appealed to this Court. Young filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) identifying the question on appeal as whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the Department's preliminary objections and dismissing with prejudice his complaint alleging negligence for the failure to protect his personal and financial information. O.R, Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal, 8/6/20. Young further asserted that he "sufficiently alleged his personal property was in the prison official's care, custody or control," such that "he is not precluded from pursuing his claim for negligence against ... Wetzel and [the Department] for breach of his property." Id.
On appeal,7 Young again argues that Appellees acted negligently in selecting a vendor that was subsequently targeted in a data breach. See id. at 8. Further, Young contends that he properly pleaded intentional tort claims that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See id. Young also asserts that sovereign immunity does not bar an action alleging negligence resulting in damage to property in the care, custody or control of prison employees or the Department, and that his personal financial information became Appellees’ responsibility upon his transfer from county to state custody. See id. at 8-9. Moreover, Young maintains that the criminal acts of the third party perpetuating the data breach did not constitute a superseding cause relieving Appellees of liability, because the data breach was foreseeable. See id. at 9-10.
Appellees repeat that Young's negligence claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; that Young fails to allege the elements of an action for breach of implied contract; that, regardless, jurisdiction over a dispute regarding such a contract would lie with the Board of Claims; and that Young lacks standing to bring his claims for failure to allege actual harm. Appellees’ Br. at 12-17.
Preliminary objections "are deemed to admit all well-pleaded material facts and any inferences reasonably deduced therefrom ...." Lennitt v. Dep't of Corr. , 964 A.2d 37, 40 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). "The Court, however, is not bound by legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion encompassed in the petition for review." Thomas v. Corbett , 90 A.3d 789, 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). "In order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them." Neely v. Dep't of Corr. , 838 A.2d 16, 19 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) ; see also Mueller v. Pa. State Police Headquarters , 110 Pa.Cmwlth. 265, 532 A.2d 900, 902 (1987) ().
"[A] party to litigation must establish as a threshold matter that he or she has standing to bring an action." Markham v. Wolf , 635 Pa. 288, 136 A.3d 134, 140 (2016). "The core concept [of standing] is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not ‘aggrieved’ thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge." Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh , 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (1975). Our Supreme Court has explained as follows:
In determining whether a party is aggrieved, courts consider whether the litigant has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the matter. To have a substantial interest, the concern in the outcome of the challenge must surpass the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law. An interest is direct if it is an...
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