Young v. Williams

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 19188,19188
• Citation: 837 P.2d 324,122 Idaho 649
• Parties: Starin YOUNG, Pauline Pardue, and Phil Young, d/b/a Young Ranch, and Fred Crabtree, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Glenn Simler and Verla Simler, husband and wife, and Dale Simler and Rozanne Simler, husband and wife, Defendants, and Roger L. WILLIAMS, Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 324

837 P.2d 324

122 Idaho 649

Starin YOUNG, Pauline Pardue, and Phil Young, d/b/a Young Ranch, and Fred Crabtree, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Glenn Simler and Verla Simler, husband and wife, and Dale Simler and Rozanne Simler, husband and wife, Defendants and Roger L. WILLIAMS, Intervenor-Appellant.

No. 19188.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Sept. 1, 1992.

Roger L. Williams, pro se.

Dennis L. Albers, Grangeville, for plaintiffs-respondents.

SILAK, Judge.

This is an appeal from a district court's imposition of sanctions under I.R.C.P. 11 against Roger Williams, the attorney for the plaintiffs in an action for a prescriptive easement. Following the plaintiffs' presentation of evidence, the court granted a motion for an involuntary dismissal and awarded attorney fees and costs against the plaintiffs. On its own initiative, the court imposed sanctions against Williams pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11. Williams appeals from this portion of the judgment arguing that Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate in this case. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Williams represented the Young family in an action for a prescriptive easement for the use of a roadway. The Youngs and the Simlers own adjoining property. In order to reach their own property, the Youngs must use a private roadway on the Simlers' property. The parties attempted to settle the case but were unable to reach mutually acceptable terms.

A trial without a jury was held on September 17, 1990. After the Youngs presented their evidence, the Simlers orally moved for involuntary dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(b), asserting that the Youngs had failed to establish a right to relief. The district court found that the Youngs failed to show that they were entitled to a prescriptive easement. Because the district court held that the Simlers had prevailed, it awarded them costs and attorney fees and ordered them to submit a cost bill.

Dale and Rozanne Simler submitted a motion for costs and attorney fees in the amount of $1,469.25. Glenn and Verla Simler submitted a motion for costs and attorney fees in the amount of $2,805. The Youngs objected to the motions on the basis that the attorney fees were excessive. On October 29, 1990, the district court held a hearing ¹ and awarded attorney fees to the Simlers. The court also ruled that the Youngs and Williams were to be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the fees.

On November 14, 1990, the district court entered a written judgment in which it stated:

After this matter was submitted to argument on Monday, October 29, 1990, the Court, on its own motion, considered the applicability of sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney Roger L. Williams. After reviewing the evidence, the Court has concluded that Mr. Williams pursued this case unreasonably, frivolously and without foundation, in that he pursued plaintiffs' cause of action seeking to obtain an easement by prescription, although [he] was allowed an opportunity to amend his pleadings before trial in order to set forth alternate theories of relief. It is the conclusion of the court that, based upon the evidence now submitted, this decision was not attributable to any input on the part of the plaintiffs, and instead was the exclusive responsibility of Mr. Williams. This decision to proceed to trial upon the single theory of easement by prescription will, in the opinion of the Court, cause unreasonable delay and additional litigation. For this reason, the Court feels that the Judgment in the form of attorney fees and costs which is awarded herein against plaintiffs, and in favor of defendants, shall be the joint and several obligations of plaintiffs and their attorney Roger L. Williams.

The court then allowed Williams seven days to show cause why the judgment should not be against him personally.

Williams timely filed an objection to the proposed judgment. On December 6, 1990, the district court held a hearing at which Williams testified in support of his position. Williams explained that the parties had attended court-supervised settlement conferences but that the settlement had fallen through. Williams further explained that he had considered alternative theories suggested by the court but had concluded that the facts did not support a claim for a negative reciprocal easement or a claim for private condemnation. Williams stated that his clients had used the road in question to take cattle to their ranch for many years. He also explained that, according to Starin Young's uncontroverted testimony, the Simlers' land had improvements on it; because the land was improved, the presumption arises that the Youngs' use of the road was adverse. Based on this, Williams argued that the district court erred in making its factual findings and legal holdings.

At the hearing on December 6, 1990, the Youngs were represented by their new attorney. Starin Young, Pauline Pardue and Phil Young submitted affidavits regarding their participation in the case. Phil Young stated that he had met with Williams once for a settlement conference. He stated that Williams had not contacted him in preparation for the trial. He also stated that there was never any discussion regarding alternative theories that may have been available to claim an easement. Pauline Pardue made a similar statement and noted that she would have testified "concerning a long uninterrupted use of the road." She also stated that she expected that the entire fee for securing the prescriptive easement would have been between $400 and $450. She further claimed that Williams never discussed with her the risks involved in the action.

Starin Young's affidavit established the fact that he told Williams that the Young family had used the road for several years and that Williams had met several times with Starin regarding the case. Starin stated:

That, your affiant [Starin Young] was generally the spokesman for the Young family and had most of the conversations with Roger Williams. That, your affiant initially contacted Roger Williams and told him about the subject road and the fact that the Young family had used the road across the Simler property for years. That, Roger Williams responded after hearing that initial information that he could secure a prescriptive easement from the Young family without a problem from $400 to $450 attorney's fees. That, as the case progressed your affiant had several meetings with Roger Williams, wherein various proposals were discussed to settle the case, but never was there any discussion about an alternate claim of private condemnation in the event that the claim of a prescriptive easement was unsuccessful. That Roger Williams essentially always reiterated that there would simply be "no problem" in securing a prescriptive easement.

That, prior to the trial your affiant contacted Roger Williams and was expecting to provide him names of witnesses who could establish the fact that the road had been used a long time by the Young family and other homesteaders in the area of Pardee. That, your affiant was told by Roger Williams that that would be unnecessary and that it would do no good. Your affiant was surprised, but relied upon that counsel.

In an order dated January 28, 1991, the district court reaffirmed its imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, stating:

This matter came before the Court on a show cause order directing counsel for Plaintiffs to show cause why Rule 11(a)(1) sanctions should not be imposed.

After considering the matters raised at trial along with post trial affidavits and argument, it is the conclusion of this Court that litigative misconduct did occur within the overall course of the trial to justify said sanctions. It is clear that counsel did not make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether or not the allegations in the complaint were well grounded in fact or whether or not the relief requested was warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification thereof.

Based upon the foregoing, the judgment previously entered herein shall remain in full force and effect.

Williams filed a timely appeal from this order, and asserts that the district court should not have awarded attorney fees and costs against him pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1).

As a preliminary matter, we note our standard of review on appeal. The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in concluding that Williams failed to meet the affirmative duty placed upon him by I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) to make reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case, and to certify that the cause of action was well grounded in fact and that the cause of action is warranted by existing law. An appellate court should apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a district court's Rule 11 determination. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) ²; Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2460. When we review a lower court's decision under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the sequence of our inquiry is: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000; Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App.1987).

The focus of Rule 11 is to prevent pleading abuses. It states:

Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions.--Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed...