Young v. Young
| Decision Date | 24 October 1979 |
| Citation | 376 So.2d 737 |
| Parties | Betty Sue YOUNG v. George L. YOUNG. Civ. 1955. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
T. J. Carnes, of Carnes & Carnes, Albertville, for appellant.
James D. Walker, Albertville, for appellee.
This is a child support case.
The former wife filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Marshall County seeking an increase in the husband's child support obligations as set forth in the prior divorce decree. The trial court, after an Ore tenus hearing, increased the amount of child support from $60 every two weeks to $75 every two weeks. Computing this on a monthly basis, the husband's obligations were increased from $130 to $162.50 per month. The wife appeals.
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred to reversal in failing to award a more substantial increase in child support. We affirm.
The record reveals the following: The parties were divorced on January 25, 1974. The wife was awarded custody of the two minor children of the marriage who, at the time were twelve and eight years of age. An agreement between the parties calling for the husband to pay $60 every two weeks in child support was incorporated into the decree of divorce.
In 1974, the husband's income was $456 per month. At the time of the hearing on the petition to modify the husband's income had increased to $1,260 per month gross, or $907 per month take home pay. The husband put forth evidence of monthly living expenses totaling $753. When the $130 per month child support obligation existing at that time is also computed, the husband's recurring monthly obligations totaled $883.
The wife testified she had very recently changed jobs. At her previous employment she grossed $600 per month. She had only received one pay check from her new position, which paid on a percentage of sales basis, and this amounted to $120 take home pay for two weeks work. She testified as to her monthly living expenses which totaled in excess of $800 per month.
The mother bottomed her petition to modify upon the premise that the child support awarded in the original decree had become inadequate due to inflation and the increased age of the minor children. As indicated, the learned trial judge granted the petition, raising the child support payments some $30 per month.
At the outset, we note that a trial court's modification of a prior decree for child support, because of changed circumstances of the parties, is a matter within that court's discretion. We will not reverse on review unless the trial court's determination is so unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong. Bill v. Bill, Ala.Civ.App., 370 So.2d 1023 (1979).
This court has committed itself to the principles that the increase in age of minor children and the correlative increase in need for support, when coupled with the increase in the cost of living due to inflation, is sufficient to constitute a material change of circumstances and support a modification. Howard v. Howard, 53 Ala.App. 426, 301 So.2d 191 (1974); Jones v. Jones, 53 Ala.App. 309, 299 So.2d 751 (1974).
This being so, on the above facts, there was no error in increasing the husband's obligation. However, the wife asks us to reverse, claiming the increase was insufficient to meet the children's needs.
While agreeing that $162 per month is hardly sufficient to provide all the needs of two teen-aged children, we cannot in this instance say that the trial judge abused his discretion. Although the trial court's primary consideration was properly the best interest and welfare of the children, he nevertheless could not ignore the ability of the father to pay in fashioning his judgment. Howard v. Howard, supra.
In neither Howard nor Jones, where we cited the age and inflation factor in upholding more substantial increases in child support awards, did we have before us a record such as we have today. Indeed, in Jones, we noted the record was totally devoid of any evidence indicating an...
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