Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Summit v. Board of Adjustment of City of Summit
| Decision Date | 18 April 1975 |
| Citation | 341 A.2d 356,134 N.J.Super. 384 |
| Parties | YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF SUMMIT, New Jersey, a New Jersey corporation, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF the CITY OF SUMMIT and Martin J. Egan, Building Inspector of the City of Summit, Defendants. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Kenneth R. Johanson, Newark, for plaintiff (Bourne & Noll, Summit, attorneys).
Arthur P. Condon, Summit, for defendants.
Plaintiff Young Women's Christian Association of Summit is the owner of premises located in the R--15 single-family district of Summit, as established under its zoning ordinance adopted June 5, 1968, as amended. The Association has been authorized by the Division of Youth and Family Services of New Jersey to operate a group home on the premises for not more than ten adolescent girls to be referred there by the Division.
In November 1974 a local citizens' group filed an application with the board of adjustment seeking an interpretation of the zoning ordinance and a declaration that plaintiff's proposed use of the premises would be in violation of the ordinance.
A hearing was conducted and on February 3, 1975 the board adopted a resolution declaring the proposed use to be in violation of the zoning ordinance and directing the building inspector to refuse to issue a certificate of occupancy. Based upon that resolution the building inspector refused to issue the certificate by letter dated February 18, 1975.
Plaintiff thereupon filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs asking this court to (1) declare the board's resolution of February 3, 1975 void; (2) declare the proposed use of the premises to be permitted under the ordinance; (3) enjoin the board from taking any further action to prevent the use of the premises as a group home, and (4) direct the building inspector to issue a certificate of occupancy for use of the premises for that purpose.
The facts are not in dispute and the matter is now before the court on a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff contends that the board lacked jurisdiction to grant the applicants the relief requested under both the enabling state legislation and the provisions of the ordinance. This court accepts the correctness of that position.
Our State Constitution grants to the Legislature the power to enact legislation enabling municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances. N.J.Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VI, par. 2; N.J.S.A. 40:55--30 Et seq. Under the enabling legislation a board of adjustment is a 'statutory, quasi-judicial body whose powers and jurisdiction are specified and strictly delimited by N.J.S.A. 40:55--39.' Auciello v. Stauffer, 58 N.J.Super. 522, 527, 156 A.2d 732, 735 (App.Div.1959).
The resolution passed by the Summit Board of Adjustment on February 3, 1975 includes the finding that the matter came before the board by application pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55--39(a) and (b), which read as follows:
The board of adjustment shall have the power to:
a. Hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by an administrative official or agency based on or made in the enforcement of the zoning ordinance.
b. Hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any such ordinance, requests for special exceptions or for interpretation of the map or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is authorized by any such ordinance to pass.
Because the building inspector's denial of plaintiff's request for a certificate of occupancy was based entirely on the resolution of the board directing him to do so, the application by the citizens' group could not properly have been considered an appeal from his decision, and N.J.S.A. 40:55--39(a) accordingly can have no effect here. Counsel for the board contends that the strongest basis for its jurisdiction flows from the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55--39(b) empowering the board to hear and decide 'special questions upon which such board is authorized by any such ordinance to pass.' The strength of that contention however, hinges upon the validity of the authorization provided in the ordinance.
Section 12.0 of the zoning ordinance reads as follows:
Pursuant to the Statute quoted in this Appendix, the Board of Adjustment is empowered to act on (a) errors, (b) conditional permits (special exceptions) and interpretations of this Ordinance, (c) hardship variances, and (d) use variances, and to adopt its own rules of procedure.
A subsequent provision § 12.5, is entitled 'Powers of the Board of Adjustment' and repeats the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55--39. There is no language interrelating the two provisions. The language in controversy is contained in § 12.0 authorizing the board to interpret its own ordinance.
Plaintiff challenges only the power of the board to issue an 'interpretative decision' construing the ordinance in such a way as to exclude the use proposed for their premises. They do not directly attack the validity of the ordinance. Because zoning ordinances are to be liberally construed by the courts in favor of the municipality, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VII, par. 11, and because the issue is not dispositive of this case, this court offers no conclusion as to the ability of the particular language to withstand constitutional attack.
The interpretation of an ordinance is a purely legal matter, clearly not treated as such by the board. Moreover, that body had no authority to issue a directive to the building inspector, and all the more so when issued as part of a resolution in the form of a pseudo-declaratory judgment which this court finds was beyond its purview. This court has and will exercise the power to interpret the ordinance, because the meaning of its provisions raises questions which are peculiarly suited to judicial treatment, rather than to disposition by an administrative board in a quasi-judicial function. The court's authority is not curtailed by the circumstances under which the matter reaches it. Jantausch v. Verona, 41 N.J.Super. 89, 96, 124 A.2d 14 (Law Div.1956), aff'd 24 N.J. 326, 131 A.2d 881 (1957).
To say that the board lacked power to construe the ordinance...
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