Youngbear v. Brewer

Decision Date25 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. C 75-62.,C 75-62.
Citation415 F. Supp. 807
PartiesEllsworth YOUNGBEAR, Petitioner, v. Lou V. BREWER, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Robert N. Clinton, Iowa City, Iowa, Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., John M. Thompson, Iowa City, Iowa, for petitioner.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Thomas D. McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for respondent.

Evan Hultman, U. S. Atty., N. D. Iowa, Waterloo, Iowa, Herbert Becker, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Div., Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae U. S.

A. John Wabaunsee, Richard B. Collins, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo., Merle L. Royce, Marshalltown, Iowa, for amicus curiae Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi In Iowa.

ORDER

McMANUS, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on petitioner's resisted motion for partial summary judgment, filed January 27, 1976.

Petitioner Ellsworth Youngbear commenced this action for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that he is being held in custody by the State of Iowa in violation of the United States Constitution. Specifically, petitioner avers that he was denied certain constitutional rights during the course of his trial and conviction for second degree murder in the Iowa District Court in and for Tama County. Petitioner moves for summary judgment with respect to one of these contentions only, to-wit, that the Iowa District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged.1

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder for the slaying of one Vincent Lasley on the Sac and Fox Indian Settlement in Tama County, Iowa. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, specifically rejecting inter alia the contention of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Youngbear, 229 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1975). A petition for writ of certiorari was sought and denied. Exhaustion of all available state remedies appears to have been completed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

Summary judgment may be granted in an action for writ of habeas corpus if the requirements of Rule 56, FRCP, are otherwise satisfied. Bowdidge v. Lehman, 252 F.2d 366, 368 (6th Cir. 1958); In re McShane's Petition, 235 F.Supp. 262, 266 (N.D.Miss.1964); see Rule 81(a)(2), FRCP; Schnepp v. Hocker, 429 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1970); Kleinhans v. Cady, 314 F.Supp. 1276, 1278 (W.D.Wis.1970).

Under Rule 56, FRCP, summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Hospers Packing Co., Inc., 363 F.Supp. 697, 698 (N.D.Iowa 1973).

No genuine issue as to any material fact remains concerning the jurisdictional question upon which summary judgment is sought. The record clearly establishes, and the Iowa Supreme Court so found, 229 N.W.2d at 732, that the defendant and the deceased victim were full-blooded Sac and Fox Indians. There is no dispute that the killing occurred on the Sac and Fox Indian Settlement near Tama, in Tama County, Iowa.

This settlement is "Indian Country" within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.2 The determination of whether lands are considered "Indian Country" does not turn on the label used in designating them, United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410 (1938), nor on the manner in which the lands in question were acquired. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962); United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971). Rather the test is whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples. See McGowan, supra 302 U.S. at 538, 58 S.Ct. 286; Martine, supra at 1023-1024. This court concurs with the Iowa Supreme Court, 229 N.W.2d at 732, that under the principles espoused above, the Sac and Fox Settlement in Tama County meets the statutory definition of "Indian Country."

Thus the undisputed facts establish that the alleged slaying of an Indian was committed by another Indian within Indian Country. The question posed is whether the State of Iowa has jurisdiction to try the accused for murder in the courts of that State. This is solely a legal question, and it is the view of the court that petitioner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The State of Iowa and the Iowa Supreme Court relied upon the provisions of Act of June 30, 1948, Ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161, Pub.L. No. 846, as a grant of jurisdiction to the courts of Iowa over the crime of murder. That statute reads:

An Act . . . That jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the State of Iowa over offenses committed by or against Indians on the Sac and Fox Indian Reservation in that State to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction generally over offenses committed within said State outside of any Indian reservation: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations. (Emphasis added.)

The Iowa High Court viewed the language of Pub.L. 846 as clear and unambiguous, and applied what it considered the plain meaning of the statute without resorting to legislative history or other rules of statutory interpretation. The court noted that in 1948, the date of enactment of Pub.L. 846, as well as thereafter, the State courts of Iowa exercised general criminal jurisdiction within the State over the crime of murder. See Ch. 690, Code of Iowa (1973). The court concluded that the State of Iowa was thus granted criminal jurisdiction over all offenses, including murder, with the proviso reserving concurrent jurisdiction in the Federal government over certain offenses. 229 N.W.2d 732-733.

A general rule of statutory construction is that a statute which is unambiguous on its face and capable of only one meaning is to be given that meaning, and extrinsic aids to interpretation need not be utilized. Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 514 F.2d 134, 140 (8th Cir. 1975); United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Bedell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 506 F.2d 174, 178-179 (1974); Kansas City v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 310 F.2d 271, 273-274 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912, 83 S.Ct. 256, 9 L.Ed.2d 171. The legislative will is the controlling factor, and that will is generally to be determined from the language of an unambiguous statute, giving the terms their ordinary and customary meaning. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571-572, 86 S.Ct. 1030, 16 L.Ed.2d 102 (1966); Bowie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362-363, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964); United States v. Freeman, 473 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1973).

Here, however, it is the view of the court that the language of Pub.L. 846 is not clear and unambiguous, and that a proper interpretation of the statute would lead to a result contrary to that reached by the Iowa Supreme Court. Of primary concern to the court is the impact of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, the Federal Major Crimes Act, on the interpretation to be given the proviso in Pub.L. 846, and the concomitant effect on interpreting the statute as a whole.

The Federal Major Crimes Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, provides in relevant part:

Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who had not attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

This statute was initially passed3 in response to the decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), wherein the United States Supreme Court declared that the jurisdiction of the United States Courts, being courts of limited jurisdiction, had not been extended to crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian of the same tribe on an Indian reservation. Shortly after its enactment, the Federal Major Crimes Act was interpreted as granting the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated therein. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 377-378, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886). Accord, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 n. 5, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1958); Seymour, supra 368 U.S. at 352, 359, 82 S.Ct. 424; Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209-210, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973); City of New Town, North Dakota v. United States, 454 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1972).

The proviso appended to Pub.L. 846 states "that nothing herein contained shall deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations." Clearly this clause refers to the crimes defined in the Federal Major Crimes Act. As indicated above, jurisdiction over these offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 is vested exclusively in the Federal courts.

Therein lies the ambiguity in Pub.L. 846. The first section of the statute purports to grant general criminal jurisdiction to the courts of Iowa to the same extent that criminal jurisdiction is exercised elsewhere in the State. But that jurisdiction is then limited by the proviso, which prohibits the Act from depriving the United States courts of jurisdiction exercised under 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The State argues that the proviso only retains concurrent jurisdiction in the Federal courts over...

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