Youngblood v. Colvin, Case No. 13-CV-209-JPS
| Decision Date | 04 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-CV-209-JPS |
| Parties | JACQUELINE YOUNGBLOOD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
On February 27, 2013, the plaintiff, Jacqueline Youngblood, filed her complaint in this case, appealing the decision of Administrative Law Judge Margaret O'Grady ("the ALJ"), which found Ms. Youngblood not disabled and, therefore, denied her request for Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid. (Docket #1). Ms. Youngblood filed a brief in support of her position, whereafter the Commissioner moved to remand the case for further proceedings. (Docket #15, #16). Ms. Youngblood responded to the Commissioner's motion arguing that, instead of remanding the case, the Court should find her disabled and order that she be awarded benefits. (Docket #18). This led to some confusion amongst the parties and the Court, as each attempted to make sense of how to proceed when the Commissioner, herself, was requesting remand. The Court issued an order reversing and remanding the case to the Commissioner, which it later vacated. (Docket #21, #31). It then requested additional briefing from the parties, which is now complete. (Docket #31, #32, #33, #34, #35).
The parties agree that the ALJ erred. In fact, as already mentioned, the Commissioner readily acknowledges that error and requests that the Court simply remand the case. (E.g. Docket #33, at 9-10). The Commissioner assuresthe Court that, upon remand, the Appeals Council will refer the case to an ALJ to gather additional evidence, re-weigh the medical opinions, and reevaluate whether Ms. Youngblood's impairments meet Listing 12.05. (Docket #33, at 9).1 Ms. Youngblood, meanwhile, maintains that the Court must reverse and remand this case for an award of benefits. (E.g. Docket #32, at 8-9). She asserts that she meets every requirement of Listing 12.05C, that the record can support only that conclusion, and, therefore, that the Court must order that she be awarded benefits. (Docket #32, at 8-9).
Thus, rather than deciding whether the ALJ erred warranting a remand, as the Court is normally called upon to do in Social Security cases, the Court's task here is only to determine whether Ms. Youngblood so clearly satisfies Listing 12.05C that the Court should order that she be awarded benefits. In other words, the only issue at this point is whether an award of benefits or a remand for further proceedings is appropriate.
"An award of benefits is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the 'record can yield but one supportable conclusion.'" Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993)). This is Ms. Youngblood's burden to establish. Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1514; Howell v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 343, 348 (7th Cir.1991)). Thus, to be entitled to the relief she requests, Ms. Youngblood must show that the record establishes only one supportable conclusion: that she meets every requirement of Listing 12.05C.
Listing 12.05C has four requirements: "(1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period before age 22; (3) a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of sixty through seventy; and (4) a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function." Adkins v. Astrue, 226 F. App'x 600, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2007) ; see also Charette v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 551, 553 (7th Cir. 2013). Ms. Youngblood must show that the record supports each of those requirements; failure to show even one means that the Court must remand this case for further proceedings.
The first two requirements—significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning—are sometimes listed and addressed together, because both are taken from Listing 12.05's introductory language, whereas the remaining two requirements are specific to subsection C of Listing 12.05. See, e.g., Grasso v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-112, 2013 WL 4046338 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 2013) () (citing Charette, 508 F. App'x at 553; Thackery v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-1488, 2013 WL 1319595, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013); Lakes v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-3592, 2013 WL 623022, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2013); Witt v. Barnhart, 446 F. Supp. 2d 886, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2006)); Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 2012) (); Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing Listing 12.05's introductory paragraph).
The Court will, therefore, address those two requirements together, although the majority of the Court's discussion focuses on the latter. In fact, the Court will assume that Ms. Youngblood has established that she suffers from significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. There is a good deal of evidence that would support that conclusion. On the other hand, the question of whether there is evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested before age 22 is much closer.
In support of her argument that the record clearly establishes adaptive functioning deficits prior to age 22, Ms. Youngblood cites to two portions of the record: Transcript Page 264 and Transcript Page 29.2 (Docket #32, at 3 (citing Tr. 264, 29)). Transcript Page 264 is a page from a form titled "Psychiatric Review Technique," which was completed by Keith Bauer, Ph.D. (Tr. 260-273 ). The page, itself, includes only a checkbox of Listing 12.05, on which Dr. Bauer checked that Ms. Youngblood suffered from significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning manifested prior to age 22 and had received a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70. (Tr. 264). A majority of the remaining pages in this form are blank. (See Tr. 260-273). On some, Dr. Bauer checked boxes regarding Ms. Youngblood's degree of limitation. (See Tr. 11). However, other than Dr. Bauer's conclusions, there is nothing in the form inthe way of discussion or evidence that Ms. Youngblood does, indeed, suffer from significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning manifested prior to age 22. (Tr. 260-273).
Transcript Page 29 is not much different. It is a single-page form titled "Disability Determination and Transmittal,"signed by Jack Spear, Ph.D., and Robert T. Callear, M.D., on which the doctors gave Ms. Youngblood a secondary diagnosis of "Mild Mental Retardation." (Tr. 29). Other than having checked other coded boxes and having provided an unrelated primary diagnosis, the doctors did not provide any other information on this form. (Tr. 29). There is nothing, whatsoever, that specifically addresses Ms. Youngblood's adaptive functioning deficits prior to age 22. (Tr. 29).3
In her reply, Ms. Youngblood adds to her discussion the opinion of William Nimmer, Ph.D., which she argues establishes her mental retardation. (E.g., Docket #34, at 1-2 (citing Tr. 251-52)). And there is no doubt that Dr. Nimmer did diagnose Ms. Youngblood with mild mental retardation. (Tr. 251 ()). However, as with the opinion signed by Drs. Spear and Callear, this conclusion does not address, specifically, Ms. Youngblood's adaptive functioning deficits prior to age 22.
As the Court already mentioned, it is Ms. Youngblood's burden to establish that the record can support only one conclusion: that an award of benefits is appropriate. See, e.g., Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 356 (quoting Campbell, 988 F.2d at 744); Allord, 631 F.3d at 416 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1514; Howell, 950 F.2d at 348).
Ms. Youngblood has not carried that burden. Most of the evidence that Ms. Youngblood relies on to establish the intellectual and adaptive functioning requirements—specifically the reports of Dr. Nimmer and Drs. Spear and Callear—do not fully support her contention. Indeed, at best, those reports establish mental retardation. That fact would certainly go to Ms. Youngblood's general intellectual functioning, but would not address her general adaptive functioning prior to age 22.
Meanwhile, her strongest piece of evidence—Dr. Bauer's report, in which he checked a box indicating that Ms. Youngblood suffers from significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with adaptive functioning limitations manifested prior to age 22—while constituting a definite opinion, is not supported by significant evidence. Moreover, it is called into question by Dr. Nimmer's report, which includes substantial amounts of information that would support a conclusion that she does not suffer from adaptive functioning limitations that manifested prior to age 22.
There is no specific definition for the term "deficits in adaptive functioning," but the Seventh Circuit has found it to "denote[ ] inability to cope with the challenges of ordinary everyday life." Novy v. Astrue, 497 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2007). As the Seventh Circuit noted, "[i]f you cannot cope with those challenges, you are not going to be able to hold down a full-time job." Id. In Novy, the evidence established that the claimant lived on her own, cared for children, paid her bills, and avoided eviction, and therefore did not suffer from adaptive functioning deficits. Id. There is no precise legal test to determine whether deficits in adaptive functioning exist; rather, the factfinder must consider the claimant's ability "to cope with the challenges of daily life." See Charette, 508 F....
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