Youngblood v. Gates, No. B002438

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ROTHMAN; McCLOSKY; GEORGE
• Citation: 246 Cal.Rptr. 775,200 Cal.App.3d 1302
• Parties: Isaac B. YOUNGBLOOD, and Elsa Kievitz, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Daryl GATES, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Decision Date: 04 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. B002438

Page 775

246 Cal.Rptr. 775 200 Cal.App.3d 1302 Isaac B. YOUNGBLOOD, and Elsa Kievitz, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Daryl GATES, et al., Defendants and Appellants. No. B002438. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California. May 4, 1988.
Review Denied Aug. 18, 1988.

[200 Cal.App.3d 1307]

Page 776

James K. Hahn, City Atty., Lewis N. Unger and Byron R. Boeckman, Asst. City Attys., and Linda K. Lefkowitz, Deputy City Atty., for defendants and appellants.

John Hagar, Marina Del Rey and Paul L. Hoffman, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and respondents.

ROTHMAN, Associate Justice. ^*

In this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against a number of governmental entities and individuals in their official capacities, ¹ plaintiffs allege that persons arrested in the City of Los Angeles are not being arraigned before a magistrate without "unnecessary delay" in violation of constitutional and statutory requirements. They further challenge the conditions of pre-arraignment confinement in city jails, including deprivation of visitation rights, reading materials, recreational opportunities,[200 Cal.App.3d 1308] and proper hygiene. Finally, the complaint charged the city with inadequate identification and treatment of mentally ill arrestees.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 7, 1977, Isaac Youngblood, an indigent being held in pre-arraignment confinement as a result of arrest by Los Angeles police officers, together with individual taxpayers, filed a class action. Their complaint underwent several amendments. A second class action suit by other individuals raising similar issues was filed November 7, 1980. On February 9, 1981, these two actions were ordered consolidated for the purpose of trial.

A court trial began on October 25, 1982, and concluded on December 10, 1982. The court heard many witnesses, received hundreds of exhibits, and visited jail facilities operated by the City of Los Angeles.

On March 9, 1983, the court filed a 96-page memorandum opinion. This opinion was later revised and became the court's statement of decision. Judgment was filed on September 6, 1983, and timely notice of appeal by all parties followed.

The appeals from those portions of the judgment affecting the municipal court and the sheriff's department were later abandoned, as was the appeal taken by respondents, plaintiffs below. The remaining appeal concerns only those portions of the judgment affecting the operations of the Los Angeles Police Department.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The following issues are raised in this appeal:

1. The meaning of the maximum "two day" delay provision of Penal Code section 825;

2. Whether certain practices of the Los Angeles Police constitute "unnecessary delay" within the maximum two day provision;

Page 777

3. The propriety of certain policies for treatment of pre-arraignment arrestees in Los Angeles City jails.

DISCUSSION

I. ARRAIGNMENT DELAY

Included in the Constitutional right of an accused person to a speedy and public trial (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) is the [200 Cal.App.3d 1309] right of a person in police custody to be promptly brought before a magistrate and formally charged. To this end, article I, section 14 of the California Constitution requires: "A person charged with a felony by complaint ... shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate...." Further, Penal Code section 849, subdivision (a) provides: "When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private person, the person arrested, if not otherwise released, shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate...."

The right to a speedy appearance before a magistrate is implemented by Penal Code section 825: "The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays; provided, however, that when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, such time shall be extended to include the duration of the next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following."

The trial court was called upon to rule on two aspects of the right to be brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay": (a) the meaning of the "two day" outer limit established by Penal Code section 825 and, (b) unnecessary delays within the "two day" period.

A. Meaning of the Two-Day Rule

The Los Angeles Police Department has established guidelines, referred to as the "due-out schedule," regarding the maximum two-day period set out in Penal Code section 825. (See Exhibit 8 in the trial, which we have reproduced here in the Appendix to this opinion.) According to appellants, this schedule is used by Los Angeles police officers to determine the maximum time by which an in-custody arrestee must be arraigned, and assumes that the maximum arraignment time under Penal Code section 825 is to be calculated from the precise time of an individual's arrest, rather than the calendar date of arrest. The city interprets "two days" as "48 hours."

After careful analysis of all the applicable authorities, the trial court concluded: "the LAPD interpretation is in error. The correct rule is that a defendant arrested at any time on one day must be arraigned on the second court day thereafter." In essence, the trial court gave a strict construction to the words "two days" in the statute. We agree.

While the distinction might seem minor, the difference between the two interpretations posed in this case can be significant, as illustrated in this example: if the accused is arrested at 11 p.m. on Thursday, under the Los [200 Cal.App.3d 1310] Angeles Police Department "due-out schedule," he or she is "due out" to court by next Tuesday at 4 p.m. This calculation can be explained as follows:

Thursday: 11 p.m.--arrest.

Friday: 11 p.m. equals 24 hours.

Saturday: This day is excluded as a municipal court "holiday" pursuant to Government Code section 71345.

Sunday: This day is excluded by Penal Code section 825.

Monday: 48 hours expires at 11 p.m. Since court is not in session at 11 p.m., the schedule gives the police until the end of the next court day.

Tuesday: Must be arraigned by the close of court at 4 p.m. during this day.

By contrast, under the trial court's interpretation of the "two day" rule, the first court day following the arrest would be Friday, and the arrestee would have to be arraigned sometime during the second court day--Monday--rather than Tuesday. The effect of the Los Angeles Police Department

Page 778

guidelines is an expansion of permissible custodial time before arraignment.

This expansion of time is contrary to the clear language of Penal Code section 825. That section expressly requires that an arrestee be arraigned within "two days" and not "48 hours." This is not simply a legislative oversight as the Legislature has used the term "48 hours" rather than "two days" when it wished to do so. ² In addition, when the Legislature amended Penal Code section 825 in 1961, instead of then changing the language to "48 hours," it reused the words "two days" in the amendment. "It is assumed that the Legislature has in mind existing laws when it passes a statute. [Citations.] 'The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.' [Citations.]" (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837-838, 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874; Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977, 140 Cal.Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394.)

[200 Cal.App.3d 1311] For this court to replace the words "two days" in Penal Code section 825 with the words "48 hours" would amount to a "judicial amendment" where the Legislature has not so amended this statute. This is not our function. "In the absence of compelling countervailing considerations, we must assume that the Legislature 'knew what it was saying and meant what it said.' [Citation.]" (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764, 150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227.)

There are no "compelling countervailing considerations" in the instant case, and, in light of settled case authority on the subject of prearraignment delay, Penal Code section 825 must be interpreted to avoid expansion of custodial time. In People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 60, 59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137, the Supreme Court held that: "The principal purposes of the requirement of prompt arraignment are to prevent secret police interrogation, to place the issue of probable cause for the arrest before a judicial officer, to provide the defendant with full advice as to his rights and an opportunity to have counsel appointed, and to enable him to apply for bail or for habeas corpus when necessary."

The right to be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay is fundamental. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said for the court in McNabb v. United States (1943) 318 U.S. 332, 343, 63 S.Ct. 608, 614, 87 L.Ed. 819:

"The purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement [requiring arrested persons to be promptly taken before a committing authority] of criminal procedure is plain. A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process.... Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary."

Moreover, in previous cases, the California Supreme Court has expressly applied a two calendar day rule in computing the permissible time before arraignment under Penal Code section 825. In one example, People v. Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d 32, 59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 429...