Youngblood v. Rotor Aids, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-784,85-784
• Citation: 491 So.2d 132
• Parties: Yvonne YOUNGBLOOD, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Son, Michael Youngblood, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROTOR AIDS, INC., Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, and Evergreen Helicopter Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 132

491 So.2d 132

Yvonne YOUNGBLOOD, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Son, Michael Youngblood, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROTOR AIDS, INC., Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, and Evergreen Helicopter Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-784.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

June 25, 1986.

Fuhrer, Flournoy & Hunter, George Flournoy, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles Foret of Jeansonne, Briney, Lafayette, for defendants-appellees.

Before FORET, PLANCHARD, ^* and McNULTY, ^* JJ.

FORET, Judge.

This suit was brought by plaintiff, Yvonne Youngblood, widow of Dalton R. Youngblood, individually and as tutrix of her minor son, Michael (who was 16 years of age at the time of his father's death, but who reached the age of majority on September 25, 1983), for worker's compensation death benefits as a result of the death of Dalton R. Youngblood against defendants, Rotor Aids, Inc. (Rotor Aids), Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company (Wausau), and Evergreen Helicopter Company, Inc. (Evergreen). After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment denying benefits, finding that decedent suffered from "significant cardiovascular disease." Plaintiff has appealed from that decision. The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether or not decedent's heart attack was causally related to occupational stress.

FACTS

Dalton R. Youngblood died of a heart attack on July 9, 1982, while employed as a helicopter pilot by Rotor Aids. He was 49 years old and a Viet Nam veteran. Youngblood had been working for Rotor Aids since 1976. He worked seven days on and seven days off. During the seven days on, he was on 24-hour call and lived in a trailer provided by his employer. Youngblood's work duties entailed ferrying passengers and cargo from Rotor Aids' base, near Intracostal City, to offshore oil platforms. He averaged five air hours per day ¹.

In September of 1981, Youngblood slipped on an offshore helipad and injured his back, requiring surgery in March, 1982 ². After convalescing for more than two months, he returned to work in early June, 1982. Youngblood was required to wear a back brace; therefore, Rotor Aids did not want him to fly the ferry helicopters because passengers were reluctant to fly with a man in a brace. Rotor Aids assigned Youngblood to maintenance flights and clerical duty.

Youngblood worked one complete hitch and four days of the second hitch before suffering a fatal heart attack. During the first hitch, decedent was goaded frequently and seriously by fellow pilots because they claimed decedent "was drawing full pay, but not carrying his load." The day before his fatal heart attack, decedent flew his first maintenance flight since his surgery in March, 1982.

The death certificate indicates the autopsy revealed atherosclerosis, 90% thickening of the left coronary artery and scarring of the left ventricular wall.

HAS CLAIMANT'S BURDEN UNDER LA.R.S. 23:1031

BEEN CARRIED?

"The requirements for a successful claim for worker's compensation as set out in La.R.S. 23:1031 are as follows:

If an employee ... receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the amounts, on the conditions, and to the person or persons hereinafter designated. (Emphasis supplied.)"

Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626, 628 (La.1982).

The first prong of La.R.S. 23:1031 dictates that "an accident occurs in the course of employment when it happens during the time of employment and at a place contemplated by the employment." Guidry, id. and cases cited therein.

There is no question that the heart attack occurred "in the course of" Youngblood's employment. Decedent was on 24-hour call and lived in a trailer provided by his employer. Although he was granted permission to take July 9 off, he was undisputably engaging in an authorized rest period. Guidry, supra; Smith v. Walker, 35 So.2d 766 (La.App. 2 Cir.1948); St. Alexandre v. Texas Company, 28 So.2d 385 (La.App.Orl.Cir.1946). Not having a heart attack during regular daytime working hours does not preclude an award of benefits. Neelley v. New Orleans Shipyard, Inc., 463 So.2d 32 (La.App. 5 Cir.1985); Barnes v. City of New Orleans, 322 So.2d 821 (La.App. 4 Cir.1975), writ refused, 325 So.2d 584 (La.1976); Wood v. Amstar Corp., 380 So.2d 735 (La.App. 4 Cir.1980). Thus, the first prong of R.S. 23:1031 has been satisfied.

The second prong requires that the accident "arise out of the employment." "Arise out of the employment" has been interpreted to require "the accident's being the result of some risk to which the employee is subjected in the course of his employment and to which he would not have been subjected had he not been so employed." Guidry, supra, at 628. Additionally, "this risk of employment from which injury resulted should be one greater than that occasioned by a person not engaged in the employment." Guidry, supra, at 629 ³.

Heart attacks satisfy the statutory requirement of personal injury by accident. Guidry, supra, and cases cited therein. Although heart attacks are partly related to the employee's personal physical condition, they are nevertheless personal injury by accident. Additionally, an employer must "take a worker as he finds him." Behan v. John B. Honor Company, Ltd., 143 La. 348, 78 So. 589 (1918); Chism v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 332 So.2d 784 (La.1976); Guidry, supra.

A heart accident must be causally related in part, however slight, to the employment. Guidry, supra. When a claim is advanced that mental and emotional stress precipitated the accident, the claimant must show that the vascular accident was produced by extraordinary mental and emotional stress related to his employment. McDonald v. International Paper Company, 406 So.2d 582 (La.1981). A claimant must present evidence of medical causation. Guidry, supra, page 633, footnote 16; Schneider v. Strahan, 449 So.2d 1338 (La.1984).

In this case, the trial court exclusively deferred, on the causation issue, to the testimony of Dr. Glenn Larkin, a forensic pathologist. Dr. Larkin performed the autopsy on Youngblood and stated that regardless of Youngblood's occupation, he would have had a heart attack sooner or later because of his condition. Apparently the trial court believed that this medical testimony was sufficient to deny compensation. However, the trial court did not distinguish between legal and medical cause. We are concerned here with legal cause. "Causation is not necessarily and exclusively a medical conclusion. It is usually the ultimate fact to be found by the court, based on all the credible evidence." Hammond v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, 419 So.2d 829 (La.1982). The trial court further ruled that all helicopter pilots are under stress and therefore the stress Youngblood experienced was not significant.

Clearly, the trial court erred because it matters not that the heart attack could have occurred at another place and time. Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Co., 318 So.2d 37 (La.1975). The court also erred in comparing Youngblood's stress to that of other pilots since the correct standard enunciated in Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., supra, is that the comparison be made between the stress associated with the claimant's job duties and that involved in everyday non-employment life.

To satisfy the causal connection, it is only necessary that the heart attack be caused, precipitated, or contributed to by the exertion, stress, or other factors directly connected with the employment. Parks v. Insurance Company of North America, 340 So.2d 276 (La.1976); McDonald v. International Paper Co., supra. In Guidry, the Supreme Court concluded that a heart attack to be compensable must be causally related in part, however slight, to the employment. (It is virtually impossible to conclusively prove or disprove work-related causation in heart accidents where the medical evidence shows pre-existing cardiovascular disease, as in this case.) Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 Mich. 105, 274 N.W.2d 411 (1979). The evidence at trial must show only a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the death or disabling condition. Hammond v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, supra.

Atherosclerosis is an ordinary disease not caused by work or aggravated by stress of work but, stress that would not normally affect a person without atherosclerosis may cause a person who has this disease to have a heart attack. Certainly heart attacks are inevitable in the sense that the victim will, at some point, have a heart attack, but such a statement begs the question of whether job stress caused the attack to occur when it did or aggravated the attack and the extent of the damage. A New Standard for Cardiovascular Claims in Workers' Compensation, 43 La.L.Rev. 17 (1982); Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., supra. Worker's compensation is not payable for ordinary diseases but does compensate work-related acceleration and aggravation of such diseases.

Stress contributes to heart disease. Pressure created by one's job environment is one of the most common causes of stress. Scott v. Ins. Co. of North America, 485 So.2d 50 (La.1986). Various stresses may cause attacks, including anxiety, anger, fear, exhilaration, fatigue, and the environment. It is medically impossible to determine whether a particular stress caused a particular injury. Nonetheless, an assessment of the probabilities of the heart attack in light of the background factual circumstances and opinion testimony aid in the determination of whether or not compensation may be awarded. Id., see especially medical studies cited therein.

The factual issue concerns the working and other conditions of the claimant's life which are alleged to constitute the stress that assertedly led to the heart attack. In other words, did the asserted stress cause the heart...