Youngblood v. Sexton

• Citation: 32 Mich. 406
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 12 October 1875
• Parties: Barney Youngblood and others v. Jared Sexton

32 Mich. 406

Barney Youngblood and others v. Jared Sexton

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 12, 1875

Heard October 5, 1875; October 6, 1875,

Appeal in Chancery from Superior Court of Detroit.

Decree of the superior court dismissing the bill affirmed, with costs.

Romeyn & Weir and F. A. Baker, for complainants.

George H. Prentis, C. A. Kent and Andrew J. Smith, Attorney General for defendant.

OPINION

Cooley, J.:

The bill in this cause was filed to restrain the collection from the several complainants of a tax assessed against them separately, in respect to the business in which each is engaged. It is a personal tax purely. It was decided at an early day in this state, that equity had no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of a personal tax, even conceding it to be illegal; the ordinary legal remedies being ample for the party's protection.-- Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. The principle has ever since been regarded as not open to controversy in this state, and it was applied without its soundness being contested, in Henry v. Gregory, 29 Mich. 68, decided last year. In other states it is supported by a strong preponderance of authority.-- Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass. 152; Durant v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 469; Loud v. Charlestown, 99 Mass. 208; Whiting v. Boston, 106 Mass. 89; Hunnewell v. Charlestown, 106 Mass. 350; Rockingham Savings Bank v. Portsmouth, 52 N.H. 17; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Ritter v. Patch, 12 Cal. 298; Berri v. Patch, 12 Cal. 299; Worth v. Fayetteville, Winst. Eq. (N. C.), 70; Van Cott v. Supervisors, 18 Wis. 247; Greene v. Mumford, 5 R.I. 472; McCoy v. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio 370; Connolly v. Chedie, 6 Nev. 322; Deane v. Todd, 22 Mo. 90; Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo. 443; Barrow v. Davis, 46 Mo. 394; McPike v. Pew, 48 Mo. 525; Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132; Intendant v. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542; Baltimore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 21 Md. 50; Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 11 Wall. 108; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 82 U.S. 547, 15 Wall. 547.

The question then presents itself, how this bill came to be filed, and on what ground the superior court was asked to and did proceed to render a decision on the merits. The jurisdictional question has not been argued in this court, but we are not inclined to pass it over in silence, thereby giving countenance to the idea, that by the mere acquiescence of parties, a jurisdiction may be made for a court of chancery, by means of which the extraordinary remedy by injunction can be made use of to restrain public officers in their action, where neither the legislation of the state nor the general principles which control the action of courts have ever given this remedy. The writ of injunction is peculiarly liable to abuse; and the practice of resorting to it in cases where it is not allowed by law, relying upon the opposite party to overlook or waive the illegality, is not one that can safely be encouraged or sanctioned. The jurisdiction of courts is never subject to be enlarged or diminished at the discretion of parties; and it would be peculiarly mischievous to permit jurisdiction to rest upon consent or waiver in cases where general public interests are to be affected by the litigation.

The grounds suggested, but not argued, as giving equitable jurisdiction in the case, are, first, that thereby a multiplicity of suits may be avoided; second, that otherwise the proceedings may ripen into a cloud upon the title to complainants' land; and third, that irreparable injury is threatened to complainants in their business. As the tax is only personal, and as yet affects no real estate, and may never do so, the second ground calls for no consideration. The force of the third must rest in the fact that enforcing the tax may in some cases compel the suspension of business, because it is more than the person taxed can afford to pay. But if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then every controversy where money is demanded, may be made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a dealer a promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The courts have never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of a money demand as falling within that category. It is true the federal courts have treated the unlawful taxation of a franchise as a case of possible irreparable injury.-- Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 9 Wheat. 738. But this was on the ground that the tax, if enforced, might destroy the franchise, and in effect the corporation itself,--the artificial person, which was taxed,--and the case has little analogy to that of the taxation of a particular business carried on by individuals.

If complainants rely upon the jurisdiction of equity to take cognizance of a controversy where thereby a multiplicity of suits may be prevented, the reliance fails, because the principles that govern that jurisdiction have no application to this case. It is sometimes admissible when many parties are alike affected or threatened by one illegal act, that they shall unite in a suit to restrain it; and this has been done in this state in the case of an illegal assessment of lands.-- Scofield v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 437. But the cases are very few and very peculiar where this can be permitted, unless each of the complainants has an equitable action on his own behalf. Now, the nature of this case is such that each of these complainants, if the tax is invalid, has a remedy at law which is as complete and ample as the law gives in other cases. He may resist the sheriff's process as he might any other trespass, or he may pay the money under protest, and at once sue for and recover it back. But no other complainant has any joint interest with him in resisting this tax. The sum demanded of each is distinct and separate, and it does not concern one of the complainants whether another pays or not. All the joint interest the parties have is a joint interest in a question of law; just such an interest as might exist in any case where separate demands are made of several persons. Such a common interest there might be if several persons should give several promissory notes on distinct purchases of a worthless article; and such there might have been under the former prohibitory liquor law, had demands been made against several persons for liquors illegally sold to them. We venture to say that it would not be seriously suggested that a common interest in any such question of law, where the legal interests of the parties were wholly distinct, could constitute any ground of equitable jurisdiction when the several controversies affected by the question were purely legal controversies. Suits do not become of equitable cognizance because of their number merely. This was affirmed in Lapeer County v. Hart, Har. Ch., 157, and in the two cases of Sheldon v. School-District, 25 Conn. 224, and Dodd v. Hartford, Ibid., 232, which in their facts, so far as this question is concerned, were like the present case, with a single exception which is not to the advantage of these complainants. In those cases the single assessment of a school-tax was involved, and the parties concerned, if permitted to unite, might have had the whole controversy determined in the one suit. In this case, the controversy is either separate, as the tax is several against each individual, or it is general, as it affects all the persons taxed under the law. Considered as a controversy which affects all the persons taxed, this suit would wholly fail in the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, because the court in which it was brought, has only a local and limited jurisdiction. Other suits might be brought outside of Detroit, and in every county of the state; and at best this suit would only reduce the number of suits, while it could not prevent a multiplicity of them. On this general subject we content ourselves with referring further to Jones v. Garcia, 1 Turn. & Russ., 297; Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. 123; Adams Eq., 198-202.

Other considerations on this branch of the case we abstain from presenting, because an argument has been withheld; and under such circumstances we deem it advisable to present none but those which are not only conclusive, but are unquestionable. We present these for the purpose of showing that if the merits of this controversy were with the complainants, the bill would nevertheless be dismissed, because the parties have no standing in a court of equity. They cannot make remedies for themselves which the law has not given them. We do not know whether there was any express assent on the part of the defendant to this jurisdiction. If there was, it could be of no avail, for reasons already stated. He would be powerless in any case, but specially so in a case like the present, where he is acting in a public capacity; and the consent, if given, would not be on his own behalf, but on behalf of the public, whom for any such purpose he has no authority to represent.

The question then arises whether, the case being one of which the court below had no jurisdiction, this court on appeal shall proceed to express an opinion upon the merits. The considerations which bear upon that question are conflicting. As a general rule, an opinion on the merits of a controversy ought to be declined when the court is powerless to give the relief demanded. But this case is in many particulars exceptional. It has been argued on the merits, the state intervening for the purpose; and there is no reason for any suggestion or suspicion that in this court, at least, it is not a bona fide controversy. The legal...