Youngbluth v. Youngbluth

• Decision Date: 28 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-527.,08-527.
• Citation: 6 A.3d 677,2010 Vt. 40
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Bruce YOUNGBLUTH v. Elisabeth YOUNGBLUTH.

6 A.3d 677

2010 VT 40

Bruce YOUNGBLUTH

v.Elisabeth YOUNGBLUTH.

No. 08-527.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 28, 2010.

Bruce D. Youngbluth, Pro Se, Hummelstown, Pennsylvania, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Susan M. Ellwood, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1.Husband appeals from the Washington Family Court's enforcement order increasing the percentage of his military retirement benefits going to wife under the property division order that was finalized when the parties divorced.We affirm in part and reverse in part.

¶ 2.Husband is a career military man who spent more than twenty years in the United States Marine Corps.On July 1, 2005, husband, who was in his forties at the time, took a forced retirement from the military, and he is now collecting retirement benefits.In the initial divorce proceeding, which began before husband's retirement but was not decided until October 14, 2005, the trial court treated husband's expected monthly retirement benefits as property and included it in the final property division.Specifically, the court granted wife "35% of the marital portion of the retirement plan," which, as the court later clarified, translated to 19.81% of husband's monthly retirement benefits.Husband appealed that determination to this Court, arguing (among other things) that his military retirement benefits should not have been subject to property division.We issued an unpublished entry order affirming the trial court's original property division.Youngbluth v. Youngbluth (Youngbluth I),No. 2006-083, 2007 WL 5318595, at *3(Mar. Term 2007)(unpub. mem.).

¶ 3.After husband retired from military service, and after the October 14, 2005 final divorce decree was issued, husband applied for disability benefits from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs(VA).According to husband, this was a routine part of the process of filling out the retirement paperwork.Husband's disability application listed numerous potential disabilities, most of which were denied by the VA.On April 3, 2006, the VA granted husband a 30% disability rating.This meant that a significant portion of husband's taxable retirement benefits would be forfeited and replaced dollar-for-dollar by tax-exempt and garnishment-exempt disability benefits.As a result, wife was now receiving 19.81% of a smaller retirement payment.

¶ 4.Wife was upset with what she viewed as husband's unilateral modification of the final property division.Meanwhile, wife was having trouble receiving any payments at all from the federal Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).Wife had submitted paperwork to DFAS to receive direct payments of her portion of husband's monthly retirement benefits, but DFAS found the paperwork unacceptable because the trial court's original order referred to 35% of an undefined "marital portion" of husband's retirement benefits.Although this clearly translated to 19.81% of the monthly retirement benefits, the original property division order did not mention that number and therefore did not meet the strict requirements for allowing wife to receive direct payments from DFAS.

¶ 5.Wife filed various motions with the trial court asking the court to grant two modifications to the original property division order: (1) wife wanted the trial court to define the exact percentage of husband's monthly retirement benefits that husband had to pay to wife, so that the order would meet the requirements for receiving direct payments from DFAS; and (2) wife wanted the court to give her a larger portion of husband's retirementbenefits than the 19.81% that was granted to wife in the original property division order, since by now husband had sheltered some of his retirement benefits when he received a 30% disability rating from the VA.Wife labeled the latter request as a "motion to amend" the original property division order, since, rather than asking for the 19.81% that was provided to her under the original property division order, wife was now requesting that the court grant her 22.4% of husband's military retirement benefits.Despite the labeling of wife's request as a "motion to amend,"the trial court treated this request as asking for enforcement, rather than modification, of the original order.The court agreed with wife and changed the percentage from 19.81% to 22.4%, based upon expert testimony that 22.4% of the smaller number would equate to the roughly $700 monthly payment that the trial court had in mind when it decided the initial allocation.

¶ 6.Husband raises two main arguments on appeal.First, husband argues that under Vermont law the trial court cannot grant wife any portion of husband's retirement benefits.Second, husband argues that even if the court is allowed to grant wife a portion of husband's retirement benefits, the court erred in changing that portion from 19.81% to 22.4% in an enforcement proceeding.¹

¶ 7.Husband's first argument merits little discussion; we have already rejected in an earlier proceeding the claim that Vermont law precludes trial courts from granting wife a portion of husband's retirement benefits.SeeYoungbluth I,2007 WL 5318595, at *3.Husband raised this same argument when he appealed the trial court's initial property division order, and we rejected it for two reasons.Id.First, we held that husband failed to properly preserve the issue before the trial court since he raised it for the first time on appeal.Id.Second, we held that federal law allows the division of disposable retirement benefits, Id.(citing10 U.S.C. § 1408), and "under Vermont law, pension rights acquired during the course of a marriage are subject to equitable distribution,"id.(citingMilligan v. Milligan,158 Vt. 436, 439, 613 A.2d 1281, 1283(1992)).Although our ruling in Youngbluth I was an unpublished decision without precedential value for other cases, it was also a final judgment for purposes of settling the particular matters disputed between the parties in that particular case.Thus, the trial court was correct in its ruling that husband cannot now collaterally attack the original property division order that we affirmed in Youngbluth I.See, e.g., Hagen v. Hagen,282 S.W.3d 899, 905(Tex.2009)(holding that "divorce judgments are not vulnerable to collateral attack" even when the "final judgment may be erroneous"(quotation omitted)).We therefore holdthat in this particular case husband cannot challenge the original property division awarding wife 19.81% of husband's disposable retirement benefits.

¶ 8.While the finality of the original property division order works against husband's first argument, the principle of finality is one reason why we agree with husband's second argument and hold that wife can receive only 19.81% of husband's disposable retirement benefits.In the recent enforcement order, the trial court increased that number to 22.4% based on the court's interpretation of the original property division order.Unlike situations where our review of a trial court order is limited to determining whether there was an abuse of discretion, the proper interpretation of a previous court order "is strictly a question of law that we must determine independently."Sachs v. Sachs,163 Vt. 498, 501, 659 A.2d 678, 679(1995);accordDartmouth Sav. Bank v. F.O.S. Assocs.,145 Vt. 62, 66, 486 A.2d 623, 625(1984)("[T]he legal effect of a written instrument is a matter of law determinable at the appellate level.").We therefore do not grant any deference to the trial court's determination that the original property division order intended to provide wife with a larger percentage of husband's disposable retirement benefits.

¶ 9.Further, in our review of the original property division order, we must address husband's argument that federal law preempts state courts from granting wife an interest in husband's disability benefits.The issue of federal preemption is a purely legal question that we review de novo.Cf., e.g., Meyncke v. Meyncke,2009 VT 84, ¶ 6, 186 Vt. 571, 980 A.2d 799(mem.)(holding that the percentage of wages that can be withheld presents a pure question of law that is reviewed de novo).In our de novo review of these issues, we hold that, under the plain language of the original property division order and under settled law that state courts cannot grant a former spouse an interest in a military servicemember's disability benefits, the original property division order does not allow wife to now receive a greater percentage of husband's disposable retirement benefits.

¶ 10.Although wife's original motion was entitled a motion for modification, the trial court seemed to recognize that it was without power to modify the original property division order, and the court referred to its decision as addressing "enforcement motions" that have "only to do with just execution of the judgment already ordered, not the legitimacy of that judgment in the first instance."To reach this conclusion, the trial court had to treat wife's motions as requesting enforcement, rather than modification, because Vermont places great emphasis on the finality of property divisions: "Vermont law is clear that the court cannot modify the property disposition aspects of a divorce decree absent circumstances, such as fraud or coercion, that would warrant relief from a judgment generally."Boisselle v. Boisselle,162 Vt. 240, 242, 648 A.2d 388, 389(1994);see generallyV.R.C.P. 60(b)(listing the circumstances in which a court can grant relief from judgment).The trial court never found that any fraud or coercion occurred here or that there were any other circumstances that would meet wife's burden for showing that she should be granted relief from the original property division order.Cf.Pill v. Pill,154 Vt. 455, 459, 578 A.2d 642, 644(1990)(rejectingthe trial court's statement that it was "not really changing" the original custody...