Youngs v. Youngs

• Decision Date: 26 November 1889
• Citation: 130 Ill. 230,22 N.E. 806
• Parties: YOUNGS v. YOUNGS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

130 Ill. 230

22 N.E. 806

YOUNGS

v.YOUNGS.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 26, 1889.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.

Bill for divorce. The circuit court dismissed the bill at the hearing, and the appellate court affirmed the decree. Complainant appeals. Rev. St. Ill. c. 40, § 1, makes it cause for divorce that a husband or wife ‘has been guilty of habitual drunkenness for the space of two years, or has been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty.’C. F. Loesch, (George Briggs, of counsel,) for appellant.

A. J. Hopkins, N. J. Aldrich, and F. H. Thatcher, for appllee.

BAILEY, J.

This was a bill in chancery, brought by Marie A. Youngs against Phineas B. Youngs, her husband, in the circuit court of Cook county, praying for a divorce. The parties were married at Galva, Ill., February 12, 1879, and shortly thereafter took up their residence at Aurora, Kane county, Ill., where they resided until about the 1st of March, 1887. One child, a daughter, was born as the fruit of their marriage, who, at the date last mentioned, was about five years of age. On or shortly after March 1, 1887, the complainant left her husband, and went to the city of Chicago, where her father and sister were living. On the 4th day of March, 1887, she filed a bill against her husband for a divorce in the circuit court of Cook county, setting up, as her only ground of complaint, that her husband, for more than two years then last past, had been guilty of habitual drunkenness. On the 11th of April, 1887, the parties executed an instrument in writing, whereby it was agreed that they should live separate and apart for the period of one year from that date; and that during that period the defendant should pay the complainant at the rate of $35 per month for the support and maintenance of herself and child; and that the defendant should have the privilege of seeing said child by himself, or in the presence of the complainant, as he might prefer, one day each month during the continuance of said contract; that the complainant should immediately dismiss her bill for a divorce, and refrain from commencing any other proceedings of like character during the same period; that the defendant during that time would wholly refrain from the use of morphine or liquor in any form, except for medical purposes, and under the direction of a skillful and reputable physician. For the period of one year mentioned in said instrument the parties lived separate and apart, the defendant living in Aurora and the complainant remaining in Chicago; the defendantduring that time making to the complainant the monthly payments agreed upon. At the end of the year the defendant ceased to make further payments, and the complainant, on the 12th day of April, 1888,-the day following the termination of the year,-filed in the same court a new bill for a divorce. By said bill the complainant alleged, as she had in her former bill, that the defendant, for the period of more than two years prior to the time she left him as aforesaid, was guilty of habitual drunkenness, and also alleged generally that the defendant had been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty towards the complainant,-that is, that he had on divers days and times since said marriage beaten and abused her, and neglected to furnish her and her child proper and necessary food and clothing, and was harsh, unkind, and tyrannical in his treatment of the complainant; but no specific acts of cruelty were set out or charged in said bill. The defendant demurred to the portion of the bill charging cruelty, and answered the residue, denying said charge of drunkenness. On the 25th day of June, 1888, the complainant filed her petition for alimony pendente lite, and for an allowance for her solicitor's fees, which petition was denied; and thereupon, on the 9th day of July, 1888, she amended her bill by inserting therein a number of specific charges of cruelty. The defendant answered, denying said charges; and, the cause afterwards coming on to be heard by the court on pleadings and proofs, a jury being waived, the issues were found for the defendant, and a decree was entered upon said finding, dismissing the bill for want of equity. Said decree was affirmed by the appellate court, and by appeal from the judgment of that court the complainant has brought the record here, and assigned errors.

The evidence fails to show that the defendant has ever been in the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors, at least to excess. But it is claimed, and the evidence on behalf of the complainant tends to show, that for several years prior to the time the complainant left him the defendant had been in the habit of using morphine, administered by hypodermic injections in the arm and leg. It appears that the effects of morphine thus administered are very similar and in many respects apparently identical with those produced by the excessive use of intoxicating liquors. This branch of the complainant's case, therefore, must rest upon the proof of the defendant's indulgence in the morphine habit, and must necessarily fail, unless it can be held that the intoxication and stupor produced by the excessive use of morphine is ‘drunkenness,’ within the meaning of the first section of the statute in relation to ‘Divorce.’ It cannot be doubted, we think, that the word ‘drunkenness' is used in said statute in its ordinary and popular sense. The primary signification of the word, as given by Webster, is: ‘The state of being drunken, or overpowered by alcoholic liquor; intoxication; inebriety.’ In Bouvier's Law Dictionary it is defined as ‘the condition of a man whose mind is affected by the immediate use of intoxicating drinks.’ A similar definition is given by Repalje & Lawrence in their Law Dictionary, viz.: ...