Youngstown Sheet Tube Co v. Sawyer Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet Tube Co, Nos. 744

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation26 A.L.R.2d 1378,343 U.S. 579,96 L.Ed. 1153,72 S.Ct. 863
Decision Date02 June 1952
Docket Number745,Nos. 744
PartiesYOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. et al. v. SAWYER. SAWYER v. YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. et al

343 U.S. 579
72 S.Ct. 863
96 L.Ed. 1153
YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. et al.

v.

SAWYER. SAWYER v. YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. et al.

Nos. 744, 745.
Argued May 12 and May 13, 1952.
Decided June 2, 1952.

[Syllabus from pages 579-581 intentionally omitted]

Page 581

Mr. John W. Davis, New York City, for Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al.

Mr. Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman, Washington, D.C., for Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce.

Messrs. Clifford D. O'Brien, Chicago, Ill., and Harold C. Heiss, Cleveland, Ohio, for Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, et al., as amici curiae, by special leave of Court.

Page 582

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg, Washington, D.C., for United Steelworkers of America, CIO, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked to decide whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills. The mill owners argue that the President's order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. The Government's position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The issue emerges here from the following series of events:

In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between the steel companies and their employees over terms and conditions that should be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the employees' representative, United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing bargaining agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service then intervened in an effort to get labor and management to agree. This failing, the President on December 22, 1951, referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization

Page 583

Board1 to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. This Board's report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation-wide strike called to begin at 12:01 a.m. April 9. The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense and that governmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel. Reciting these considerations for his action, the President, a few hours before the strike was to begin, issued Executive Order 10340, a copy of which is attached as an appendix, post, 72 S.Ct. 868. The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued his own possessory orders, calling upon the presidents of the various seized companies to serve as operationg managers for the United States. They were directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the Secretary. The next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his action. Cong.Rec., April 9, 1952, p. 3962. Twelve days later he sent a second message. Cong.Rec., April 21, 1952, p. 4192. Congress has taken no action.

Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the District Court. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions. The District Court was asked to declare the orders of the President and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining their enforcement. Opposing the motion for pre-

Page 584

liminary injunction, the United States asserted that a strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had 'inherent power' to do what he had done—power 'supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court decisions.' The Government also contended that in any event no preliminary injunction should be issued because the companies had made no showing that their available legal remedies were inadequate or that their injuries from seizure would be irreparable. Holding against the Government on all points, the District Court on April 30 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from 'continuing the seizure and possession of the plant * * * and from acting under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340.' 103 F.Supp. 569. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. 197 F.2d 582. Deeming it best that the issues raised be promptly decided by this Court, we granted certiorari on May 3 and set the cause for argument on May 12. 343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 775.

Two crucial issues have developed: First. Should final determination of the constitutional validity of the President's order be made in this case which has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage? Second. If so, is the seizure order within the constitutional power of the President?

I.

It is urged that there were nonconstitutional grounds upon which the District Court could have denied the preliminary injunction and thus have followed the customary judicial practice of declining to reach and decide constitutional questions until compelled to do so. On this basis it is argued that equity's extraordinary injunctive relief should have been denied because (a) seizure of the companies' properties did not inflict irreparable dam-

Page 585

ages, and (b) there were available legal remedies adequate to afford compensation for any possible damages which they might suffer. While separately argued by the Government, these two contentions are here closely related, if not identical. Arguments as to both rest in large part on the Government's claim that should the seizure ultimately be held unlawful, the companies could recover full compensation in the Court of Claims for the unlawful taking. Prior cases in this Court have cast doubt on the right to recover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public use as these properties were alleged to have been. See e.g., Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335—336, 31 S.Ct. 85, 89, 54 L.Ed. 1055; United States v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333, 40 S.Ct. 518, 519, 64 L.Ed. 935. But see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701—702, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1467, 93 L.Ed. 1628. Moreover, seizure and governmental operation of these going businesses were bound to result in many present and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement. Viewing the case this way, and in the light of the facts presented, the District Court saw no reason for delaying decision of the constitutional validity of the orders. We agree with the District Court and can see no reason why that question was not ripe for determination on the record presented. We shall therefore consider and determine that question now.

II.

The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed, we do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure. There are two statutes which do authorize the President

Page 586

to take both personal and real property under certain conditions.2 However, the Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President's order was not rooted in either of the statutes. The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes (§ 201(b) of the Defense Production Act) as 'much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.'

Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes. When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency.3 Apparently it was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining.4 Consequently, the plan Congress adopted in that Act did not provide for seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the plan sought to bring about settlements by use of the customary devices of mediation, conciliation, investigation by boards of inquiry, and public reports. In some instances temporary injunctions were authorized to provide cooling-off periods. All this failing, unions were left free to strike after a secret vote by employees as to whether they wished to accept their employers' final settlement offer.5

Page 587

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provisions of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should...

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1159 practice notes
  • Haviland v. Butz, No. 74-1322
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 23, 1976
    ...authorized to exercise the federal legislative power. U.S.Const. art. 1, § 1; see also Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-589, 72 S.Ct. 863, 866-867, 96 L.Ed. 1153, 1167-1168 (1952). Since it cannot be maintained that the Secretary may enact legislation, the question......
  • U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 80-1348
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • February 19, 1981
    ...failure to afford the executive an express right of action, and the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952), compelled a refusal to permit the Attorney General's suit. This court We do not find persuasive the Solomo......
  • Under 21 v. City of New York
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • June 28, 1985
    ...legislative and judicial--to prevent too strong a concentration of authority in one person or body (see, Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153; id., at pp. 634, 635, 72 S.Ct. at pp. 869, 870 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 525 ). We have consistentl......
  • City of San Jose v. Trump, No. 20-CV-05167-RRC-LHK-EMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • October 22, 2020
    ...appropriate action" to "the maximum extent feasible." 85 Fed. Reg. at 44,680 (emphasis added); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 591, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (reviewing Executive Order 10,340, which ordered agencies to "cooperate with the Secretary of Comm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1130 cases
  • Haviland v. Butz, No. 74-1322
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 23, 1976
    ...authorized to exercise the federal legislative power. U.S.Const. art. 1, § 1; see also Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-589, 72 S.Ct. 863, 866-867, 96 L.Ed. 1153, 1167-1168 (1952). Since it cannot be maintained that the Secretary may enact legislation, the question......
  • U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 80-1348
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • February 19, 1981
    ...failure to afford the executive an express right of action, and the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952), compelled a refusal to permit the Attorney General's suit. This court We do not find persuasive the Solomo......
  • Under 21 v. City of New York
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • June 28, 1985
    ...legislative and judicial--to prevent too strong a concentration of authority in one person or body (see, Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153; id., at pp. 634, 635, 72 S.Ct. at pp. 869, 870 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 525 ). We have consistentl......
  • City of San Jose v. Trump, No. 20-CV-05167-RRC-LHK-EMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • October 22, 2020
    ...appropriate action" to "the maximum extent feasible." 85 Fed. Reg. at 44,680 (emphasis added); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 591, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (reviewing Executive Order 10,340, which ordered agencies to "cooperate with the Secretary of Comm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 firm's commentaries
  • Judge Suspends Federal Contractor Vaccine Mandate
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • December 21, 2021
    ...in pursuit of desirable ends." Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 585–86 (1952)). In this case, Plaintiffs will likely succeed in their claim that the President exceeded the authorization given to him......
  • Judge Suspends Federal Contractor Vaccine Mandate
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • December 21, 2021
    ...in pursuit of desirable ends." Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 585–86 (1952)). In this case, Plaintiffs will likely succeed in their claim that the President exceeded the authorization given to him......
32 books & journal articles
  • Administering the National Environmental Policy Act
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter Nbr. 45-4, April 2015
    • April 1, 2015
    ...as a valid exercise of the President’s Article II powers.” homas , 627 F. Supp. at 570. 159. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that presidents act either “pursuant to” a governing statute, in the absence of a governing ......
  • THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 'REASONABLENESS' STANDARD OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996.
    • United States
    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 Nbr. 3, March 2022
    • March 22, 2022
    ...Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-09 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86 (241.) Oaks, Early State Habeas Corpus, supra note 233, at 244. (242.) Id. at 244 & n.5. (243.) Id. at 243-44. (244.) Id. at 24......
  • The Supreme Court Opens a Door in ARCO v. Christian, Part Two
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter Nbr. 51-4, April 2021
    • April 1, 2021
    ...of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)). See also , e.g. , Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 134 S. C......
  • Article II Separation of Powers and the President's Enforcement Right
    • United States
    • The Clean Water Act and the Constitution. Legal Structure and the Public's Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment Part II
    • April 20, 2009
    ...11. Id . 12. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)). 13. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926). 14. Id . at 117, 163-64 (holding that “article II grants to the Preside......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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