Younie v. State
| Decision Date | 22 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 303,303 |
| Citation | 272 Md. 233,322 A.2d 211 |
| Parties | Walter A. YOUNIE v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
William F. Mosner, Assigned Public Defender, Towson, for appellant.
Gilbert Rosenthal, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Samuel A. Green, Jr., State's Atty., and John J. Lucas, Asst. State's Atty., respectively, for Baltimore County, Towson, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, * C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.
This case reaches us on certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals after it affirmed the first degree murder and armed robbery convictions of Walter A. Younie (petitioner) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. In granting the writ, we limited our review to the following:
'(1) whether the court erroneously permitted an interrogating detective to recite to the jury the fact that the appellant refused to answer certain specific questions, which questions, along with a notation that the defendant refused to answer, were interspersed in a series of admittedly proper questions and answers, and
(2) Whether, if error was committed in submitting evidence of the full interrogation to the jury, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'
In considering these issues, we shall recite only those facts which are required for an understanding and determination of the legal questions involved. If more detail is desired, a fuller description of the events which gave rise to this case may be found in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. Younie v. State, 19 Md.App. 439, 311 A.2d 798 (1973).
On December 27, 1971, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Reuben J. Kaufman, an employee of the B & F Liquor Store, was killed by a shotgun blast fired at close range during the course of an armed robery of that business located on Pulaski Highway in Baltimore County. Eyewitness accounts established the fact that the crime was perpetrated by three individuals who drove from the scene in a darkcolored Cadillac. From this information, the police followed a trail of evidence which eventually led to the petitioner's arrest in Putnam, Indiana. While still incarcerated in that midwestern town, and after being advised of his constitutional rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), which he waived by signing a standardized form, members of the Baltimore County police force questioned the petitioner about this crime. The full extent of this interview, as it was recorded by the police officer in longhand, was signed by Younie at the bottom of each page.
At the trial, over strong defense objection, one of the two police officers who had conducted the custodial interrogation to which we have just referred was permitted to give the following testimony:
'Q. (By the State's Attorney) Let's start with the questions and answers. Will you read the questions and Mr. Younie's answers to each question to the Court and to the Jury, please?
A. (By witness) On page one:
'Q. (By police officer) Are you willing to answer questions reference this armed robbery homicide?
A. (By Younie) Some.
Q. I show you two mug shots. Who are they?
A. No. 73574 John McCormack, Gloucester, Massachusetts.
No. 73576 Adelbert Grondin, Hartford, Connecticut.
Q. Did you three pull this armed robbery?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Did you go in on the job at the liquor store?
A. No.
Q. Who drove the car?
A. I did.
Q. What kind of car?
A. Dark blue Cadillac two door.
Q. Whose Cadillac?
A. Stole it in Quincy, Massachusetts, from in front of a tire store first part of December.
Q. Where is this Cadillac now?
A. I don't know.
Q. Where is it the last time you saw
A. We left it near a railroad underpass.
A. We left it near a rairoad underpass.
Q. What did you do to the car?
A. John set it on fire.
Q. Whose gun was used?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Where is the gun now?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Was there a girl with you?
A. Well Lorrie Scully left Hartford, Connecticut with us but stayed at the New Motel in Baltimore.
Q. Do you want to talk about the armed robbery homicide?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever seen Lieutenant Roemer and Detective DeMuth before?
A. Yes. At the Greyhound Bus Station in Baltimore on Tuesday, December 28, 1971.
Q. Did the girl Lorrie know there was going to be a holdup?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone have a gun in the Cadillac?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Did you buy a gun in Hartford, Connecticut?
A. No.
Q. Who went in the liquor store?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Did you shoot anyone in the armed robbery?
A. No.
Q. Did John McCormack shoot anyone?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Did Adelbert Grondin shoot anyone?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. How much money did you get out of the holdup?
A. Refused to answer.
Q. Walter, do you want us to stop this interview?
A. Yes, I believe I should have an attorney.'
The statement was concluded and dated 1/2/72; time 1425 hours, and it was signed by Walter A. Younie and Witnessed by Detective DeMuth and lieutenant L. Roemer.' (emphasis added). 1
Immediately following this testimony, the original handwritten statement (along with a typed copy of it) was received into evidence, again over the petitioner's objection. Then, at the conclusion of the testimony, over the third and fourth defense objections directed at this evidence, the State was permitted in closing argument to refer to these refusals to respond to some of the officer's questions, and the petitioner's complete statement was given by the trial judge, along with other exhibits, to the jury for it to consider while deliberating. Throughout the trial, as well as on appeal, the petitioner has contended that the reading of those questions to which he did not respond, together with the notation that he 'refused to answer' them was improper. Younie reasons that their deletion from the statement submitted was required by law, and that his request for this should have been granted. He has consistently urged that his silence was a permissible exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination and, since the only purpose the objected to evidence served was to create the highly prejudicial inference that his failure to respond was motivated by guilt, its inclusion was reversible error. We agree.
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States spelled out in considerable detail the policy which underlies the fifth amendment to the federal constitution. 2 In that landmark case, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, stated:
384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. at 1620.
Concerned with both the inherent unreliability which may infest a coerced confession, and the unhealthy tendency which its use creates in making police and prosecutors alike less zealous in the search for independent, objective evidence, 3 the Court in Miranda addressed itself specifically to the voluntariness requirement of the fifth amendment. Of particular concern to that Court was its view that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. In response to this, and in an effort to insure that statements made by an accused while under the control of the police were given in the exercise of a free will, procedural mandates were spelled out which were followed by the caveat that 'the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.' Miranda, supra at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
The petitioner here does not question that these procedural requirements were complied with and does not allege that the inquisition should have been halted prior to the time when it was. Instead, Younie urges that the State's employment during the trial of those portions of his statement which reflect his silence in response to certain of the interrogator's questions violates both the language and the spirit of the fifth amendment mandate as expressed in Maranda and its progeny. Our inspection of...
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