Youpe v. Moses

• Decision Date: 25 March 1954
• Docket Number: No. 11523.,11523.
• Citation: 213 F.2d 613,94 US App. DC 21
• Parties: YOUPE v. MOSES et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

94 US App. DC 21, 213 F.2d 613 (1954)

YOUPE v. MOSES et al.

No. 11523.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Decided March 25, 1954.

Messrs. J. Roy Thompson, Jr., and Bernard J. Gallagher, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mr. Marvin J. Sonosky, Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before STEPHENS, Chief Judge, and WILBUR K. MILLER and PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENS, Chief Judge.

This is a motion to dismiss an appeal upon the ground that the orders sought to be reviewed are not of appealable character. The appeal is from two orders of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, each quashing service of process upon one of 115 defendants named as such in an action for declaratory relief and for damages for alleged breach of contract to pay a salary and bonus for the personal services of the appellant, plaintiff below. The complaint charged joint and several liability on the part of the defendants and sought joint and several relief. Twelve of the defendants answered. Of the remaining 103, all of whom were non-residents of the District of Columbia, 101 were not served and did not answer. The remaining two, the appellees, on the grounds that they were non-residents of the District and were served with process while they were acting as attorneys before the Indian Claims Commission in the District, separately moved to quash the service of process. After a hearing the motions were granted, and separate orders granting them were entered. This appeal was then taken.¹ The record on appeal does not show whether or not there have been further proceedings in the case or whether or not any judgment has been entered against any of the answering defendants.

The essential ground of the motion to dismiss the appeal is that the orders appealed from are not within any of the classes of interlocutory orders made appealable by 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (Supp.1952) and that they are not final decisions such as are made appealable by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp.1952). The appellant does not contend that the orders are interlocutory orders such as are made appealable by Section 1292. He does contend that they are final decisions made appealable by Section 1291.

Numerous cases appear to support the contention of the appellees that orders quashing service of process upon some defendants, leaving the suit pending as to other defendants, are not final decisions and are therefore not appealable: Drown v. United States Pharmacopoeial Convention, 198 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.1952), decided in view of Section 1291 of Title 28; Piascik v. Trader Navigation Co., 178 F.2d 886 (2d Cir.1949), also decided under Section 1291 of Title 28; Markham v. Kasper, 152 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1945), decided under 28 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1940), providing that the circuit courts of appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal "final decisions"; Moss v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.1938), decided under a similarly worded, earlier statute, 28 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1934); Berkeley v. Culley, 42 App.D.C. 140 (1914), decided under D.C.Code § 226 (1901), providing for appeals from any final orders of the District Court and from certain interlocutory orders of that court, and providing also for so-called special appeals from other interlocutory orders in the discretion of the Court of Appeals in the interest of justice. In all of the foregoing cases, except Berkeley v. Culley, it was ruled that orders quashing service of process, not being final decisions, are not appealable. In Berkeley v. Culley, the ruling was that an order sustaining a motion to quash service of process against one defendant, leaving the case standing at issue with a co-defendant, was not a final order and was therefore appealable under the special appeals provision.

The appellant cites Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct. 170, 67 L.Ed. 372 (1923), as justifying the appeal. That case ruled that an order quashing service of summons is a final, appealable order. But in that case there was but a single defendant, and the effect of the order quashing service was, therefore, completely to dispose of the action. Complete disposition of an action is, except for the situations involved in the cases to be discussed below, a sine qua non for the finality of a decision. Moss v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., supra.²

The appellant also seeks to justify the appeal by assimilating the orders appealed from in the instant case to such orders as were involved in Collins v. Miller, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 198 F.2d 948 (D.C.Cir.1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951); Roberts v. U. S. District Court, 339 U.S. 844, 70 S.Ct. 954, 94 L.Ed. 1326 (1950); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 70 S.Ct. 861, 94 L.Ed. 1206 (1950); Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). In Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. the ultimate question was whether or not a United States District Court having jurisdiction over a stockholder's derivative action only because the parties to the suit were of diverse citizenship must apply a statute of the forum state which made the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of the defense and entitled the corporate defendant to require security. The corporate defendant moved in the United States District Court for New Jersey, 7 F.R.D. 352, wherein the derivative action had been filed, to require security. That court was of the opinion that the state statute was not applicable to a derivative action when pending in a federal court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, took a contrary view and reversed. In the Supreme Court, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, on certiorari, a threshold question was whether or not the District Court's decision refusing to apply the statute was appealable. The Court ruled that it was. In so ruling, it expressed itself, in an opinion written for the Court by Mr. Justice Jackson (Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Rutledge dissenting) as follows:

* * * Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides, as did its predecessors, for appeal only "from all final decisions of the district courts," except when direct appeal to this Court is provided. Section 1292 allows appeals also from certain interlocutory orders, decrees and judgments, not material to this case except as they indicate the purpose to allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties. It is obvious that, if Congress had allowed appeals only from those final judgments which terminate an action, this order would not be appealable.

The effect of the statute is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete. Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal. But the District Court's action upon this application was concluded and closed and its decision final in that sense before the appeal was taken.

Nor does the statute permit appeals, even from fully consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge. The purpose is to combine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results. But this order of the District Court did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment. When that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably. We conclude that the matters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such an interlocutory nature as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of this case.

This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical construction. Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 1 Pet. 567, 569, 7 L.Ed. 265; United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414, 46 S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed. 339; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783.

We hold this order appealable because it is a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it. 337 U.S. at pages 545-547, 69 S.Ct. 221

In Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Caribe the Supreme Court, relying upon the decision in the Cohen case, ruled that an order of a United States District Court vacating an attachment secured in a libel in personam is reviewable as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp.1952). In Stack v. Boyle the Supreme Court, again relying upon the Cohen decision, ruled that an order of a United States District Court denying a motion to reduce bail is a final decision appealable under Section 1291. In Roberts v. U. S. District Court the Supreme Court ruled that a denial by a district judge of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable decision under Section 1291; again, the reliance was upon the Cohen case. In Collins v. Miller this Court of Appeals, relying primarily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cohen case, ruled that an order of the District Court denying a petition for removal of the administrators of an estate of a deceased person is appealable as a final decision under Section 1291. In so ruling, this...