Bright, C. J., and Moll and Clark, Js.
BRIGHT, C. J.
Following a trial to the court, the defendant, RCN Capital Funding, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Your Mansion Real Estate, LLC, in an action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 49-8 (c). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in (1) not dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not have standing because it admitted that it had incurred no actual damages and, therefore, was not aggrieved, (2) not permitting the defendant to introduce testimony concerning whether it was common practice for borrowers to contact the defendant if they had not received a § 49-8 (c) release, (3) rejecting the defendant's first special defense in which it alleged that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate its damages, and (4) rejecting the defendant's second and third special defenses in which it claimed that § 49-8 (c) was unconstitutional because it allows for punitive damages and excessive fines in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which were found by the trial court and which are uncontested on appeal, and procedural history inform our review. "Prior to November 4, 2015, the plaintiff ... was and had been, since March 14, 2014, the owner of the premises known as 90 Reut Drive, Stratford, Connecticut 06614 (‘premises’). The premises were encumbered by (1) a mortgage deed from the plaintiff to [the defendant] on March 14, 2014, in the original amount of $112,000 recorded in the Stratford land records ... and (2) ... a collateral assignment of leases and rentals from the plaintiff to the defendant dated March 14, 2014, recorded in the Stratford land records .... On November 4, 2015, the plaintiff sold and conveyed title to the premises to a new owner. On or about October 20, 2015, prior to [the] sale of the premises, the Law Offices of Raymond G. Heche, as counsel representing the plaintiff as seller, requested a payoff number of the mortgage from the defendant. On October 20, 2015, the defendant sent to ... Heche's office a payoff letter stating that the payoff number of the mortgage through November 6, 2015, would be $118,911.96. On November 4, 2015, the date of the closing of the sale of the premises ... Heche, as counsel for the plaintiff as seller of the premises, remitted by overnight mail to the defendant at its office at 75 Gerber Road East, South Windsor, Connecticut 06074, a bank check ... payable to the defendant in the payoff amount of $118,911.96 together with a copy of the October 20, 2015 payoff letter. [The] November 4, 2015 letter to the defendant also requested that the defendant ‘upon receipt of said payoff provide to ... Heche's office in proper form a release of the mortgage and a release of the collateral assignment.’ [The] letter further advised:
" ‘Kindly be advised that [§] 49-8 (c) of the ... General Statutes states that a mortgagee who fails to deliver and release within [sixty] days from the request for the same, "shall be liable ... at the rate of $200 for each week after the expiration of such [sixty] days or in an amount equal to the loss sustained, whichever is greater.’ "
"On March 26, 2018, when the requested releases had not been provided ... Heche sent a certified mail letter to the defendant ... with another copy of his November 4, 2015 letter and the payoff check, advising the defendant that the requested releases had still not been provided, and reminding the defendant again of the [sixty] day deadline of ... § 49-8 (c) which ‘had long expired.’ The March 26, 2018 letter, sent more than two years after the expiration of the original [sixty] day deadline from November 4, 2015, gave the [d]efendant ten days to provide the requested releases together with statutory damages of $5000 plus attorney's fees of $850 to avoid suit under [§] 49-8 (c). When the requested releases had still not been received, the plaintiff, through ... Heche, commenced this action by complaint dated April 26, 2018, seeking statutory money damages under [§] 49-8 (c), plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees. ...
"The defendant filed its amended answer and special defenses on July 28, 2019, admitting in the answer that it had received the full payoff of $118,911.26 with ... Heche's transmittal letter of November 4, 2015, and that it had failed to provide a proper release of mortgage at the time this action was commenced, and leaving the plaintiff to its proof of the allegation that the plaintiff had sold the premises on November 4, 2015, and that the plaintiff was an aggrieved party entitled to damages under [§] 49-8 (c).... The plaintiff filed [a] reply ... denying the allegations of all special defenses. The pleadings were closed on November 14, 2018, and the case was assigned for a nonjury trial ... on September 11, 2019....
"The parties at trial presented a corrected stipulation of fact dated September 12, 2019, by which they agreed that the court could find the following facts established without presentation of evidence:
" ‘1. On November 4, 2015, the plaintiff ... sold the premises ....’
" ‘2. As of April 26, 2018, the defendant ... had not furnished or recorded a release of mortgage related to [the premises].’
" ‘3. On June 8, 2018, the defendant recorded a release of mortgage to [the premises] as well as a termination of collateral assignment of leases and rents ....’
" ‘4. The plaintiff has not suffered any demonstrable loss with respect to [the] [d]efendant's delay in furnishing or recording the release of mortgage.’
" ‘5. The plaintiff, prior to sending its demand dated March 26, 2018, but after it had sent the payoff funds, had not, whether through its principal or its counsel, contacted the defendant by any medium of communication.’ " ‘6. An affidavit, through counsel, has not been filed on the land records of Stratford ... pursuant to ... § 49-8a, in order to release the mortgage on [the premises].’
"[On the basis of] the corrected stipulation, the court finds the facts recited therein to be proven."
On the basis of these facts, the court, in a thorough memorandum of decision, concluded, inter alia, that the plaintiff was statutorily aggrieved, that the defendant's amended special defenses had no merit, and that "the damages requested by the plaintiff in the amount of $5000, [were] authorized by [§] 49-8 (c) in that more than twenty-five weeks from the January 4, 2016 sixty day deadline flowing from the November 4, 2015 letter requesting a release of mortgage had passed without a release being provided. The statutory weekly damages of $200 per week therefore reached the maximum statutory damages of $5000." Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $5000, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees, as set forth in the statute. This appeal followed.
The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in not dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not have standing, as was demonstrated through its concession that it had incurred no actual damages; therefore, it was not aggrieved. The defendant argues that " § 49-8 (c) requires the party bringing an action pursuant to it to be aggrieved. Only an aggrieved party, therefore, has standing to bring the claim." The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that it, without question, was statutorily aggrieved.1 We agree with the plaintiff.
"If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. ... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. ...
"Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory. ... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. ... Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest. ... Statutory aggrievement [however] exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation. ...
"In order to determine whether a party has standing to make a claim under a statute, a court must determine the interests and the parties that the statute was designed to protect. ... Essentially the standing question in such cases is whether the ... statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. ... [Stated differently, the] plaintiff must be within the zone of interests protected by the statute." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McKay v. Longman , 332 Conn. 394, 409–10, 211 A.3d 20 (2019).
Additionally, we are mindful that matters of statutory construction are governed by General Statutes § 1-2z, which provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the...
