Youth Serv. v. Dep't Of Pub. Welfare

• Decision Date: 29 July 2010
• Citation: 2 A.3d 794
• Parties: NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES, Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Respondent. S.C., Petitioner v. Department of Public Welfare, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

2 A.3d 794

NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES, Petitioner

v.DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Respondent.

S.C., Petitioner

v.Department of Public Welfare, Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs April 23, 2010.

Decided July 29, 2010.

Michael J. Robinson, Sunbury, for petitioner.

No appearance entered on behalf of respondent.

Julie A. Werdt, Pottsville, for intervenor, S.C.

BEFORE: LEADBETTER, President Judge, and BROBSON, Judge, and FLAHERTY, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY President Judge LEADBETTER.

In these consolidated appeals, Northumberland County Children and Youth Services (CYS) and S.C. seek review of the order of the Department of Public Welfare, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (Bureau), directing CYS to provide S.C. with documents that CYS' expert witness would use at a hearing scheduled on S.C.'s request for expungement of the indicated child abuse report. CYS argues that 55 Pa.Code § 3490.104, relied on by the Bureau to support the discovery order, is invalid because it conflicts with the confidentiality provision in Section 6340 of the Child Protective Services Law (Law), as amended, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6340. In her appeal, S.C. argues that the Bureau should have required CYS to produce all documents and information requested in her motion to compel discovery. This Court has raised the issue of whether the Bureau's order constitutes a collateral order appealable as of right under Pa. R.A.P. 313.

I.

On February 4, 2009, CYS received an oral report that S.C. physically abused her infant son, S.P., who was born in January 2009. On March 6, 2009, CYS issued an indicated report (Form CY-48), naming S.C. and the child's father as perpetrators of child abuse. In the report, CYS stated:

The minor child was seen at Janet Weis Children's Hospital Geisinger [M]edical Center. The physician documented seizure activity and subdural hematomas

and concluded these injuries were the result of physical abuse. The alleged perpetrators were interviewed and denied any abuse or neglect of the minor child. They also could not provide an explanation for the injuries although they both were primary caretakers for the child. This case meets criteria for serious physical injury.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 33. The Department of Public Welfare (Department) subsequently determined that the indicated report was accurate and was being maintained in a manner consistent with the Law. ¹

S.C. appealed the Department's determination to the Bureau and requested that the indicated report be expunged. The Bureau then scheduled a hearing for September 17, 2009 and directed S.C. and CYS to comply with the Bureau's Standing Practice Order issued on March 28, 2008. Part 7 (Discovery), Rule 22(b) and (e) of the Standing Practice Order provides:

(b) The practice of the Bureau has been to direct parties to exchange material and relevant information which a party intends to use in a formal proceeding as soon as practicable after a hearing has been scheduled in order to avoid delay of the hearing date.

....

(e) A Witness List for Child Abuse Expunction appeals shall be filed according to the instruction specified in the Unified Pre-Hearing Filing.

R.R. at 50-51 (emphasis in original). ² CYS filed a Unified Pre-Hearing Filing, listing as its witnesses the caseworker, Jill Stender, and the pediatrics inpatient director at Geisinger Medical Center and S.P.'s treating physician, Paul J. Bellino, M.D. CYS provided S.C. with a copy of the indicated report and stated that Dr. Bellino's report would be provided on the day of the hearing.

S.C. thereafter filed a motion to compel CYS to produce the following documents and information:

1. The expert report of Dr. Bellino, expert witness for [CYS].

2. All documentation, including medical records and films of S.P., upon which Dr. Bellino is using or has used to form the basis of his expert testimony.

3. Any and all information contained in the investigatory file of [CYS], which has been properly redacted.

R.R. at 36. S.C. averred that her expert must have the requested documents and information to prepare to rebut Dr. Bellino's testimony.

By order dated September 10, 2009, the Bureau granted S.C.'s motion in part and directed CYS to comply with S.C.'s “request to produce all documentation, including medical records and films of subject child, S.P., upon which Dr. Bellino will be using as part of his expert testimony in accordance with 55 Pa.Code § 3490.104 and the Standing Practice Order Rule # 22.” R.R. at 38. Section 3490.104(a) provides:

Upon written request to a county agency or ChildLine,^{[ 3 ]} a subject of a report may receive at any time a copy of the reports filed with the county agency and ChildLine. The identity of the person who made the report or a person who cooperated in a subsequent investigation may be released only under § 3490.94 (relating to release of the identity of a person who made a report of child abuse or cooperated in a subsequent investigation). [Footnote added.]

Both CYS and S.C. appealed the Bureau's order. S.C. intervened in CYS' appeal and filed an application to consolidate the appeals, which the Court granted. The Department advised the Court that it would not file a brief.

II.

Before addressing the issues raised by the parties, we must consider whether the Bureau's order is appealable as a collateral order. Generally, an appellate court's jurisdiction extends only to review a final order which (1) disposes of all claims and of all parties, (2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute or (3) is certified as a final order pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 341(c). Rule 341(a) and (b). Rule 313(a), adopted in 1992 codifying existing case law, provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.” A “collateral order” is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Rule 313(b). Whether an order is appealable as a collateral order “is an issue of this Court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of such an order.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 583 Pa. 208, 215, 876 A.2d 939, 943 (2005). We directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether the Bureau's discovery order constitutes an appealable collateral order.

Because the collateral order doctrine is “a specialized, practical application of the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of right,” it “must be interpreted narrowly ... in order to prevent undue corrosion of the final order rule.” Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 272, 836 A.2d 42, 46-47 (2003). A narrow construction of the doctrine not only avoids piecemeal determinations and protraction of litigation but also furthers judicial accuracy because an appellate court is more likely to decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication and a full development of record. Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 602 Pa. 65, 977 A.2d 1121 (2009). To be appealable as a collateral order, an order must satisfy all three elements in the definition of a collateral order: separability, importance and irreparable loss. Melvin. This three-prong test “must be applied independently to each distinct legal issue over which an appellate court is asked to assert jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 313.” Rae, 602 Pa. at 80, 977 A.2d at 1130.

The parties' challenge to the Bureau's discovery order in these appeals raises the issue of S.C.'s entitlement to receive the documents and other information in CYS' possession, which is clearly separate from and collateral to the substantive issue raised in S.C.'s appeal from the indicated report, i.e., whether S.C. physically abused S.P. as alleged by CYS. The Court can address the discovery issue without reviewing the substantive child abuse issue. The mere fact that the documents and information requested by S.C. “shed some light” on the child abuse allegations does not affect the existence of the separability element of a collateral order. Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 483, 729 A.2d 547, 551 (1999) [quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir.1997) ].

An issue is important for the purpose of the second element of a collateral order, “if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that order are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 597 Pa. 483, 502, 952 A.2d 541, 552 (2008), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 51, 175 L.Ed.2d 43 (2009) (quoting Ben, 556 Pa. at 484, 729 A.2d at 552). As the Supreme Court has explained: “[I]t is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 598, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (1999).

Under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. 1, § 1, an individual has an “inherent and indefeasible” right to protect his or her reputation. In Pennsylvania, therefore, reputation is a fundamental interest which cannot be abridged without compliance with constitutional standards. R.H.S. v. Allegheny County Dep't of Human Servs., Office of Mental Health, 936 A.2d 1218 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007). The discovery issue raised in these appeals involves the constitutionally protected reputation interest of an individual accused of child abuse and the competing interest of the agency in maintaining the confidentiality of information in its possession. The Court is also asked to decide the validity of a provision of the Department's regulations. Resolution of these issues affects not only the parties in this case but also all other litigants in expungement proceedings....