Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co
| Decision Date | 26 February 1941 |
| Docket Number | 6180 |
| Citation | 110 P.2d 566,100 Utah 120 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | YOWELL v. OCCIDENTAL LIFE INS. CO |
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; R. I McDonough, Judge.
Action by Amy E. Yowell against the Occidental Life Insurance Company on an accident policy issued by the defendant to Zella Andrew, sister of the plaintiff, in which plaintiff was named as beneficiary. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Shirley P. Jones and Knox Patterson, both of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Van Cott, Riter & Farnsworth, of Salt Lake City, for respondent.
McDONOUGH, J., being disqualified, did not participate.
The plaintiff in this action was the beneficiary under a policy of insurance written by the defendant, an insurance company, on the 25th day of February, 1921, by the terms of which the defendant insured one Zella Andrew, sister of the plaintiff, "against loss resulting directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes from bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy solely through external, violent and accidental means (suicide, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat, sane or insane, excepted)," and undertook to pay to said beneficiary the sum of $ 1,000, if said insured should lose her life necessarily and solely from such injury as described in the above-quoted part of said policy.
Zella Andrew died on the 26th day of April, 1936, whereupon the plaintiff filed proof of her death with the defendant and made demand upon it for the payment of the principal of said policy. The defendant refused to pay the claim, and the plaintiff commenced this action.
The suit was tried in the court below without a jury. On the trial of the case it was stipulated that said policy of insurance was in full force and effect at the time of the death of said insured and that proof of death and presentation of claim was properly and timely made. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the death of Zella Andrew resulted directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes from bodily injury sustained by her in an accident during the life of said policy, solely through external, violent and accidental means, exclusive of suicide. The defendant, by its answer, admitted that Zella Andrew died on the date aforesaid, but denied that her death resulted from bodily injury and denied all other allegations of the complaint relating to the cause and manner of her death.
The plaintiff here assigns that finding as error, and asserts that there was no substantial evidence before the trial court to support it. That assignment presents the only question to be determined by us on this appeal, and is here determinative of the cause.
At the outset we may remark that it is well settled in this state that we are bound by the findings of fact of the trial court, if there is any substantial evidence to maintain them ( Brittain V. Gorman, 42 Utah 586, 133 P. 370), and that where a finding is based upon sufficient evidence we will not reverse it, even if we are inclined to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial judge. Fee V. National Bank, 37 Utah 28, 106 P. 517.
To determine whether or not the finding hereinbefore quoted is supported by substantial evidence which justified the trial court in making it, it is necessary to summarize the evidence. It appears therefrom that the deceased, Zella Andrew, on the 14th of February, 1936, while walking from her residence in Salt Lake City to a grocery store, accompanied by the plaintiff herein, was struck by an automobile. The automobile struck her on the right arm and side, knocked her down, and pushed her for about fifteen feet. She was apparently rendered unconscious for a moment, but as soon as she was able to speak she said that she didn't think that she was badly hurt, and declined an offer by the driver of the automobile to take her to an emergency hospital. Thereupon, with the help of her sister, she walked home--a distance of about three blocks. Upon arriving home the sister gave her a hot bath, rubbed her with alcohol and put her to bed. The next day her condition appeared to be worse, and the morning of the following day, February 16th, her sister called a physician, Dr. David Andrew.
Dr. Andrew, after establishing his qualifications as a physician and surgeon, in the course of which it appeared that he had specialized in gynecology, testified that he called to treat Zella Andrew on the 16th of February, 1936. He found her in bed suffering from partial shock and breathing with difficulty. His examination then made disclosed that she was black and blue all over the right arm and the right side of the chest, in the region of the pelvis and the legs, and that she had two fractured ribs. She was coughing and appeared to be in great pain, particularly in her head and chest. Dr. Andrew also testified that he had been the physician of the deceased for about twenty-five years; that prior to the accident the general condition of her health had been very good, and that he had never known her to have any serious illness; and that he continued to treat her from the occasion when he was called after the accident until the time of her death.
The patient, according to Dr. Andrew, was unable to move for a period of about ten days, and was confined to her bed for two or three weeks. Thereafter, she visited Dr. Andrew at his office, going there generally in a cab, but at least once by street car. Throughout the period from the first examination until her death she had a cough and complained of pain in her chest. She also complained of pain in her head, and Dr. Andrew called in Dr. Harrow, a nerve specialist, for observation and treatment of that condition. On March 13th she was taken to the Latter-Day Saints Hospital for that purpose. Upon arrival there she was examined by Dr. Harrow, with the assistance of Dr. Andrew. Dr. Harrow made a record of his findings, which was introduced in evidence as an excerpt of the hospital's records. According to that record the patient gave a history of pain in the right side of the face extending back about three years, but ending in the summer of 1935 after some teeth were extracted. The notation of her history also showed that she had influenza in 1919, and had had measles and whooping cough. Among other things the record of the examination showed Dr. Harrow administered an alcoholic injection of the trigeminal nerve, after which the patient was relieved of pain, and, on March 22nd, she was discharged from the hospital "greatly improved." The hospital temperature chart was also received in evidence. It showed the patient's temperature, pulse and respiration rate for each day she was in the hospital, i. e., for the days from March 13th to March 22nd, inclusive. The chart shows little variation from normal throughout the ten-day period that it covers. On the day of her admission the temperature was 100.4 degrees, and that was its maximum elevation except on the fifth day when it reached 100.8 degrees. On the day of her discharge the temperature was normal. Her pulse rate was between 70 and 80 on the day of her admission, advanced to a maximum of 103 on March 14th, the day of the trigeminal injection, varied below that figure during the remainder of the period, and on the day of her discharge was about 80. Her respiration throughout the period was practically normal.
Dr Andrew was again called to see the deceased about the 12th of April, and found her very ill. She had a low temperature, her pulse irregular and not extremely fast, about 110, and her respiration rather rapid, about 30. He diagnosed her condition as pneumonia, and gave her the usual treatment for lobar pneumonia; however, he regarded the pneumonia as being of an atypical type. She gradually grew worse, and on April 24th was removed to the...
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Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. and Med. Ctr.
...his own interpretation of facts that have a foundation in the evidence, even if those facts are in dispute. Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah 120, 110 P.2d 566, 569 (1941). Indeed, we allow experts latitude to interpret the facts before them. See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215......
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Eskelson v. Davis Hospital and Medical Center, 2010 UT 15 (Utah 3/12/2010)
...on his own interpretation of facts that have a foundation in the evidence, even if those facts are in dispute. Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 110 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1941). Indeed, we allow experts latitude to interpret the facts before them. See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1223......