Yphantides v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 09 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21cv1575-GPC(BLM) |
| Parties | NICHOLAS YPHANTIDES, an individual, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity and DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendant County of San Diego’s amended motion for partial summary judgment[1] on the third through eleventh causes of action alleged in the complaint. (Dkt. No 61.) Plaintiff filed an amended opposition. (Dkt. Nos. 60.) Defendant filed an amended reply. (Dkt. No. 62.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s amended motion for partial summary judgment.
On September 8, 2021, Plaintiff Nicholas Yphantides, M.D. (“Plaintiff” or Dr. Yphantides”), the former Chief Medical Officer of the County of San Diego, filed a complaint against Defendant County of San Diego (“Defendant” or “County”) for 1) unlawful medical and psychological inquiry and psychological and medical examination in violation of California Government Code (“Government Code”) section 12940(f); 2) unlawful medical and psychological inquiry and psychological and medical examination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1)(4); 3) disability discrimination or perceived disability discrimination in violation of Government Code section 12940(a); 4) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of Government Code section 12940(m); 5) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of Government Code section 12940(n); 6) retaliation for requesting disability accommodations in violation of Government Code section 12940(m)(2); 7) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12940(k); 8) interference with the right to medical leave in violation of Government Code section 12945.2, et seq.; 9) retaliation for taking medical leave in violation of Government Code section 12945.2, et seq.; 10) interference with the right to medical leave in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and 11) retaliation for taking medical leave in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl.)
Defendant moves for partial summary judgment on the third to eleventh causes of action arguing they fail as a matter of law because the material facts are undisputed. (Dkt. No. 61.) Plaintiff opposes arguing there are material facts in dispute. (Dkt. No. 60.) Defendant filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 62.)
In 1992, Dr. Yphantides graduated from University of California, San Diego School of Medicine with honors and attended a one-year internship at Ventura County Medical Center in 1992-93. (Dkt. No. 60-4, Yphantides Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) During the internship, Plaintiff experienced his first mental health crisis of “depression that evolved into hypomania[2] while working under extreme stress and sleep deprivation.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Though Plaintiff was not tuned into his hypomania state, his colleagues recognized his symptoms and were supportive. (Id.) He was granted medical leave and sought treatment from a psychiatrist who diagnosed him as being on the bipolar spectrum and was prescribed and took Lithium, a mood stabilizer. (Id.) Once he returned from medical leave, the internship program accommodated him by restructuring his duties and schedule such as reducing his on-call schedule, admitting fewer patients, and he was assigned a senior resident to monitor his condition. (Id.) With the accommodations, he was able to complete the program. (Id.) Except for a couple of relapses of depressive episodes, his condition remained stable and he was able to perform his job duties without additional workplace accommodations. (Id. ¶ 5.) After he finished his training, he was a full-time clinician for three years, and then in 1996, he transitioned into public and population health when he was publicly elected to be the Chairman of the Board for Palomar Health. (Id.)
Plaintiff began consulting with Defendant County of San Diego in 2007 and became employed as the Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) with the County in April 2009 in a part-time capacity. (Id. ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 252, Yphantides Depo. at 21:8-11; 27:20-28:5.) As CMO, Plaintiff was an “unclassified” or “at will” employee. (Dkt. No. 60-2, Pl’s Response to SSUF No. 1.) In September 2016, he became the County’s full-time CMO which is the position he held until his termination on March 22, 2021. (Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 252, Yphantides Depo. at 27:20-28:5; Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 257, Evers Depo. at 51:17-52.)
As CMO, Plaintiff was responsible for representing the County well because his conduct reflected upon the County. (Dkt. No. 60-2, Pl’s Response to SSUF No. 2.) All County employees must behave ethically and as a supervisor, Plaintiff was held to a higher ethical and moral standard. (Id., No. 3.) In 2016, Plaintiff began receiving annual performance evaluations where his continually scored “exceeds expectations” through September 2020.[3] )
Nick Macchione (“Mr. Macchione”), Director of the County’s Health and Human Services Agency (“HHSA”) was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor until May 1, 2020 when Dean Arabatzis (“Mr. Arabatzis”) became the Acting Director of HHSA. (Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 252, Yphantides Depo. at 28:15-29:25.) Plaintiff, Mr. Macchione and Mr. Arabatzis and their families have known each other for years and routinely socialized outside of work. (Dkt. No. 60-4, Yphantides Decl. ¶ 10.) Kimberly Evers (“Ms. Evers”) has been the Director of Human Resources for the HHSA since 2015. (Dkt. No. 46-4, Evers Decl. ¶ 1.) Susan Brazeau (“Ms. Brazeau”) has been the Director of Human Resources for the County of San Diego since 2013. (Dkt. No. 46-5, Brazeau Decl. ¶ 1.)
Beginning in January 2020, due to the COVID 19-pandemic, Plaintiff began working long hours of up to 15 hours per day. (Dkt. No. 60-4, Yphantides Decl. ¶ 8.) He experienced an extended period of intense stress, anxiety and insomnia from January 2020 until his first medical leave on October 14, 2020. (Id.) During this time, he was treated with an anti-depressant prescribed by Dr. James Lin (“Dr. Lin”), Plaintiff’s primary care physician. (Id. ¶ 9.) However, by October 2020, Plaintiff was in deep depression. (Id.) At that time, he retrieved his handgun, and went into a closed closet at his home to commit suicide but the thought of his two teenage daughters prevented him from following through. (Id.) He called his brother to take the gun away which he did. (Id.)
Starting in August 2020, Plaintiff shared with Mr. Arabatzis, his direct supervisor, that he was stressed and Mr. Arabatzis would respond with suggestions of taking time off and other things. (Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 252, Yphantides Depo. at 102:14103:1.) Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff felt he could not take leave because there was no time, no person to take his place and he felt like he was still capable of performing his duties. (Id.) When he got to the point of not sleeping for two or three days due to insomnia, Plaintiff felt he was not able to perform his duties and informed Mr. Arabatzis in greater detail about the seriousness of his condition. (Id. at 103:2-8.) In October 2020, he reached out to each of his seven “direct reports” and told them he was “struggling” and was going to take time off. (Id. at 103:14-25.)
Plaintiff requested, was approved and took FMLA leave from October 14, 2020 to November 16, 2020. (Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 252, Yphantides Depo. at 101:5-101:13.) The Medical Certification for FMLA Leave was signed by Dr. Lin on October 12, 2020. ) On the Medical Certification, Dr. Lin responded in the negative when asked if the employee is unable to perform any of his/her job functions due to the condition and “N/A” to the questions of “[w]ill the employee need to attend follow-up treatment appointments or work part-time or on a reduced scheduled due to the medical condition?” and “[w]ill the condition cause episodic flare-ups periodically preventing the employee from performing his job functions.” (Id. at 15.) However, on Plaintiff’s FMLA leave request, Plaintiff checked the box for the reason for his leave, “Employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his/her job due to a serious health condition.” (Id. at 17.)
Plaintiff returned to work around November 17, 2020. (Dkt. No. 60-4 Yphantides Decl. ¶ 11.) Upon his return, Plaintiff did not make any requests for accommodations. (Dkt. No. 46-3, Klekowski Decl., Ex. 252, Yphantides Depo. at 94:13-19; 106:2-5.) Yet, while he was no longer suicidal, he was not “fully recovered” or back to his “usual self” which he openly communicated with his colleagues, such as Denise Foster, Chief of Nursing, and Jamie Beam, Assistant Director of Medical Care Services, in his return email. (Dkt. No. 60-4, Yphantides Decl. ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 51-1, Olsen Decl., Ex. 38, 11/18/20 email.) When he returned from leave, Plaintiff informed several colleagues, including Ms. Evers and Andrew Pease (“Mr. Pease”), Chief Operating Officer of HHSA, about his depression and lack of sleep while he was on medical leave as well as his suicidal ideation. (Dkt. No. 60-4, Yphanti...
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