De La Ysla v. Publix theatres Corporation
| Decision Date | 09 November 1933 |
| Docket Number | 5284 |
| Citation | 26 P.2d 818,82 Utah 598 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | DE LA YSLA v. PUBLIX THEATRES CORPORATION |
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; Wm. H Bramel, Judge.
Action by Roque E. de la Ysla against the Publix Theatres Corporation. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Roque E. de la Ysla, in pro. per.
Ingebretsen Ray & Rawlins, and J. M. Christensen, all of Salt Lake City for respondent.
This case went off on a demurrer to the complaint. Upon the failure of the plaintiff to further plead, the action was dismissed. He appeals. The substance of the complaint is that the defendant, a corporation, was the owner of and operated at Salt Lake City "a public amusement theatre" under the name of the "Victory Theatre"; that the plaintiff purchased from the ticket seller of the defendant and paid $ 1.40 for four tickets, one for himself and three for three of his friends accompanying him, all Filipinos and residents of Salt Lake City, Utah, and adult persons, which tickets called for seats on the lower floor of the theater and entitled the holders to occupy such seats and were sold for such purpose; that the plaintiff and his friends presented the tickets to the usher and as they were about to enter the lower floor called for by the tickets, the head usher "halted the plaintiff and his friends and showed them to the balcony, to which plaintiff objected in a decorous and orderly manner" and demanded an explanation, to which the head usher stated, "It is the rule of the house that we are not allowed to seat you Filipinos on the lower floor by reason of your race and color"; that the plaintiff and his friends, being without notice or knowledge that Filipinos were not allowed to occupy seats on the lower floor, "and relying upon the contract entered into between the plaintiff and said defendant corporation whereby plaintiff paid the purchase price of the seats desired and the defendant to furnish the accommodation called for, proceeded to enter the seats on the lower floor, who as a result were maliciously denied public accommodation causing the breach of the contract by the said defendant corporation"; that the "plaintiff and his companions as a result of such racial discrimination in front of several persons present at the said theatre at the time, were put to shame, great embarrassment, mortification, ridiculed and humiliated thus causing said plaintiff and his other three friends great disgrace, mental sufferings and humiliations of their personal dignities to their damage of $ 4,000.00, plus the purchase price of the four tickets in the amount of $ 1.40."
The prayer is that the defendant "be ordered to allow plaintiff to occupy the seats on the lower floor or to occupy any seats to which their tickets may call for"; judgment for $ 1.40, the price paid for the tickets; $ 4,000 punitive damages; and for attorney's fees and costs.
The demurrer interposed to the complaint was a general demurrer. No special demurrer or other pleading or motion was interposed either as to parties or as to plaintiff's right to claim and recover anything for mental suffering or humiliation, etc., either on his own behalf or on behalf of his friends. While some of such claimed defects are here argued by the respondent, yet, as the complaint was not challenged on such ground, the respondent is restricted to a consideration of the general demurrer for want of facts to state a cause of action, the only ground upon which the complaint was challenged in the court below.
At the threshold it may be conceded that the complaint does not state a cause of action in tort. If one is stated, it is in contract. Apparently the pleader attempted to characterize the action as one in contract, but in such connection claimed not only actual and pecuniary damages as a direct and proximate result of the alleged breach of the contract, but also punitive damages as prayed for, or compensatory damages for mental suffering, humiliation, etc., attempted to be alleged in the body of the complaint. If the complaint states a cause of action for an alleged legal element of damage, the fact that other elements may be alleged which are not legal or recoverable damages in the action does not render the complaint bad on a general demurrer.
Rather extended arguments are made and many cases cited with respect to civil rights statutes and rights and privileges guaranteed by the state and national Constitutions. Many of the states have civil rights statutes. We have none. The case, as we view it, is to be ruled under the law of contracts and a breach thereof. From textbooks and adjudicated cases on the subject in hand, we by the great weight of authority deduce these principles: That the carrying on of a theater or other place of public amusement is a private business which is not governed by rules governing common carriers or other kind of business affected with a public duty, and, in the absence of statutory regulations of the business or of a statute, the proprietors are not, as in the case of common carriers, obligated to admit any one who may apply and be willing to pay for a ticket, but may admit or exclude persons at their pleasure, and if any one applies at the ticket office of a theater and desires to purchase tickets of admission and is refused, he has no cause of action against the proprietor of a theater for such refusal; that in the absence of a statute or statutory regulation, the proprietor may make such rules and regulations for the conduct of the business as he sees fit; he may segregate or exclude persons of all classes or races and admit only whomsoever he desires; that a ticket of admission to a theater or other place of amusement in the absence of a statute is a mere license and revocable at the will of the proprietor, and where the right of revocation has been exercised, if a ticket holder attempts to enter or if, after having entered, he refuses to leave, he becomes a trespasser and may be prevented from entering or may be removed after having entered, with such force as is necessary for the purpose, and it makes no difference whether the ticket is one for general admission or for particular seats in a designated portion of the house. Where, however, in the absence of a statute or statutory regulations, a ticket is sold by the proprietor or by one authorized or employed by him to sell tickets to a purchaser, whether white or colored, and who has paid the purchase price entitling him to a particular seat or portion of the house or for general admission and without fault or misconduct or misbehavior on his part, is by the proprietor, or by his agent or employee in the course of his employment, denied and refused to occupy the seat or portion of the house called for by the ticket and the ticket revoked, and no more force used than is necessary to prevent the purchaser from entering or occupying the seat or the portion of the house called for by the ticket and is not subjected to abusive or insulting or offensive language or otherwise by improper treatment, his only remedy is for breach of contract, and the measure of his damages the amount paid for the ticket and other legal and pecuniary damages sustained by him as a direct and proximate result of the breach;...
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...that if the games had not been performed they would have been liable for the purchase price. See, e. g., De La Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corp., 82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818 (1933). The authorities cited by the Falcons do not so much indicate that a ticket is not a contract, as hold that the selle......
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