Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. City of El Paso

• Decision Date: 15 January 2020
• Docket Number: EP-17-CV-00162-DCG
• Citation: 433 F.Supp.3d 1020
• Parties: YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO, a federally recognized sovereign Indian tribe, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EL PASO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

433 F.Supp.3d 1020

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO, a federally recognized sovereign Indian tribe, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF EL PASO, Defendant.

EP-17-CV-00162-DCG

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

Signed January 15, 2020

Justin J. Solimon, Michelle T. Miano, Alburquerque, NM, Kelli J. Keegan, Randolph Barnhouse, Barnhouse Keegan Solimon & West LLP, Los Ranchos deAlbuquerqe, NM, Kenneth F. Coffman, Ken Coffman Law Office, El Paso, TX, Thomas E. Luebben, Law Offices of Thomas E. Luebben, Sandia Park, NM, for Plaintiff.

Daniel Ortiz, Office of General Counsel, Maria Guadalupe Martinez, Oscar Guillermo Gabaldon, Jr, Karla Mariana Nieman, El Paso City Attorney's Office, El Paso, TX, Lynn H. Slade, Walter Eugene Stern, III, Nathan T. Nieman, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID C. GUADERRAMA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Defendant City of El Paso's ("City") "Motion for Summary Judgment" (ECF No. 56) ("City's Motion") and Plaintiff Ysleta del Sur Pueblo's ("Pueblo") "Motion for Summary Judgment" (ECF No. 57) ("Pueblo's Motion"). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the City's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized Indian Tribe.¹ In May 2017, the Pueblo brought this declaratory judgment action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1362, and 2201. It seeks judicial confirmation of the Pueblo's title to 111.73 acres of real property ("Property") encompassed by what is described as "the Ysleta Grant";² the Pueblo alleges that it is the owner of the Property under the 1751 Spanish Land Grant.³ It also asks the Court to enjoin the City from claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to the Property.⁴

On July 29, 2019, the City filed its instant motion for summary judgment. See City's Mot., ECF No. 56. That same day, the Pueblo also filed its instant motion for summary judgment. See Pueblo's Mot., ECF No. 57.

II. DISCUSSION

By its Motion, the City asserts that the Court should grant summary judgment in its favor because: (1) no dispute of facts exists regarding the absence of a 1751 Spanish Land Grant confirmed by a 1825 survey the Mexican government conducted; (2) the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the 1751 Spanish Land Grant has not been confirmed by Congress; (3) the Pueblo's claim is barred by the doctrine of laches; and (4) the State of Texas is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 required party which cannot be joined, and the resulting unavoidable prejudice to the State requires dismissal under Rule 19(b). City's Mot. at 3, 6, 19, 26.

By its Motion, the Pueblo argues that the Court should grant summary judgment in its favor because: (1) the Pueblo had official legal status as a "Pueblo de Indios" under Spanish colonial law, which meant that Spanish colonial law afforded the Pueblo's lands full protection as to prohibiting Spanish settlement on Indian lands, its privatization, and its alienation or conveyance to non-Indians; and (2) the Indian Non-Intercourse Act applies to the Property it claims. Pueblo's Mot. at 2, 10.

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the City's contention that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the Pueblo's claim on the merits. When dismissal is sought for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the proper procedural form is a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, not summary judgment. Stanley v. Cent. Intelligence Agency , 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the City filed a motion seeking summary judgment against the Pueblo, the Court construes the City's Motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment in the alternative. See United States v. One 1988 Dodge Pickup , 959 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[I]t is clear that the proper characterization of the motion for these purposes is not determined by the label that the motion bears."); Med. Components, Inc. v. Osiris Med., Inc. , 226 F. Supp. 3d 753, 760 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (construing a motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).

"When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss with a motion for summary judgment in the alternative, we must determine if subject matter jurisdiction is present before considering the substantive arguments of the summary judgment motion." Cupit v. United States , 964 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (W.D. La. 1997) (citing Stanley , 639 F.2d at 1157 ). Thus, the Court will first address subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and will only consider the merits of both summary judgment motions if dismissal is unwarranted.

A. Standard for Dismissal for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute...." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). But "[w]ithout jurisdiction[,] the court cannot proceed at all in any cause." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env. , 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle , 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) ). Federal courts are under a mandatory duty to dismiss a suit over which it has no jurisdiction. Stanley , 639 F.2d at 1157 (internal citations omitted). A court may properly dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss. , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).

"In considering a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the district court is ‘free to weigh the evidence and resolve factual disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear the case.’ " Flores v. Pompeo , 936 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc. , 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005) ). A district court may dispose of a motion to dismiss or lack of subject matter jurisdiction based "on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Id. (quoting Robinson v. TCI/US W. Commc'ns Inc. , 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997) ).

B. The Pueblo Asserts Federal Question Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362

The Pueblo asserts that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider its claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for federal question jurisdiction and under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 for civil lawsuits brought by Indian tribes. Compl. ¶ 6. Both § 1331 and § 1362 contain identical "arising under" language. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. ") (emphasis added) with 28 U.S.C. § 1362 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States ") (emphasis added). Section 1362 was enacted when § 1331 had a monetary requirement, similar to that now found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and was intended to permit Indian tribes to proceed in federal court even when the jurisdictional amount could not be met:

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide that the district courts are to have original jurisdiction of all civil actions brought by Indian tribes or bands wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. These civil actions would therefore be permitted without regard to the $10,000 jurisdictional amount provided in section 1331(a) of title 28, when brought by an Indian tribe or band under the authority of the new section added by the bill.

H.R. Rep. 89-2040 as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145, 3146; see also Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. State v. Oneida Cty., New York , 414 U.S. 661, 663, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) [hereinafter " Oneida I "] (noting the same); Ponca Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. Contl. Carbon Co. , 439 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174–75 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (same). The Supreme Court has also noted that § 1362 may grant federal jurisdiction over a claim brought by an Indian tribe where the claim was one which the United States could have brought on the tribe's behalf. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation , 425 U.S. 463, 474, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976) ("We think that the legislative history of § [1]362, though by no means dispositive, suggests than in certain respects tribes suing under this section were to be accorded treatment similar to that of the United States had it sued on their behalf.").

At any rate, the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent indicate that § 1362 does not provide federal court jurisdiction to a claim merely because it is brought by a federally recognized Indian tribe. Ponca Tribe , 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 ; Charrier v. Bell , 547 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D. La. 1982) ("Although the federal government has long had a special relation to the American Indian, the Congress has not provided for jurisdiction in the federal courts merely because an Indian Tribe is a party to the action."). Indeed, § 1362 will provide a jurisdictional basis for an Indian tribe's claims only if they satisfy the "arises under" requirement of § 1331. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez , 519 F.2d 479, 483 (10th Cir. 1975) ("[ Section] 1362 does not in our view dispense with the necessity of showing the presence of a federal question.... [I]n order for jurisdiction to attach under [§] 1362, the matter in controversy, and we emphasize that phrase, must itself arise under the Constitution, laws, or...