Yuba County v. Pioneer Gold-Mining Co.

• Decision Date: 29 August 1887
• Citation: 32 F. 183
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: COUNTY OF YUBA v. PIONEER GOLD MIN. CO. and others.

32 F. 183

COUNTY OF YUBA v. PIONEER GOLD MIN. CO. and others.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. California.

August 29, 1887

Syllabus by the Court

Under section 1 of the removal act, as amended by an act of March 3, 1887, the circuit court cannot take cognizance of a suit brought against a party in a district of which he is not an inhabitant; and section 2 does not authorize the removal of a suit brought in a state court against a party not an inhabitant of the district.

Section 2 of said act, as amended, does not authorize the removal of a suit from a state court to the United States circuit court which could not have been originally brought in said circuit court.

A. L Rhodes, for plaintiff.

Wm. M Stewart, for defendant.

Before FIELD, Justice; SAWYER, Circuit Judge; and SABIN, District judge.

SAWYER J.,

(FIELD, Justice, and SABIN, J., concurring.) The county of Yuba-- a county of the state of California-- brought a suit in equity, in the superior court of Yuba county, against the Pioneer Gold Mining Company, and the Cleveland & Sierra Gold Mining Company,-- two corporations,-- both organized in the state of Nevada, and existing under the laws of that state. The defendant, the Pioneer Gold Mining Company, removed the case from the state court to the United States circuit court, under the act of March 3, 1887, on the ground that the complainant is a citizen of the state of California, and the defendants are citizens of the state of Nevada. The question now presented, is, whether the act of March 3, 1887, authorizes a removal of this case? and we are all of the opinion that it does not. So far as applicable to this question, the act of 1887, Sec. 1, provides that, 'the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at law, or in equity, * * * in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states, * * * and no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts, against any person, by any original process of (doubtless, intended to be 'or') proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant.'

The habitation of a corporation, is, necessarily, in the state under whose laws it exists. It can have no other, and it is only recognized in other states and countries, upon principles of comity. Clearly, under the express and pointed prohibitory clause quoted, under this section alone, the suit could not have been originally brought in this court; and it could not have original jurisdiction, or, in the language of the act, 'original cognizance,' because a suit anywhere in the state of California, would not be in the district whereof either of the defendants is an inhabitant.

It is insisted on the part of the party removing, that the prohibitory clause is limited by the words, 'original process of proceeding;' that the prohibition does not extend to cases brought before the court by any other than 'original process of proceeding,' and does not prohibit a removal of a suit from a state court. But section 1, to which we must look for jurisdiction, does not provide for, or authorize, the obtaining of jurisdiction by removal, or otherwise. It defines and limits the jurisdiction of the courts, and goes not further. Section 2 is the section, that authorizes removals, and declares what cases may be removed. The clause of section 2 which covers this case, if any, authorizes the removal of 'any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the circuit courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by the preceding section,'-- that is to say, by section 1. But section 1 does not give jurisdiction of a suit brought against defendants, who are not inhabitants of the district wherein the suit is brought. Such a suit cannot be brought in the circuit court, nor can the court obtain jurisdiction under section 1. Strike section 2 from the act, and no jurisdiction at all could be obtained. If the court can have jurisdiction by removal, therefore, it must get it by virtue of the provisions of section 2, and not of the provisions of section 1; an...