Yuichi Inouye v. Clark, 5945-W.
| Decision Date | 05 September 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 5945-W.,5945-W. |
| Citation | 73 F. Supp. 1000 |
| Parties | YUICHI INOUYE et al. v. CLARK et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
James M. Carter, U. S. Atty., and Ronald Walker, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.
The plaintiffs of Japanese ancestry born in the United States and residents of the State of California bring this action to cancel and declare null and void their renunciations of citizenship made by them when they were confined and detained in Relocation Centers, with a large number of Japanese who are not citizens of the United States during the period of the war.
They claim to be citizens and nationals of the United States by birth and assert that their renunciations were not of their free and voluntary act but were the result of undue influence, mistake, duress and coercion. Jurisdiction is vested by Section 903, Title 8 U.S.C.A., wherein it is provided that any person who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States is denied such right by any department or agency upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, may institute an action in a District Court of the United States for a decree declaring him to be a national of the United States.
The applications for renunciations were made under Section 801 of the Nationality Act of 1940, authorizing them to be made in compliance with law.
The case, under stipulation, is before the court upon the merits and the record consists of the pleading and affidavits filed by the parties.
When considering the case, we must keep in mind that each of the plaintiffs' rights are to be considered and determined separately and according to the facts pertaining to them. While the question of whether the government had the power to confine the plaintiffs in the Relocation Centers is not presented, yet it seems pertinent to consider the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243, a Japanese, claiming citizenship by birth in the United States, as relating to the situation of the plaintiffs were in and their conduct before and after confined in the Relocation Centers, upon the thought as to whether they were loyal abiding citizens or violating any laws before and at the time of their applications for renunciations, or it was for the protection of the war effort against espionage and sabotage, as bearing upon their state of mind as to duress and coercion, as the Supreme Court held that the War Relocation Authority is without authority to subject to its leave procedure loyal and abiding citizens of the United States, as the purpose of the law was the protection of the effort against espionage and sabotage and there is no basis for keeping loyal evacuees of Japanese ancestry in custody on the ground of community hostility.
The record here presents no problem of disloyalty, violations of law, or espionage and sabotage, and when not, their confinement is repugnant to the basis of liberty, and should be considered only as to whether the fundamental principles of law are applicable as to age, mistake, duress or coercion existed which dominated and influenced their minds in not acting freely and voluntarily at the time the plaintiffs made their applications for renunciations. This is the primary thought to be considered in the present case.
The inquiry then is, under the record relating to these plaintiffs, what are the facts relating to each of them separately and the situation existing at the Center?
The plaintiff, Albert Yuichi Inouye, was a young boy of the age of seventeen years at the time he signed his application for renunciation and born in the United States. His parents were of Japanese ancestry and subject to being deported. He was the only son and had never been in Japan or had any feeling of loyalty to that country. He was with his family when they were evacuated from Los Angeles to the Manzanar Relocation Center in California and thereafter transferred to Santa Fe Detention Center, New Mexico, where he remained until his release. He was not disloyal to the United States or violated any law or performed any act or conduct that could be considered espionage and sabotage. Prior to his evacuation he attended the public schools and was active in the Christian Church, Y.M. C.A. athletics, participated in the contribution to the drives for infantile paralysis, tuberculosis, waste paper and purchased war savings stamps. While at the Relocation Center he was active in the American Red Cross project and went to school there. While seventeen years of age in March, 1945, he applied for renunciation and signed the application form furnished by the Department of Justice on July 9, 1945, and withdrew his renunciation on August 23, 1945, which was of no avail. While at the Relocation Center he was accorded another hearing and after proof of his loyalty to the United States had been evident was released in April, 1946. Soon after his release from the Center he volunteered for the United States Army, was ordered to report for overseas duty on November 2, 1946, and on November 16, 1946 for Military Intelligence school where he is presently stationed.
At the hearing before the government agent and what had occurred before, it appears clear that the youth yielded to parental compulsion and a clear case of "parental influence" in order to hold the family intact. In his application to withdraw his renunciation, he states that his renunciation was done under mistake and influence, not his free will and that he was a minor.
Two thoughts are presented relating to his renunciation: First, can one born in and a national of the United States legally renounce his citizenship at the age of seventeen years? Section 801 of the Nationality Act of 1940 is silent as to the age when a person may renounce his citizenship. A minor being one under the age of twenty-one cannot, by his activities, be legally deprived of his civil rights but the defendants contend that as Section 803 of the Nationality Act of 1940, provides that no national under eighteen years of age can expatriate himself under Subsection (b) to (g) inclusive, Section 803 requirement of eighteen years should apply to Subsection (i) of Section 801. It will be observed that both Section 801(i), under which the renunciations were made, and Section 803 were enacted at the same time and no mention as to age is made in Section 801, at which a person who is a national of the United States by birth...
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Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
...cards involuntary and not expatriating under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (5); Acheson v. Murakami, 9 Cir. 1949, 176 F.2d 953; Inouye v. Clark, S.D.Cal. 1947, 73 F.Supp. 1000, rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cir. 1949, 175 F.2d 740 decisions to renounce United States citizenship by Japanese-Americans con......
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Scardino v. Acheson, Civ. No. 700.
...or physical injury; if the plaintiff acted under duress, the acts of expatriation cannot be considered conclusive. Yuichi Inouye v. Clark, D.C.S.D.Cal.1947, 73 F.Supp. 1000; Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, 1 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 860. This court agrees with Tomasicchio v. Acheson, D.C.D.......
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