Yun Hee So v. Shin
Decision Date | 28 January 2013 |
Docket Number | B234636 |
Citation | 212 Cal.App.4th 652,151 Cal.Rptr.3d 257 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | YUN HEE SO, Plaintiff And Appellant, v. SOOK JA SHIN, HP Anesthesia Group., Defendants and Respondents. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James R. Dunn, Judge. Reversed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC443520)
Henry M. Lee & Associates, Henry M. Lee, and Robert Myong for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cassidy C. Davenport; Taylor Blessey, Raymond L. Blessey, and Barbara M. Reardon for Defendant and Respondent Sook Ja Shin.
Maranga•Morgenstern, Kenneth A. Maranga, Stephanie Charles; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Timothy T. Coates, and Carolyn Oill for Defendant and Respondent CHA–Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center.
Law Offices of Jeffrey C. Bogert and Jeffrey C. Bogert for Defendant and Respondent HP Anesthesia Group.
Plaintiff Yun Hee So (plaintiff) underwent a dilation and curettage procedure (D & C or procedure) in September 2008 following a miscarriage. She alleges that she was administered inadequate anesthesia and awoke during the procedure. When she later confronted the anesthesiologist, the anesthesiologist became angry, shoved a container filled with plaintiff's blood and tissue at her, and then urged plaintiff not to report the incident. Plaintiff sued the anesthesiologist and her medical group, as well as the hospital, asserting that the anesthesiologist's conduct constituted negligence, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the hospital and medical group were liable to her directly and through the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court sustained demurrers to the causes of action for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress; it later granted motions for judgment on the pleadings as to the cause of action for negligence. We reverse.
Plaintiff filed the present action on August 11, 2010, and filed the operative first amended complaint (complaint) on January 6, 2011. The complaint alleges the following: Defendant Sook Ja Shin (Dr. Shin) is an anesthesiologist employed by defendant HP Anesthesia Medical Group (medical group). On September 30, 2008, plaintiff was admitted to defendant Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center (hospital) 1 for a D & C following a miscarriage. Dr. Shin was the attending anesthesiologist. Plaintiff was administered insufficient anesthesia and awoke during the procedure, experiencing pain and discomfort.
After the procedure was over, plaintiff asked to speak to Dr. Shin, who came to the recovery room. Plaintiff asked Dr. Shin why she had awakened during the procedure. Dr. Shin became visibly upset and raised her voice. After hearing what plaintiff experienced, Dr. Shin admitted that plaintiff could have awakened during the procedure, but said that the suction sound and pain was nothing more than blood being suctioned from plaintiff's uterus. Dr. Shin was clearly angry that plaintiff had questioned her competence. Dr. Shin then left the room and returned with a container filled with blood and other materials. She was still visibly angry and spoke in a loud voice. She gestured with the container as if to hand it to plaintiff and then Subsequently, Dr. Shin offered to buy plaintiff dinner and “even bribed Plaintiff with a refund for the cost of the anesthesia, in exchange for Plaintiff's silence about the incident.”
At the time of the incident, Shin was on the verge of being terminated by the medical group or the hospital. Shin feared that plaintiff might report her conduct to the medical group or the hospital, and therefore Plaintiff reported the incident to the hospital, but it did not take any remedial action. Moreover, the hospital and medical group “knew at all times that SHIN was unfit to administer health care services and employed her and continued to employ her in spite of their knowledge of SHIN's unfitness.”
Plaintiff asserted three causes of action. The first cause of action, for negligence, alleges that Dr. Shin breached her duty of care to plaintiff, the incident did not constitute any form of health care, and “any reasonable person could foresee that showing Plaintiff a container filled with blood and other fragments, knowing Plaintiff had just finished a D & C procedure in the middle of which Plaintiff felt she had awoken and experienced the actual procedure being conducted, would cause Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress.” It also alleges that the hospital and medical group are liable to plaintiff pursuant to two theories: (1) directly, because they hired and continued to employ Dr. Shin despite their knowledge that she was not fit to provide health care services, and (2) indirectly, because Shin was their agent/employee. The second cause of action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleges that during the incident, Dr. Shin had actual knowledge that plaintiff was physically and emotionally distressed: Plaintiff had just been through a D & C, she had told Dr. Shin she had awakened during the procedure, and she was emotionally distraught and crying. Nonetheless, Dr. Shin reacted “with anger, rage and conscious disregard for Plaintiff's condition when SHIN brought in the container to try to prove to Plaintiff that Plaintiff was wrong and that SHIN was right.” The third cause of action, for assault and battery, alleges that Dr. Shin acted with the intent to place plaintiff in fear of an imminent offensive contact. Among other things, Dr. Shin The second and third causes of action allege that the hospital and medical group knew of Dr. Shin's tortious acts but did nothing about them, and therefore “have ratified, approved and consented to SHIN's intentional conduct and should be held liable to plaintiff.”
Dr. Shin and the hospital demurred to the second and third causes of action; the medical group joined the demurrers. As to the second cause of action (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Dr. Shin asserted that Further, Dr. Shin said, plaintiff pled no facts showing that she actually suffered severe emotional distress. Therefore, “because Plaintiff failed to plead facts establishing that this Defendant engaged in anything that approached ‘outrageous conduct,’ or that Plaintiff suffered ‘severe emotional distress,’ the Second Cause of Action is defective and this demurrer should be sustained.” As to the third cause of action (assault and battery), Dr. Shin contended that touching plaintiff was an essential part of providing the surgery to which plaintiff consented. Further, Dr. Shin's subsequent attempts to comfort her patient by “approaching the plaintiff to show her what was suctioned from her for the purposes of reassurance can hardly be argued to establish the requisite intent for a harmful and offensive contact; therefore, it is not an assault.”
The hospital also demurred to the second and third causes of action. The hospital contended that the second cause of action failed to plead extreme or outrageous conduct because “[t]he best that can be...
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