Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
• Writing for the Court: MOORE, Circuit Judge.
• Citation: Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior, 785 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
• Decision Date: 08 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–1529.,2014–1529.
• Parties: YUROK TRIBE, Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Appellee.

785 F.3d 1405

YUROK TRIBE, Appellant

v.DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Appellee.

No. 2014–1529.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 8, 2015.

Nathaniel Nesbitt, Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by Catherine Emily Stetson, Lacy Renee Logsdon.

Joseph Ashman, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by Joyce R. Branda, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Donald E. Kinner.

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

The Yurok Tribe (Tribe) appeals from the Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals' (Board) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. J.A. 2–3. Because the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, we affirm.

Background

In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self–Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 –450n. The ISDA encourages Indian tribes to manage federally-funded programs by authorizing the government to enter into “self-determination contracts” with tribes under which a tribe agrees to administer a program and the government agrees to fund the program. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785, 788 (Fed.Cir.2009). The statute directs the Secretary of the Interior, upon a tribe's request, to enter into a self-determination contract for programs that the Secretary is authorized to administer. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1). When a tribe wishes to enter into a self-determination contract, also known as a Title I contract, it submits a proposal to the Secretary. Id. § 450f(a)(2). The Bureau of Indian Affairs receives and reviews proposals for the Secretary. The statute mandates that “the Secretary shall, within ninety days after receipt of the proposal, approve the proposal and award the contract unless the Secretary provides written notification to the applicant” that the proposal does not meet certain statutory criteria. Id. Regulations governing the Bureau state that “[a] proposal that is not declined within 90 days ... is deemed approved and the Secretary shall award the contract ... within that 90–day period.” 25 C.F.R. § 900.18. In effect, if the Secretary does not timely respond to a Title I proposal, the proposal is deemed approved and the Secretary is directed to award a contract based on the terms of the proposal.

This case presents a request for a contract by the Tribe and a lack of response by the government. On October 12, 2011, the Tribe wrote a letter to the director of the Bureau's Office of Self Governance stating that it was “submitting this letter of interest for program inclusion and funding under title I of the [ISDA].” J.A. 18. The letter set forth a request for approximately $5.5M in annual funding to support the Tribe's Department of Public Safety, a request for $2M to fund facilities and infrastructure for the Department of Public Safety, a request for approximately $1.5M in annual funding to support the Tribe's Tribal Court, and a request for approximately $7.6M to fund facilities and infrastructure for the Tribal Court. J.A. 18–19. Attached to the 15–page letter was a Tribal Resolution authorizing the submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” J.A. 33.

On October 17, the Office of Self Governance sent an email to the Tribe stating that it did not “have authority to manage a Title I agreement.” J.A. 36. The email copied individuals in the Bureau's Office of Justice Services and stated that those individuals would need to be the primary contacts for a self-determination contract. Id. On October 28, the Office of Justice Services asked the Tribe “to clarify whether the Tribe is seeking a self-determination contract under Title I of the [ISDA] or, inclusion of programs and funding in a self-governance annual funding agreement under Title IV.” J.A. 41. The Office further stated that if the Tribe was “interested in submitting a proposal to enter into a self-determination contract, then [it should] contact the Office.” J.A. 41. On November 2, the Tribe wrote an email to the Office of Justice Services, regarding “availability tomorrow to meet ... regarding our recent Title 1 request.” J.A. 42. The Tribe then wrote emails requesting to “follow up regarding the Yurok Tribe's Title 1 request” on December 27, 2011, and January 30, 2012. J.A. 46.

It is undisputed that the Bureau did not decline the proposal in the Tribe's October letter within 90 days of receiving the letter. On February 1, 2012, the Tribe wrote a letter to the Office of Justice Services, stating that because the Bureau did not respond to the proposal set forth in the Tribe's October letter, “the contract is deemed approved and the Tribe seeks to receive the requisite contract documents.” J.A. 49. On February 8, the Office of Justice Services wrote a letter to the Tribe stating that the intent of the Tribe's October letter was unclear and did not meet the requirements of a self-determination contract proposal. J.A. 50–51. On February 15, the Tribe responded that because the Bureau did not timely decline the proposal, “[t]he Yurok Tribe demands the Secretary award forthwith the formal contract as required by section 900.18 and according to the terms of the Title I funding request.” J.A. 55.

A year later, in March 2013, the Office of Justice Services received a letter from the Tribe titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” J.A. 65. The letter referenced the Tribe's October letter, the Secretary's failure to respond to the Tribe's proposal within 90 days, and the deemed approval of the contract. J.A. 65. In response, the Office of Justice Services stated that the October letter was not a complete proposal, and that even if it were a proposal, the Secretary would have declined it. J.A. 67–73.

The Tribe then filed the present appeal. J.A. 79. It alleged that because the Secretary did not decline the Tribe's October 12 and February 15 letters, contracts with the terms set forth in the letters arose by operation of law and that the Bureau had not performed under these “deemed contract[s].” Id. Accordingly, the Tribe requested that the Board “[o]rder the Bureau to enter into a Title I contract as proposed by the Tribe in the letters dated October 12, 2011, and February 15, 2012.” J.A. 80.

The Tribe also filed a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA). J.A. 99. The Tribe alleged that the Bureau's inaction resulted in a deemed approval of the Tribe's proposal and a valid and enforceable contract. J.A. 104. After filing its appeal with the IBIA, the Tribe requested a stay of that appeal pending a decision by the Board. J.A. 103. The Tribe argued that the Board was the appropriate forum, but that it wanted to preserve the IBIA appeal in the event that the Board declined jurisdiction. Id.

In the IBIA's decision granting the Tribe's request for a stay, the IBIA considered its own jurisdiction. J.A. 105. It noted that to the extent the Tribe seeks to enforce a contract or assert claims based on an awarded contract, the IBIA would not have jurisdiction. J.A. 105. The IBIA noted “that the ISDA regulations appear to distinguish between a proposal being ‘deemed approved,’ and the Secretary's obligation, in such a case ‘to award the contract.’ ” J.A. 106 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.18 ; id. § 900. 19 (“Upon approval the Secretary shall award the contract....”); cf. id. § 900.13 (“Does the contract proposal become part of the final contract? No, unless the parties agree.”)). The IBIA concluded that although the Tribe contended that a deemed contract had arisen by operation of law, the case appeared to present a pre-award dispute, and consequently the IBIA had jurisdiction. J.A. 107. After deciding it had jurisdiction, it granted the Tribe's motion to stay. J.A. 107.

Back in the Board appeal, the government moved to dismiss, arguing that no contract exists between the Tribe and the government. J.A. 93–100. It argued that the Tribe's October letter was not detailed enough to constitute a contract proposal in the general sense and lacked specific details required for Title I proposals by 25 C.F.R. § 900.8. J.A. 96–97. It also argued that even if the proposal in the Tribe's October letter were deemed approved, the Bureau would not be obligated to fund the contract because the Tribe requested money for programs that the government is not currently providing. J.A. 97–98.

Finally, the government argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the Tribe's appeal because it is not a post-award contract dispute. J.A. 98. It argued that the “Board has jurisdiction over ‘[Department of Interior] self-determination contracts' and ‘disputes regarding an awarding official's decision relating to a self-determination contract.’ ” J.A. 98 (quoting 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.215(a), 900.222 and 25 C.F.R. § 900.151(a)(l ) ). It noted that, in contrast, the “IBIA has jurisdiction over ‘appealable pre-award decisions.’ ” J.A. 98 (quoting 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.150(i), 900.152 ). It argued that the IBIA was the proper forum in which to determine whether the Bureau was required to award the contract under § 900.18. J.A. 99.

The Board granted the government's motion to dismiss. First, it determined that no proposal was deemed approved because the 90–day deadline was never triggered. It found that the “Tribe's October 2011 letter is not clear in intent and lacks many of the details plainly required for a contract proposal by 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2) and 25 CFR 900.8.” J.A. 5. It determined that the Bureau was not required to notify the Tribe of the missing details—despite a regulation that requires the Bureau to notify tribes of missing details within 15 days—because the letter did not make clear that the Tribe was proposing a Title I contract. J.A. 5; see 25 C.F.R. § 900.15(b). It further determined that even if the Tribe made its intentions clear at an in-person meeting...