Z.D. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc.
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CT-644 |
| Decision Date | 06 October 2022 |
| Citation | 197 N.E.3d 330 |
| Parties | Z.D., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK, INC., Appellee-Defendant |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Neal F. Eggeson, Jr., Eggeson Privacy Law, Fishers, Indiana, Bradley C. Lohmeier, Lohmeier Law LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Jenny R. Buchheit, Sean T. Dewey, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] An employee of Community Health Network, Inc. (Community), put a letter with Z.D.’s medical diagnosis in an envelope addressed to another person. That person received the envelope in the mail, opened it, and posted the letter on Facebook, where it was seen by multiple third parties. Z.D. filed a multi-count complaint against Community, seeking damages for pecuniary losses, emotional distress, and loss of privacy. Community filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. With the exception of the ruling as to one count, Z.D. argues that the trial court erred. We hold that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Z.D.’s claim for invasion of privacy and her claim for pecuniary damages resulting from Community's alleged negligence, and therefore we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
[2] On September 30, 2018, Z.D. underwent an examination and medical testing in the emergency department of a Community facility in Indianapolis. Afterward, Community was unable to contact Z.D. via telephone to notify her of her test results. So on October 5, the emergency department's patient resource coordinator wrote a letter to Z.D. that was printed on Community letterhead and included her diagnosis and suggested treatment. The letter was placed in an envelope bearing Community's preprinted return address and the handwritten mailing address of Jonae Kendrick, who was a classmate of Z.D.’s high-school-aged daughter. Kendrick received the envelope in the mail, opened it, and posted the letter on Facebook, where it was seen by multiple third parties, including Z.D.’s daughter.1 Z.D. learned about her diagnosis from her daughter, and she paid Kendrick $100 in exchange for the letter, which was removed from Facebook.
[3] In January 2020, Z.D. filed a three-count complaint against Community alleging generally that Community's employee(s) "distributed [her] extremely sensitive and private health information to unauthorized person(s) and the general public" and that, as a result, she "suffered extensive injuries." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25. Specifically, Count 1 alleged that Community was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the distribution of Z.D.’s "extremely private and sensitive health records to unauthorized member(s) of the general public" and that, "[a]s a direct and proximate result" of those acts, Z.D. had suffered damages. Id. at 26. Count 2 alleged that Community was negligent in training, supervising, and retaining its employee(s). And Count 3 alleged that Community "owes a non-delegable duty to its patients to protect the privacy and confidentiality of their protected health information" and that Community "breached its statutory and common law duties of confidentiality and privacy to [Z.D.]" by having "no warning system, tracking software, or audit-trigger in place to alert it to or prevent its employee's unauthorized distribution of [Z.D.’s] protected health information before it was too late." Id. at 27, 28. Community filed a motion to dismiss Z.D.’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that her claims fell under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Z.D. filed a response disputing that allegation. The trial court denied Community's motion to dismiss, and Community did not appeal that ruling.
[4] Community then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Kendrick's posting of the letter on Facebook was an unforeseeable "criminal act" that broke "the chain of proximate causation[,]" that Z.D. could not recover emotional distress damages under a negligence theory, that Community could not be liable for negligent training and supervision if its employee was acting within the scope of employment, and that to the extent Z.D. sought to recover for an invasion of privacy, "her only potential tort claim would be the subtort of public disclosure of private facts, which Indiana does not recognize as valid." Id. at 101-02, 115. Z.D. filed a response, and Community filed a reply. In support of their filings, the parties designated the letter and the envelope, as well as excerpts from Z.D.’s medical records, deposition, and discovery responses.
[5] According to Z.D.’s medical records, shortly after the letter was posted to Facebook, Z.D. told her physician at Community that her fiancé "broke up with her after finding out" her diagnosis and "kicked her out of his house." Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 63. She stated that she started suffering depression "after all of the events of [the] last week" and was "down all the time, feeling hopeless." Id. She was prescribed an antidepressant and started attending counseling sessions.
[6] In her deposition, Z.D. testified that her coworkers and supervisor at the warehouse where she worked "found out" about her diagnosis "through their kids[,]" who learned about it either on Facebook or by other means. Id. at 50. She received "unwanted attention" from men at work, and she left her job because she "just wanted to be in an atmosphere that someone didn't know." Id. at 52. She also lost several clients of her hairdressing business whose children attended high school with her daughter. After Z.D.’s fiancé kicked her out of his house, she had to rent her own apartment. Z.D. testified that the diagnosis is Id. at 48. When asked by Community's counsel whether she had "any reason to think that Community [...] sent your letter to Ms. Kendrick on purpose or that Community did anything purposeful[,]" Z.D. replied, "No." Id. But later, when Z.D.’s counsel asked Z.D. whether she knew if "this incident was intentional by Community[,]" she replied, "I don't know." Id. at 59. She acknowledged that she did not "have any reason to believe that it was intentional[,]" but that it was "something that [was] still being investigated[.]" Id.
Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 164. Z.D. further stated that she was "seeking damages for loss of privacy and lost income for [her] job[,]" as well as for rent expenses and "emotional and mental distress." Id. at 165.2
[8] In March 2022, after a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Community's summary judgment motion. The court concluded that Count 2 of Z.D.’s complaint "fails as a matter of law" because Community had "acknowledged that its employee was acting within the scope of her employment." Appealed Order at 5. As for Counts 1 and 3, the court concluded that the modified impact rule and the bystander rule barred Z.D. from recovering emotional distress damages under a negligence theory; that Z.D. could not recover damages for loss of privacy because she did not specifically plead an invasion of privacy claim; and that Community was not the proximate cause of Z.D.’s alleged injuries as a matter of law. The order did not address pecuniary damages. Z.D. now appeals the trial court's order, but not as to Count 2, so we summarily affirm the ruling on that count. Additional facts will be provided below.
[9] We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo, taking care to ensure that no party is denied her day in court. Schoettmer v. Wright , 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). "Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Strickholm v. Anonymous Nurse Prac. , 136 N.E.3d 264, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). "A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences[.]" Williams v. Tharp , 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (citations omitted).
[10] "To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the other party's claim." Strickholm , 136 N.E.3d at 267. "Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist." Id. (italics omitted). "Our review of a summary judgment ruling is limited to those materials designated to the trial court." Millikan v. City of Noblesville , 160 N.E.3d 231, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). "In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, all doubts must be resolved against the moving party and the facts set forth by the party opposing the motion must be accepted as true." Strickholm , 136 N.E.3d at 267 ().
[11] ...
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