Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Division, Dept. of Revenue

• Decision Date: 10 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 25920,25920
• Citation: 516 P.2d 634,183 Colo. 335
• Parties: John Henry ZABA and Jack Dayton Work, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of Colorado, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 634

516 P.2d 634

183 Colo. 335

John Henry ZABA and Jack Dayton Work, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of

Colorado, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 25920.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Dec. 10, 1973.

William Pehr, Perry W. Fox, Westminster, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., James K. Tarpey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellee.

HODGES, Justice.

Appellants Zaba and Work in separate proceedings before the appellee (Motor Vehicle Division) had their driver's licenses suspended. In both cases, an accumulation of points derived from traffic violations was the basis for the suspensions which are authorized by statutory law.

1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--4--23(1)(a) in pertinent part provides:

'The department shall have the authority to suspend the license of any operator or chauffeur who, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points within any twelve consecutive months, or eighteen points within any twenty-four consecutive months, . . ..'.

In the Zaba case, because of the dates of the administrative proceedings, the 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--4--23(1)(a) was the statute in force. However, it is identical with the pertinent part of the 1969 version quoted above which is the statute applicable in the Work case. For the purposes of this opinion therefore, we will refer only to the 1969 amendment.

Both Zaba and Work in separate cases appealed their license suspensions to the district court. In each case, the district court affirmed the suspensions. Zaba and Work, who are represented by the same attorney, thereupon initiated appeals to this court. Their cases have been consolidated in this court because of several constitutional issues common to both. We resolve all these issues and alleged errors in favor of the appellee and therefore, affirm the judgments in the district court.

I.

The appellants contend that 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--4--23(1)(a) is unconstitutional for the following reasons: It is overbroad in its terminology; it is vague and indefinite; and it contains standards which are unmanageable and uncertain. Thus, the appellants argue that this statute violates their rights to due process of law. The appellants also allege that the statute constitutes an unreasonable exercise of the police power.

All of the appellants' arguments in this regard are directed against that portion of 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--4--23(1)(a) which is quoted in the second paragraph of this opinion. It is the appellants' position that when this part of the statute grants the Motor Vehicle Division authority to suspend the driver's license of any operator who has accumulated 'twelve points within Any twelve consecutive months, or eighteen points within Any twenty-four consecutive months' (emphasis added.), it is overbroad, vague, indefinite and thus, in violation of the appellants' constitutional rights of due process of law. They maintain that the authority delegated to the Motor Vehicle Division is an unbridled and unlimited power which actually grants that agency the power to suspend a driver's license for point accumulation in Any prior period which the Motor Vehicle Division might delve up from the operator's past driving history. The appellants argue that the Motor Vehicle Division under the authority of this statute as it is worded could conceivably suspend a driver's license in 1972 for a point accumulation in 1942. These arguments by the appellants are without merit.

Legislative history clearly demonstrates that it was the intent of the legislature to authorize the Motor Vehicle Division to consider that period of time ending with the date of the last violation involved. In Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540, 383 P.2d 791 (1963), we held that an earlier version of this statute required that the 24-month period is to be computed from the anniversary date of the issuance of the driver's license and we specifically rejected the argument that the 24-month period could be 'any' 24-months. After the announcement of the Markham opinion, the legislature amended the statute by inserting the word 'any' to avoid the anniversary year requirement of the earlier statute as interpreted by this court. Clearly, it was the legislative intent to allow the computation of the time period to start from any month rather than from the anniversary date of the issuance of the license. The legislature did not intend by this statute to empower the Motor Vehicle Division to delve back into the driving history of any operator for the purpose of suspending his license.

A statute should be given the construction and interpretation which will render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted. In Re Questions Concerning 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--15 and 16, Colo., 499 P.2d 1169 (1972). Also, a statute which is susceptible to more than one interpretation should be interpreted so as to render it constitutional.

A statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it is clearly shown otherwise. Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970); Asphalt Paving v. County Comm'rs, 162 Colo. 254, 425 P.2d 289 (1967). Here, the appellants clearly have not demonstrated that the statute involved here is unconstitutional nor that it was applied in an unconstitutional manner. It should be pointed out that neither of the appellants claim that the period during which they accumulated points involved a period other than a period which ended at the date of the last traffic violation involved in each record.

As to the appellants' allegation that this statute constitutes an unreasonable exercise of the police power, we reiterate what we have previously stated many times that an individual's right to use the highways of the state is an adjunct of the constitutional right to acquire, possess and protect property. This right, however, is not absolute. It may be limited by a proper exercise of the police power of the state based upon a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety and welfare. Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970) and People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961).

Our holding in People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513, 485 P.2d 500 (1971) has application here on the issue of reasonable use of the police power. We stated therein as follows:

'This Court, in recognizing that the regulation and control of traffic upon the highways has a definite relationship to the public safety, expressly declared that the general assembly could establish standards of fitness and competence which a citizen must meet before he is entitled to exercise the right to drive upon the highways; and likewise, the general assembly may declare when by an abuse of that right or other just cause the right to drive may be curtailed and the license of a driver revoked. In other words, there is no constitutionally guaranteed illimitable right to drive upon highways.'

In several other respects, the appellants have contended that either the statute or the procedures utilized in suspending their licenses violated...