Zagar v. Field Enterprises Educational Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 62734,62734
• Citation: 58 Ill.App.3d 750,16 Ill.Dec. 122,374 N.E.2d 897
• Parties: , 16 Ill.Dec. 122 Lottie A. ZAGAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIELD ENTERPRISES EDUCATIONAL CORPORATION, William Phillips and Betty Bennett, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 897

374 N.E.2d 897

58 Ill.App.3d 750, 16 Ill.Dec. 122

Lottie A. ZAGAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIELD ENTERPRISES EDUCATIONAL CORPORATION, William Phillips and Betty Bennett, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 62734.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

March 22, 1978.

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1978.

Lottie A. Zagar, pro se.

Isham, Lincoln & Beale, A. Daniel Feldman and Marlene R. Abrams, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

McGILLICUDDY, Justice.

The plaintiff, Lottie A. Zagar, a non-lawyer who appeared pro se in the trial court and in this court, filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Count I of her amended complaint alleged that Field Enterprises Educational Corp., William Phillips, its employee-relations manager, and Betty Bennett, the plaintiff's supervisor, breached the plaintiff's contract with Field. Count II alleged that Betty Bennett maliciously interfered with the plaintiff's performance under the contract causing her dismissal from Field. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings alleging that neither count stated a cause of action. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff sought to vacate the court's dismissal order and to reinstate the amended complaint, or in the alternative, the plaintiff moved that she be allowed to file a second amended complaint. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff has appealed from the order granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing both counts of her amended complaint. However, she no longer asks that she be given leave to file a second amended complaint as urged in the trial court. Rather, she stands on her amended complaint and asks that the trial court's order be reversed and the cause remanded to allow the defendants to answer.

The well-pleaded allegations of Count I of the amended complaint essentially show that on August 28, 1972, the plaintiff began working for Field as a beginning micro-typist in the keypunch department at a salary of.$99 per week. The plaintiff alleges that she is unable to state the exact terms of her employment, in which case we may assume for purposes of ruling on the propriety of the dismissal order, that the employment relationship was terminable at the will of either party, with or without cause. Roemer v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1975), 25 Ill.App.3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582.

The plaintiff further alleges that on January 12, 1973, she, Arlene Mehnke, department manager, and Phillips entered into a "memorandum." A copy of this memorandum appears as an exhibit attached to the complaint. This "Interoffice Correspondence" provides in pertinent part:

"SUBJECT: Final Warning.

"A meeting was held today in my (Phillips') office among Lottie Zagar, Arlene Mehnke and myself to discuss a problem regarding Miss Zagar's work progress. Miss Zagar feels that her many errors and low production rate are because of the amount of training she has had to date. It has been agreed that one more hour of individual training by Kevin Foster should be sufficient to throughly (sic) allow Miss Zagar basic fundamentals of the Logic Machine. We will then watch Miss Zagar's work through January 18th for errors and speed. We expect by that time that her work will be comparable to others at the same stage of development.

"If at the end of one week, things do not work out, we will see what other openings there are at night and transfer her.

Should there be no openings available, we will have to terminate her."

The plaintiff alleges that Field and the other defendants breached the agreements contained in this memorandum because she was not given one full week, but was terminated summarily before the work day of January 19, 1973, and because the defendants made no effort to locate another opening for her as promised. As a result of this breach, the plaintiff alleges that she was damaged. The plaintiff makes other allegations in Count I, some of which relate to the supposed reasons for which she was fired. However, the memorandum is the foundation of Count I and other allegations which seek to explain, modify or interpret this memorandum are not controlling.

We find that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I of the amended complaint. The interoffice correspondence is not a contract....