Zainc v. City of Waterbury
| Citation | 603 F.Supp.2d 368 |
| Decision Date | 23 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:06CV01516(DJS).,3:06CV01516(DJS). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Sean ZAINC and William Demers, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF WATERBURY, Sgt. Setzer, Jaimie Hobart, Joseph Costanzo, Patrolman T. Cavenaugh, Patrolman S. Laferrier, Lt. M. Edwards, and James Egan, Defendants. |
John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, Robert A. Serafinowicz, Bojka Law Offices, Waterbury, CT, for Plaintiffs.
Cheryl E. Johnson, Law Office of Cheryl E. Johnson, Waterbury, CT, for Defendants.
The plaintiffs, Sean Zainc ("Zainc") and William Demers ("Demers") (collectively, "the Plaintiffs") bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants, the City of Waterbury ("the City"), Sgt. Setzer ("Setzer"), Jaimie Hobart ("Hobart"), Joseph Costanzo ("Costanzo"), Patrolman T. Cavenaugh ("Cavanaugh")1, Patrolman S. Laferrier ("Laferriere")2, Lt. M. Edwards ("Edwards"), and James Egan ("Egan") (collectively, "the Defendants") alleging that the Defendants violated the Plaintiffs' rights under the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants violated the Connecticut Constitution and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon them, and that Costanzo subjected Demers to assault and battery. The Defendants have filed a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that hereafter follow, the Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment (dkt. # 50) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
At all times relevant to this case, the individual Defendants were members of the City's Police Department. Setzer held the rank of Sergeant; Edwards, who now holds the rank of Captain, held the rank of Lieutenant; Cavanaugh held the rank of patrol officer; Laferriere held the rank of patrol officer; Egan held the rank of Deputy Chief in charge of operations and Commander of the Detective Bureau; Costanzo held the rank of patrol officer; and Hobart held the rank of patrol officer.
In the early morning of October 4, 2005, the Plaintiffs and defendants Hobart and Costanzo were patrons at Boru's Bar and Grill ("Boru's") in Waterbury, Connecticut. There is evidence that both Hobart and Costanzo were intoxicated. Soon before Boru's was to close, Hobart realized that she could not locate her cell phone. Hobart began to ask other patrons at Boru's, including the Plaintiffs, whether they had seen her phone. It appears that she did this a number of times. When nobody admitted to knowing where the phone was, she and Costanzo began accusing other patrons of stealing the phone.
After Boru's closed, this situation continued into the parking lot. There is evidence that, once in the parking lot, Costanzo began to focus his attention upon Demers, who continued to deny stealing the phone. The verbal altercation between Costanzo and Demers soon became physical. Demers claims that Costanzo assaulted him. According to the Plaintiffs, Costanzo threatened to arrest anybody who tried to stop him. In addition, Hobart had moved her car so as to prevent other vehicles, including the Plaintiffs' vehicle, from leaving.
At some point during this incident, Hobart and Costanzo dialed 911 three times. During the first call, Hobart, who apparently did not address the 911 dispatcher, could be heard saying things to the effect of "keep running your mouth," "do you know who you're fuckin' talking to," and "I am a cop you fuckin' asshole." (See dkt # 70, Ex. II.) During the second call, Costanzo identified himself as a police officer to the 911 dispatcher and asked that a police car be sent to Boru's because his "partner," whom he identified as another police officer, had her phone stolen. (See id.) During the third call, Hobart told the 911 dispatcher that there was a fight at Boru's "with two cops and a bunch of kids." (See id.)
The first police unit to arrive at the scene consisted of Cavanaugh and Laferriere. Upon arriving at the scene, Cavanaugh and Laferriere noticed several individuals in the parking lot and recognized that two of those individuals, Hobart and Costanzo, were off-duty police officers. The parties admit that Cavanaugh's and Laferriere's duties at the scene were to separate the disputing parties, inquire if anyone needed medical attention, and maintain the peace until a supervisor arrived at the scene. The Plaintiffs maintain, however, that as soon as Cavanaugh and Laferriere arrived on the scene, they immediately shook hands with Costanzo, asked him what had happened, and placed the Plaintiffs into custody. Moreover, the Plaintiffs maintain that none of the Defendants ever offered Demers any medical treatment for the injuries he sustained at the hands of Costanzo.
Within a few minutes, Setzer arrived at the scene to investigate. The Defendants maintain that Setzer was the only officer at the scene investigating the incident. The Plaintiffs allege that Edwards also arrived at the scene to investigate. According to Zainc, he saw a white officer conduct an inquiry at the scene, point at Demers, and order that Demers be arrested. Setzer is black.
The parties agree that, at some point after the arrival of the other police officers at the scene, Hobart called Egan at home, apparently to seek his help or advice. Egan held the highest rank out of all the individual defendants in this case. It is undisputed that it was not normal protocol for Hobart to call Egan, who was a friend of Hobart's father, and that by doing so, Hobart broke the chain of command.
Eventually, Demers was placed under arrest for breaching the peace, and Zainc was placed under arrest for interfering with a police officer. Setzer, the sergeant on the scene, made the decision to arrest them. It does not appear that either Hobart or Costanzo was arrested. According to the Plaintiffs, Costanzo and Hobart were allowed to drive away from the scene even though they were intoxicated. The Plaintiffs were transported to the police headquarters for booking. Egan, who had not been on duty at the time of the incident, arrived at the headquarters around 2:00 a.m. Both Plaintiffs state that they were questioned there. The criminal charges against the Plaintiffs were eventually dropped by the State's Attorney for the Judicial District of Waterbury.
The Internal Affairs Department ("the IAD") of the Waterbury Police Department conducted an investigation of Hobart's and Costanzo's conduct. The IAD then issued a report wherein it found that both Hobart and Costanzo had taken "considerable police action in a member involved dispute." (Dkt.# 63, Ex. 11.) The IAD also found that: both Hobart and Costanzo, after using physical force during the incident at Boru's, failed to file a use of force report; Hobart, when calling 911, used profanity, failed to identify herself, and failed to give concise information about the incident; Costanzo, when calling 911, failed to give concise information about the incident; both Hobart and Costanzo failed to conduct themselves in a manner that reflected favorably on the Waterbury Police Department; and that Hobart had violated the chain of command.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants are liable for: unreasonable force; false arrest; false imprisonment; malicious prosecution; denial of medical treatment; and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Defendants now move for partial summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the City; (2) probable cause existed to arrest the Plaintiffs; (3) the Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment; (4) the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Egan, Edwards, and Setzer in their supervisory capacities; (5) there are no material facts to support a claim that Hobart used unreasonable force against Zainc; (6) there are not material facts to support a claim that Egan, Edwards, Setzer, Cavanaugh, or Laferriere used unreasonable force against the Plaintiffs; (7) there are no material facts to support the claims that Egan, Edwards, Setzer, Cavanaugh, Laferriere, Costanzo, or Hobart falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, or maliciously prosecuted the Plaintiffs; (8) Demers has failed to state a claim against all the Defendants for a denial of medical treatment; (9) there are no material facts to support the claim that the Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs; (10) all the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (11) Hobart and Costanzo are entitled to qualified immunity regarding the issue of acting under "color of law." The Plaintiffs refute all of the Defendants' arguments, arguing that the Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on any of the claims in the complaint. The Court shall discuss the parties' arguments seriatim.4
A motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The burden is on the moving party `to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'" Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.1981) (quoting...
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