Zalewski v. Waterbury Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1914
• Citation: 89 Conn. 46,92 A. 682
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ZALEWSKI v. WATERBURY MFG. CO.

92 A. 682

89 Conn. 46

ZALEWSKI

v. WATERBURY MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 21, 1914.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; William H. Williams, Judge.

Action by Ignatius Zalewski against the Waterbury Manufacturing Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Error, and new trial ordered.

The plaintiff was employed in the defendant's factory as a pressman, and was injured by the punch falling on his hand. The plaintiff claimed, and offered evidence to prove, that the accident was caused by a defective condition of the clutch and the attachments and gearing connected with the treadle.

After the jury had been impaneled, plaintiff's counsel, a member of the New York bar, asked permission to examine the jurors individually as to their interest and qualifications to act as jurors in the cause, and the trial judge declined to allow any examination of the individual jurors, stating that it rested in the discretion of the trial judge whether or not to allow such examination in a civil cause, and that the practice was not to allow it except for special reasons. Counsel made several ineffectual attempts to induce the trial judge to allow specific questions to be put, and, after repeated refusals, submitted to the ruling without taking any exception. Neither the court nor any of the counsel appear to have had actual knowledge of chapter 146 of the Public Acts of 1913, then in force, giving either party a right to so examine jurors in civil causes.

Charles A. Ludlow, of New York City (Francis J. Hogan, of Waterbury, on the brief), for appellant.

E. Henry Hyde, of Hartford, for appellee.

BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above). The only assignments of error we deem it necessary to discuss relate to the refusal of the court to permit counsel to examine the jurors individually in accordance with the act of 1913. It is necessarily admitted, in view of the statute, that the ruling of the court was erroneous, and the real question is whether the point of law has been lost or waived by the appellant submitting to the ruling without taking an exception. We think there was no intentional waiver, and that what was said in submitting to the ruling must be understood as spoken in view of the trial court's statement that it was a matter of discretion, and in the belief that the point had already been pressed as far as the court was disposed to permit counsel to go. Before discussing the question whether an exception was necessary, it is to be observed that the statute does not govern the substantive rights of the parties, as was the case in Cunningham v. Cunningham, 72 Conn. 157, 44 Atl. 41, where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that it did not state a cause of action, although the statute which was overlooked expressly gave a right of action under the facts alleged. The statute here in question merely governs a detail of procedure, and the error is not one which would require this court to order a new trial on that ground, regardless of whether the question was properly presented on the record. It should also be observed that the statute on its face applies to all civil actions, and does not exclude pending suits; so that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of it, although his suit was brought some time before the statute was enacted. Neilson v. Perkins, 86 Conn. 425, 427, 85 Atl. 686; Lew v. Bray, 81 Conn. 213, 217, 70 Atl. 628; Atwood v. Buckingham, 78 Conn. 423, 426, 62 Atl. 616.

We do not think an exception was necessary in this case. None is expressly required by any statute or rule of court. Paragraph 116 of the rules of the superior court provides that no ruling relating to the reception or rejection of evidence will be reviewed, unless the...