Zalewski v. Zalewski

• Docket Number: 357047
• Decision Date: 28 July 2022
• Citation: Zalewski v. Zalewski, 342 Mich.App. 429, 995 N.W.2d 553 (Mich. App. 2022)
• Parties: Francis H. ZALEWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Casimir J. ZALEWSKI, Defendant-Appellee, and Department of Health and Human Services, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

342 Mich.App. 429

995 N.W.2d 553

Francis H. ZALEWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Casimir J. ZALEWSKI, Defendant-Appellee, and Department of Health and Human Services, Appellant.

No. 357047

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 12, 2022, at Detroit.

Decided July 28, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.

Simasko, Simasko & Simasko, PC, Mount Clemens (by Patrick M. Simasko ) and Robert Charles Davis for Frances Zalewski.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Geraldine A. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Health and Human Services.

Before: Jansen, P.J., and O'Brien and Hood, JJ.

Per Curiam.

The Department of Health and Human Services(DHHS) appeals as of right an order for spousal support directing transfer of essentially all of defendant's assets and income to plaintiff.DHHS contends that plaintiff's sole purpose for initiating this action for separate maintenance was to impoverish defendant so that he would qualify for Medicaid benefits, while simultaneously preserving the marital estate for her use.DHHS argues that the trial court could not properly enter a domestic-relations order when the parties did not truly intend to end their marriage, plaintiff failed to comply with statutory and court-rule requirements regarding actions for separate maintenance, and there was no evidence warranting entry of the support order.We decline to address these issues because DHHS did not take the appropriate procedural steps to present them for review.The only issue properly before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying DHHS's motion for reconsideration of the support order.Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for separate maintenance, stating that she and defendant had lived together as husband and wife for several decades until defendant suffered a stroke that required his placement in a nursing home.Plaintiff further alleged that if she ever became disabled "her income and assets will be insufficient to support herself if the Defendant's income and assets would be used to pay for his care in the nursing home or long term care facility."But "[o]nce on Medicaid, 100% of Defendant's care needs will be met by his Medicaid benefits."Plaintiff asked the court to order defendant to pay spousal support "in the amount of [the] total marital estate" and assign his Social Security income to plaintiff.The parties stipulated to entry of a support order, and, after a perfunctory hearing on the matter, the trial court entered the parties’ proposed order.¹

Designating itself as an "interested party," DHHS moved for reconsideration of the support order.DHHS argued that the parties were attempting to evade Medicaid policy regarding eligibility for, and the extent of, long-term-care benefits—which were available only to those with minimal financial resources—and that this Court had previously disapproved of similar schemes undertaken in probate proceedings.DHHS further argued that the support order did not comport with certain statutes and court rules governing separate-maintenance actions or caselaw requiring equitable distribution of marital assets.Plaintiff and defendant both opposed DHHS's motion, arguing, in part, that DHHS could not participate in the domestic-relations action.The trial court agreed that third-party intervention in domestic-relations matters was only permitted in limited circumstances that did not apply to DHHS, and denied DHHS's motion for reconsideration.

As an initial matter, we must first address plaintiff's arguments regarding the proper scope of this appeal.Plaintiff maintains that the only issue properly before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying DHHS's motion for reconsideration.We agree.

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion decisions regarding motions for reconsideration, which occurs when the trial court"chooses an outcome outside the range of principled outcomes."Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. TNT Equip., Inc. , 328 Mich.App. 667, 672, 939 N.W.2d 738(2019)."Whether a party has standing is a question of law that is reviewed de novo."Mich. Ass'n of Home Builders v. City of Troy , 504 Mich. 204, 212, 934 N.W.2d 713(2019).

Michigan common law does not include authority to grant a judgment of divorce.Stamadianos v. Stamadianos , 425 Mich. 1, 5, 385 N.W.2d 604(1986).Instead, "[t]he jurisdiction of the circuit courts in matters of divorce is strictly statutory."Id .MCL 552.6(1) states, "A complaint for divorce may be filed in the circuit court upon the allegation that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved."MCL 552.7(1) similarly grants jurisdiction to the circuit court in actions for separate maintenance, which "may be filed in the circuit court in the same manner and on the same grounds as an action for divorce."

In Estes v. Titus , 481 Mich. 573, 577, 751 N.W.2d 493(2008), Julie Swabash divorced Jeff Titus after he was incarcerated for murder.Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Swabash received nearly all of the marital assets.Id.The victim's widow, Jan Estes, unsuccessfully sought to intervene in the divorce action to challenge the distribution of assets, but she did not appeal the court's denial of her motion to intervene.Id.After she obtained a judgment against Titus in a separate wrongful-death action, Estes moved to join Swabash in that case on the basis that the property settlement was a fraudulent transfer of Titus's assets.Id. at 577-578, 751 N.W.2d 493.The trial court did not permit the joinder, reasoning that it lacked authority to amend Swabash and Titus's divorce judgment.Id. at 578, 751 N.W.2d 493.

The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Estes's failure to appeal the divorce court's denial of her motion to intervene did not have a preclusive effect on the issue of whether fraud occurred because the divorce court did not have jurisdiction over that issue and could not have decided it on the merits.Id. at 583-586, 751 N.W.2d 493.The Court explained that "the jurisdiction of a divorce court is strictly statutory and limited to determining ‘the rights and obligations between the husband and wife, to the exclusion of third parties ....’ "Id. at 582-583, 751 N.W.2d 493, quotingYedinak v. Yedinak , 383 Mich. 409, 413, 175 N.W.2d 706(1970).And although an exception exists allowing third parties to be "joined in the divorce action only if they have conspired with one spouse to defraud the other spouse of a property interest," that exception did not apply to Estes.Estes , 481 Mich. at 583, 751 N.W.2d 493.

Estes and Yedinak make clear that, as a general rule, "a divorce court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of third-party creditors."Souden v. Souden , 303 Mich.App. 406, 410, 844 N.W.2d 151(2013).When a person other than the husband or wife claims an interest in divorce proceedings, intervention is not permitted, and the third-partyclaimant must rely on other proceedings to pursue the claim.See, e.g., Cassidy v. Cassidy , 318 Mich.App. 463, 494-495, 899 N.W.2d 65(2017)(discussing earlier caselaw requiring the wife's parents to file an independent action to recover money loaned to the husband and wife);Killingbeck v. Killingbeck , 269 Mich.App. 132, 140 n 1, 711 N.W.2d 759(2005)(indicating that the biological father's only recourse was a paternity action, rather than intervention in divorce proceedings between the biological mother and her husband).

Plaintiff and defendant were the only proper parties in this action for separate maintenance.There was no suggestion that DHHS conspired with either party to defraud the other, so DHHS's involvement in this case does not fall within the narrow fraud exception for third-party joinder.Rather, DHHS moved for reconsideration of the support order on the basis that the order improperly placed the financial burden of defendant's long-term care on DHHS.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying DHHS's motion for reconsideration.Like any other person claiming to be adversely affected by the support order, DHHS had to pursue a remedy through means other than involvement in the divorce proceedings.

Contrary to plaintiff's position on appeal, however, our conclusion that the trial court's ruling was within the range of principled outcomes does not end our analysis.Another important question remains: Can DHHS still challenge the merits of the support order as an aggrieved party with appellate standing?

Federated Ins. Co. v. Oakland Co. Rd. Comm. , 475 Mich. 286, 715 N.W.2d 846(2006), is the predominant authority addressing appellate standing.After petroleum released by the defendant migrated to neighboring property, the landowner plaintiff and his insurer filed a cost-recovery action under the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.20101 et seq.Id. at 288-289, 715 N.W.2d 846.The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant, concluding that the action was time-barred, and this Court affirmed.Id. at 289, 715 N.W.2d 846.The parties did not timely appeal this Court's decision.Id.The Attorney General, however, "[o]n behalf of the people of the state and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality," filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court as an intervening appellant, arguing that this Court misconstrued the NREPA.Id. at 289, 715 N.W.2d 846.The Supreme Court granted the application, but it declined to address the merits of the Attorney General's position, reasoning that there was no justiciable controversy because the Attorney General did not represent an aggrieved party and neither of the losing parties below had pursued a timely appeal.Id. at 289, 297, 715 N.W.2d...