Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz

• Decision Date: 04 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-1601,SUAREZ-CRUZ,ZAMBRANA-MARRERO,98-1601
• Citation: 172 F.3d 122
• Parties: Zasha, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Carlos, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 122

172 F.3d 122

Zasha ZAMBRANA-MARRERO, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Carlos SUAREZ-CRUZ, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 98-1601.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard March 4, 1999.

Decided April 21, 1999.

Judith Berkan and Federico Lora Lopez for appellants.

John F. Nevares with whom Gustavo A. Gelpi, John M. Garcia and Isabel Abislaiman for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, COFFIN and CYR, Senior Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

This case requires us to examine once again the often difficult concept of "under color of state law" as it relates to the death of a private individual at the hands of police officers. Plaintiffs, the widow and four children of Rembert Zambrana-Rodriguez ("Zambrana"), filed this lawsuit seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Puerto Rico law after Zambrana died from injuries he suffered when two police officers intervened in a fight at a bar. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the pendent state law claims, on the ground that the officers' conduct constituted private violence rather than violence "under color of state law" as required for liability under section 1983. Our review of the record and case law persuades us that the issue should have gone to the jury. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

Consistent with our obligation in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties, and also draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 44 (lst Cir.1999).

On the night of June 10, 1993, Zambrana was socializing at Freddy's Pub in Carolina, Puerto Rico, when he insulted the girlfriend of the bar's owner, Freddie Casablanca. A verbal exchange between Zambrana and Casablanca quickly escalated into a physical fight. Other patrons in the crowded bar gathered around to watch, and some of them attempted to separate the two men.

Among those at the bar at the time were two police officers, Carlos Suarez-Cruz ("Suarez") and Angel Rolon-Mercado ("Rolon"), who had been playing pool in an area somewhat removed from the site of the fight. The officers had been together since shortly after ending their shift earlier that evening and had attended a birthday party for another officer before driving in Suarez's personal car to the pub. The officers were partially in uniform, both wearing their police-issue pants and boots. Rolon also was wearing a t-shirt identified with the letters "DOT," the Spanish acronym for the Tactical Operations Division of the police department. Both also were carrying their police-issue weapons, pursuant to departmental regulations. ¹

Rolon encountered the fight when he walked over to the bar to get more beer. He returned initially to Suarez to tell him what was going on, and then went back to where the fight was taking place, with Suarez following. At this point, Casablanca and Zambrana were on the floor; Zambrana was pulling Casablanca's neck chain, which was cutting the back of his neck and "choking" him, and Casablanca was trying to free himself. When the two fighters rose to their feet, Rolon and Suarez entered the fray: Suarez grabbed Zambrana by putting his arm around Zambrana's neck, forcing him to let go of Casablanca. Other bystanders assisted Casablanca, who went to the bathroom to clean up. Although Casablanca was no longer involved, the fracas continued. As Zambrana attempted to free himself from Suarez's hold, Rolon began hitting Zambrana with all available objects, including a pool cue and billiard ball, his boots and his service revolver.

By all accounts, Rolon's attack on Zambrana was excessively vicious. ² Suarez sent Rolon to retrieve handcuffs from the officers' car, and Suarez managed to place them on Zambrana by sitting on top of him and pulling his arms behind his back. One witness stated that Rolon told those gathered around the scene in the bar not to intervene because he and Suarez were police officers. ³ After Zambrana was handcuffed, Casablanca told Suarez to take the fight outside.

Once outside, Rolon searched Zambrana and seized a small packet of cocaine from him. The officers also took out his wallet and kept his ATM card. ⁴ Suarez and Rolon left the scene a short time later, leaving Zambrana lying on the ground, seriously injured. Zambrana was taken home and, early the following morning, admitted to the hospital. He died two days later of kidney failure due to bodily trauma.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Suarez and various of his supervisors, ⁵ alleging that Zambrana's civil and constitutional rights had been violated by the officers' conduct. Additional claims were asserted under Puerto Rico law. The defendants filed various motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and on March 31, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment for all defendants based on its conclusion that plaintiffs had offered insufficient evidence to prove that Suarez and Rolon acted "under color of law" as required to establish a violation of section 1983. The court dismissed the pendent state law claims. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A district court may grant summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Our review is de novo, and, as noted earlier, see supra at 123, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the plaintiffs. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence taken in that light "fails to yield a trialworthy issue as to some material fact." Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 983-84 (lst Cir.1995). Otherwise stated, our task is to determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In this specific case, that obligation is to decide whether a jury could find that Suarez and Rolon acted "under color of state law" when they intervened in Zambrana's fight with Casablanca and administered the blows that led to Zambrana's death.

B. Under Color of State Law ⁶

Establishing that the defendant acted "under color of state law" is one of two essential requirements for an action under section 1983, which imposes liability only for conduct attributable to the state. ⁷ In distinguishing private action from state action, the general inquiry is whether "a state actor's conduct occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office, or ... is such that the actor could not have behaved in that way but for the authority of his office." Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986. The concept can be particularly elusive when applied to police conduct, as we have recognized in three recent cases. See Barreto-Rivera, 168 F.3d at 45-46; Parrilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 108 F.3d 445, 448-50 (lst Cir.1997); Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986-87. We quote from Barreto-Rivera:

No single, easily determinable factor will control whether a police officer was acting under state law. While certain factors will certainly be relevant--for example, a police officer's garb, an officer's duty status, the officer's use of a service revolver, and the location of the incident--these factors must not be assessed mechanically.

168 F.3d at 45 (citation omitted).

Resolving the "under color of law" question therefore requires an assessment of the totality of the circumstances, in which we must consider both " 'the nature and circumstances of the officer's conduct and the relationship of that conduct to the performance of his official duties.' " Barreto-Rivera, 168 F.3d at 46 (quoting Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986-87); see also Parrilla-Burgos, 108 F.3d at 449. The determination does not turn on "whether an officer stays strictly within the line of duty, or oversteps it." Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986. An officer who abuses or exceeds his recognized authority may be acting under color of law if, "at the time in question, [he] purposes to act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities pursuant to state law." Id. Although the subjective reactions of the victim may have some relevance, "the primary focus of the color of law analysis must be on the conduct of the police officer," Barreto-Rivera, 168 F.3d at 47, and whether it "related in some meaningful way either to the officer's governmental status or to the performance of his duties," Martinez, 54 F.3d at 987.

In both Martinez and Parrilla-Burgos, the application of these principles led us to uphold district court summary judgment rulings that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the defendant police officers acted "under color of state law." In Martinez, an on-shift police officer accidentally shot and maimed a fellow off-shift officer after repeatedly harassing that officer in the station house. Although he was in uniform and armed with his service revolver, the harassing officer never asserted his authority as a police officer. We concluded that he "was bent on a singularly personal frolic: tormenting an acquaintance. Though on duty and in uniform, [the officer's] status as a police officer simply did not enter into his benighted harassment of his fellow officer," Martinez, 54 F.3d at 987 (footnote omitted).

The facts in Parrilla-Burgos more closely resemble those before us. In that case, an off-shift police officer using his service revolver fatally shot a fellow bar patron. The officer, who was on medical leave and not in his uniform, had encountered...