Zamiar v. Linderman

• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1606,84-1606
• Citation: 88 Ill.Dec. 219,132 Ill.App.3d 886,478 N.E.2d 534
• Parties: , 88 Ill.Dec. 219 Joseph ZAMIAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mr. Eugene LINDERMAN and Mrs. Eugene Linderman, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 534

478 N.E.2d 534

132 Ill.App.3d 886, 88 Ill.Dec. 219

Joseph ZAMIAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mr. Eugene LINDERMAN and Mrs. Eugene Linderman, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1606.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Second Division.

April 30, 1985.

Appel & Auwers, Chicago, (Warren H. Appel, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Fraterrigo, Best & Beranek, Chicago, (Scott D. Hammer, Chicago, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

PERLIN, Justice:

Plaintiff, Joseph Zamiar, filed a two-count complaint against defendants. In count I plaintiff alleged that plaintiff, while a minor and a guest in defendants' home, became intoxicated and incurred injuries when he tripped over a rug. Count I, seeking damages for defendants' "negligent maintenance" of their home, remains pending in the trial court. In count II, plaintiff alleges that defendants "wilfully and wantonly permitted and allowed the said plaintiff to consume alcoholic beverages" in their home, that plaintiff became intoxicated and that defendants then "wilfully and wantonly failed to properly supervise the plaintiff after allowing and assisting him in the consumption of alcoholic beverages" and that plaintiff thereafter tripped on a rug and was injured.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss count II on the basis that it failed to state a cause of action under Illinois law. The trial court granted defendants' motion, dismissed count II with prejudice and made the order final and appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110A, par. 304(a).) Plaintiff appeals.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true; the court considers only the question(s) of law presented by the pleadings. Lowe v. Rubin (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 496, 53 Ill.Dec. 919, 424 N.E.2d 710.

The question of law raised here is whether a noncommercial, or "social host," supplier of liquor to a minor who becomes intoxicated and injures himself can be held liable for failing to "supervise" the intoxicated minor.

Plaintiff concedes that he has not alleged a cause of action under the Illinois Dramshop Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 43, par. 93.9, et seq.); rather, he requests this court to recognize a common law action against social hosts who "wilfully and wantonly" "assist, permit and allow" minor guests to become intoxicated and who then "fail to supervise" the minor who subsequently injures himself.

Defendants respond that the long and unwavering law in Illinois is: (1) that the right to recover damages for the act of supplying liquor is purely statutory under the Act; and (2) Illinois courts have, for more than 100 years, refused to recognize any common law action based on the noncommercial supplying of liquor. We affirm.

The original Dramshop Act, the "Temperance Bill" of 1872 (1871-72 Ill.Laws, pp. 552-56), precursor of the present Act, imposed liability upon dramshops for supplying intoxicating liquors to persons who became intoxicated and then injured third parties. In 1889 the Illinois Supreme Court held that no cause of action existed under the Act against persons who were not engaged in the sale of or traffic in liquor. (Cruse v. Aden (1889), 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73.) The law in this State remains that "[n]oncommercial suppliers of liquor are not liable under the Dramshop Act [citation], and Illinois courts have refused to enlarge the scope of the Act to impose statutory liability upon anyone not engaged in the liquor business." (Richardson v. Ansco, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill.App.3d 731, 732, 31 Ill.Dec. 599, 394 N.E.2d 801.) "The uncompensated social host is clearly not subject to liability under the act." Heldt v. Brei (1983), 118 Ill.App.3d 798, 800, 74 Ill.Dec. 413, 455 N.E.2d 842.

Plaintiff, however, requests this court to recognize a common law cause of action against defendants under the facts of this case, contending that our failure to do so would in effect cause this court to "indirectly give its blessing to unthinking adults who serve intoxicating liquor to minors in total disregard of their safety and after serving them do not even lift a hand to assist them while they are obviously incapacitated." While we do not wish to be so understood, we must nonetheless decline plaintiff's invitation to conjure a common law cause of action.

It has been repeatedly held that Illinois does not recognize a common law cause of action against suppliers of liquor, whether they be commercial suppliers (Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill.2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153) or noncommercial suppliers (Heldt v. Brei (1983), 118 Ill.App.3d 798, 74 Ill.Dec. 413, 455 N.E.2d 842). Rather, "the only remedy [against suppliers of liquor] is that provided by the legislature in the Dramshop Act [Citation.]" Richardson, 75 Ill.App.3d 731, 732, 31 Ill.Dec. 599, 394 N.E.2d 801.

Requests to the Illinois courts to fashion a common law action against social host suppliers of liquor have been repeatedly rejected:

"The issue presented in this appeal and the arguments presented by plaintiffs are not new to the supreme court and appellate courts of this State. These courts have consistently held that a social host is not liable under common law negligence for injuries sustained by a third party. Our courts have adhered to this position and make no distinction as to whether the intoxicated individual is a corporate defendant, a strong and able-bodied man, or a minor." Coulter v. Swearingen (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 650, 652, 69 Ill.Dec. 344, 447 N.E.2d 561. See also Lowe v. Rubin (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 496, 53 Ill.Dec. 919, 424 N.E.2d 710.

Reasons advanced for the policy of non-liability for social hosts include that it is the act of drinking, not the supplying of the liquor, which is the proximate cause of intoxication (Cunningham, 22 Ill.2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153) and that liability for social hosts would be unlimited, whereas liability for each occurrence under the Act for commercial suppliers of liquor is limited to $35,000. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 43, par. 135.) Miller v. Moran (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 596, 52 Ill.Dec. 183, 421 N.E.2d 1046.

Nor do we find plaintiff's efforts to distinguish the various relevant and controlling cases to be persuasive. He argues that because article I, section 12 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides, in part, that "[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries which he receives * * *," a cause of action should be here recognized. First, it has been recognized that this provision is an expression of a philosophy, and not a mandate that a certain remedy be provided. (Berlin v. Nathan (1978), 64 Ill.App.3d 940, 21 Ill.Dec. 682, 381 N.E.2d 1367.) Second, this...