Zamora v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty. & Kan. City
| Decision Date | 15 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-CV-2261-JAR |
| Parties | FLORINDA ZAMORA, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY AND KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiff Florinda Zamora ("Zamora") brings this action against Defendant Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the "UG"), alleging that the UG violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., when it terminated her employment at the Wyandotte County Juvenile Detention Center ("JDC") in retaliation for reporting a coworker's inappropriate conduct toward a juvenile resident. This matter is now before the Court on the UG's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons set forth in depth below, the UG's motion is denied.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."1 In applying this standard, the Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefromin the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.2 "There is no genuine [dispute] of material fact unless the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."3 A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim."4 A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way."5
The moving party initially must show the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.6 In attempting to meet this standard, a movant who does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.7
Once the movant has met the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."8 The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden.9 Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would beadmissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant."10 In setting forth these specific facts, the nonmovant must identify the facts "by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein."11 To successfully oppose summary judgment, the nonmovant must bring forward "more than a mere scintilla of evidence" in support of his position.12 A nonmovant "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact with unsupported, conclusory allegations."13 Finally, summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut"; on the contrary, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."14 When examining the underlying facts of this case, the Court is cognizant that it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.15
Before turning the parties' statements of fact, the Court will briefly address the UG's objections to two of Zamora's statements of fact. Summary judgment evidence need not be "submitted 'in a form that would be admissible at trial.'"16 But "the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible."17 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), a party may object on thisbasis—that the material "cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Indeed, as the advisory committee notes to the 2010 Federal Rule amendments explain: "The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated."18
The UG objects to Zamora's Statements of Fact 78 and 117 on the basis that they contain inadmissible hearsay, meaning a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing and that a party offers to prove the truth of the matter asserted.19 Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by law,20 and hearsay within hearsay is excluded unless each part of the combined statement conforms with an exclusion from or exception to the rule against hearsay.21
Zamora's Statement of Fact 78 relies on the deposition testimony of Kansas City, Kansas Police Detective Vincent Kingston concerning statements made to him—during the course of his investigation of the events underlying this case—by JDC employee Ryan Schuler, about what was said to Schuler by another JDC employee, Kelsey Davis, concerning something Davis heard from a Sheriff's Office employee, Andrew Carver. Similarly, Zamora's Statement of Fact 117 refers to Davis's "testimony" about the "exact words" Zamora said about Davis to another of the Sheriff's Office employee, Daniel Anderson, which Anderson then repeated to Carver andCarver relayed to Davis. The source cited to support this fact is the deposition testimony of an investigating Sheriff's detective, Sherry Simpson, about Davis's unsworn statement to her. It is not entirely clear which portions of these statements of fact the UG objects to because the UG makes largely identical factual assertions in its own briefing.22 It appears that the UG objects not to evidence offered to establish that these conversations occurred or even the general content of the conversations, but to evidence offered to prove the exact words that were said.
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) permits Zamora to support her factual assertions at the summary judgment stage by citing to deposition testimony,23 the content or substance of the deposition testimony must be otherwise admissible.24 Zamora does not argue for the admissibility of the triple and quadruple hearsay statements contained within Kingston's and Simpson's deposition testimony, and the Court finds no exclusion or exception that applies for each level of hearsay.25 Accordingly, while the Court does not omit facts relied upon by bothparties, it does exclude hearsay statements in Zamora's Statements of Fact 78 and 117 to the extent that they are offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
With the above rules of law and evidence in mind, the following material facts are either uncontroverted or, if controverted, construed in the light most favorable to Zamora.26
The UG is a municipality located in Wyandotte County, Kansas City, Kansas, and a recipient of federal financial assistance. The JDC is a division of the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office") within the UG. The JDC is licensed by the Kansas Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF") as a child-care facility under Kansas law, and is subject to detailed regulations. DCF monitors the JDC's compliance with regulations and can revoke its license for failure to comply.
The JDC is licensed to hold forty-eight juveniles, both male and female, from the ages of ten to seventeen. JDC residents are juvenile offenders facing criminal charges; many have behavioral problems and/or have been raised in difficult environments. Some residents have been abused, some are gang members, and many have a history of substance abuse. The JDC is a secure facility, and residents are not permitted to leave. All entrances and exits are under the exclusive control of the staff and are continuously monitored. Residents are housed in one of four pods, each with eight to sixteen rooms. The pods are locked and access is limited; at night, residents are required to be in their rooms and the doors are locked from the outside. There are security cameras throughout the facility, and monitors are set up in a control booth. JDCresidents are supervised by juvenile care workers, also called juvenile detention officers. At least one juvenile detention officer is assigned to each pod at all times, and juvenile detention officers control the movements of residents and supervise them twenty-four hours per day.
Don Ash is Sheriff of the Sheriff's Office and, by law, has charge and custody of the JDC. At all relevant times, Jeff Fewell, a Colonel in the Sheriff's Department and Warden of the JDC, was responsible for the custody, care, control, safety, and security of the juvenile residents of the JDC. He reported to Undersheriff Larry Roland and to Sheriff Ash. Terri Broadus, the JDC Administrator, was responsible for administering all operations of the JDC and reported to Fewell.
Major Daniel Soptic, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gunja, Detective Sherry Anderson-Simpson ("Simpson"), and Deputy Daniel Anderson were all employed by the Sheriff's Office in the roles indicated by their titles. Andrew Carver was a detective in the Sheriff's Office and, during the events underlying this action, was promoted to captain. Vincent Kingston was a detective in the Internal Affairs Division of the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department.
Plaintiff Florinda Zamora was employed as a juvenile detention officer at the JDC, as were Kelsey Davis, Angela Garcia, Kathy Harrington, Peair Howard, Ryan Schuler, and Jaya Paden. During the time period at issue, Davis was engaged to Carver, and they are now married. Lieutenant Jelani Coppage was a shift supervisor at the JDC, overseeing juvenile detention officers. Adrienne Gilchrist was also a lieutenant at the JDC. Duane Olden was a JDC maintenance worker. Minors J.K., B.R., and N.C. were male residents at the JDC.
DCF regulations applicable to the JDC require that "[c]lassroom...
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