Zamot v. Municipality of Utuado
| Decision Date | 06 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 19-1209 (RAM) |
| Parties | MADELINE ALFONZO ZAMOT, ET AL. Plaintiffs, v. MUNICIPALITY OF UTUADO, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Pending before the Court is codefendant Ernesto Irizarry-Salvá's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"). (Docket No. 18). Plaintiffs opposed the same and codefendant replied. (Docket Nos. 23 and 27, respectively). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
Plaintiffs are thirty-one (31) Utuado Head Start employees allegedly unlawfully terminated on June 30, 2017 due to their age, disability or perceived political affiliation to the New Progressive Party ("PNP" by its Spanish acronym). (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 3.1-3.30).
Codefendant Ernesto Irizarry-Salvá ("Defendant" or "Irizarry-Salvá"), the mayor of the Municipality of Utuado ("the Municipality"), filed the pending Motion in his personal capacity. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 3.33). The other codefendants are Programa Head Start - Utuado ("Utuado Head Start"), the Municipality, Mr. Irizarry-Salvá in his official capacity, his spouse Jane Doe, and the conjugal partnership between them. (Id. ¶¶ 3.31-3.35).
Head Start and Early Head Start Programs (jointly, "Head Start Program") are federally-funded education programs which aim to improve social competence and school readiness for low income children aged zero to five years old. Id. ¶ 5.2. Until 2017, program funds were granted and administered by the Department of the Family Administration for the Integral Development for Childhood (or "ACUDEN" by its Spanish Acronym). Id. ¶ 5.4. ACUDEN annually sub-awarded funds to Delegate Agencies, such as consortia, non-profits and municipalities. Id. Specifically, it supervised the Municipality's assigned funds which were used to operate the Head Start Program centers in Utuado, Adjuntas and Jayuya until June 30, 2017. Id. ¶ 5.5.
In 2017, the U.S. Government opened Puerto Rico's Head Start Program funding to competitive bidding and the Municipality submitted a proposal. Id. ¶ 5.6. Around May 23, 2017, Defendant met with Utuado Head Start employees, told them the Municipality had submitted a proposal "to run the Head Start franchise" and supposedly said that they would all keep their jobs after June 30, 2017. Id. ¶ 5.7. Around July 1, 2017, the Municipality was awarded $3,394,179.00 to operate the Head Start Program in and around Utuado after July 1, 2017. Id. ¶ 5.8. It was no longer a Delegate Agency and was instead funded by the U.S. Government. Id.
Defendants then allegedly used this transition from funding source as pretext to terminate employees at Utuado Head Start. Id. ¶ 5.9. Plaintiffs posit that the lay-offs were carried out at Defendant's request as mayor of Utuado and/or due to officially promulgated or adopted policies. Id. Plaintiffs were told to submit employment applications with the Municipality or Utuado Head Start to be considered for rehire. Id. ¶ 5.10. Despite submitting the applications, Plaintiffs were denied employment despite being qualified to work at Utuado Head Start and allegedly having more experiences than other candidates. Id. Instead, the employees that kept their jobs and/or were rehired after July 1, 2017, were all supposedly under 40 years of age and were perceived to be affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party ("PPD" by its Spanish acronym), the mayor's political party. Id. One employee was purportedly terminated and not rehired because of her hearing impairment. Id.
On March 6, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking both general and compensatory damages, with prejudgment interest, for over fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000.00), punitive and exemplary damages for over thirty million dollars ($30,000,000.00) and attorney's fees and costs. (Docket No. 1 at 37). They also seek nominal damages, equitable relief in the form of back pay, special damages as to lost salary, front and back pay, bonuses and other benefits they would have been entitled to as Utuado Head Start employees. Id. Id. Finally, they seek an injunction reinstating their employment and restoring their former salaries, duties and responsibilities, and an injunction mandating the elimination of Defendants' discriminatory practices. Id. at 37-38. The remedies sought stem from multiple claims: 1) Deprivation of Civil Rights and Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") under 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq.; 3) Discrimination on the Basis of Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") under 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq.; 4) Discrimination in Employment on the Basis of Political Affiliation and Age under 29 L.P.R.A § 146 et seq. ("P.R. Law 100"); 5) Discrimination on the Basis of Disability under 1 L.P.R.A § 501 et seq. ("P.R. Law 44"); 6) Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of Public Policy; 7) Breach of Implied Contract and Promissory Estoppel, and 8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id. ¶¶ 6.1-13.4.
On May 15, 2019, Defendant filed the pending Motion stating the Section 1983 claim was time-barred and that all claims against him in his personal capacity should be dismissed. (Docket No. 18). Plaintiffs filed an opposition ("Opposition") alleging that the Section 1983 claim is not time-barred, that they have a First Amendment claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Defendant is individually liable under ADEA and ADA, the Puerto Rico Constitution creates a cause of action for discrimination enforceable for damages under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code and the state law claims should not be dismissed. (Docket No. 23). Defendant subsequently filed a reply ("Reply") (Docket No. 27).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Ruling upon such a motion requires determining whether "all the facts alleged [in the complaint], when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, render the plaintiff's entitlement to relief plausible." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). This requires treating non-conclusory factual allegations as true. See Nieto-Vicenty v. Valledor, 984 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2013). But, this is unsuitable to legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Borras-Borrero v. Corporacion del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 2020 WL 2097553, at *4 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, (1979) (). To prevail in a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff "must allege facts sufficient to support a determination (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that [it] worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). For liability purposes, a state employee acts "under color of state law when, while performing in his official capacity or exercising his official responsibilities, he abuses the position given to him by the State." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). A plaintiff is also "required to plausibly establish the link between each particular defendant and the alleged violation of federal rights." Torres Lopez v. Garcia-Padilla, 209 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454-55 (D.P.R. 2016) (citation omitted). This can be achieved by showing any "personal action or inaction [by defendants] within the scope of [their] responsibilities that would make [them] personally answerable in damages under Section 1983." Id. (quotation omitted). "[W]hile plaintiffs are not held to higher pleading standards in § 1983 actions, they must plead enough for a necessary inference to be reasonably drawn." Montañez v. State Ins. Fund, 91 F. Supp. 3d 291, 297 (D.P.R. 2015) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
The first step in assessing Plaintiffs' due process claim under Section 1983 is to "identify the exact contours of the constitutional right said to have been violated and to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all." Garcia-Diaz v. Cintron-Suarez, 120 F. Supp. 3d 68, 79 (D.P.R. 2015) (citation omitted). Both the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the rights of individuals to freely associate with others "for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas." Ramirez-Nieves v. Municipality of Canovanas, 2017 WL 1034689, at *7 (D.P.R. 2017) (quotation omitted). As Defendant points out in his Reply, Plaintiffs solely bring forth a Fourteenth Amendment violation and do not bring a First Amendment violation when asserting a claim pursuant to Section 1983. (Docket Nos. 1 ¶¶ 6.1-6.14; 27 at 3). Further, the record does not reflect any attempt by Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint to include a First Amendment violation. However, the Court will sua sponte briefly address any potential First Amendment claims.
The First Amendment prohibits government officials from "taking adverse action against public employees on the basis of political affiliation, unless political loyalty is an appropriate requirement of employment." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d...
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