Zane v. Friends Hosp.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2003
• Citation: 836 A.2d 25,575 Pa. 236
• Parties: Jerilyn ZANE, Appellee v. FRIENDS HOSPITAL, Dr. John Doe, and Ronald E. Anderson, Appeal of Friends Hospital.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

836 A.2d 25

575 Pa. 236

Jerilyn ZANE, Appellee v. FRIENDS HOSPITAL, Dr. John Doe, and Ronald E. Anderson,

Appeal of Friends Hospital.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 21, 2002.

Decided November 19, 2003.

Howard Mason Cyr, Ernest John Bernabei, Wayne Edward Pinkstone, Philadelphia, for Friends Hosp., appellant.

William E. Averona, Philadelphia, for Jerilyn Zane, appellee.

Ronald E. Anderson, for appellee Ronald E. Anderson.

Before: ZAPPALA, C.J., and CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CAPPY.

We granted allocatur to consider a limited exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule. As part of our review, we are asked to evaluate the breadth of the confidentiality provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (the "Mental Health Procedures Act"), 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq., as well as the statutory provision regarding confidential communications to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the Superior Court.

Appellee Jerilyn Zane ("Zane") brought a negligence action against Appellant Friends Hospital (the "Hospital"), Ronald E. Anderson ("Anderson") and Dr. John Doe.¹ The facts as alleged by Zane, and which serve as the basis for her complaint, are as follows. Zane had been admitted to the Hospital for therapy as an inpatient in August 1994. While Zane was receiving treatment at the Hospital, she befriended Anderson, a fellow inpatient. Although Zane was discharged from the Hospital on September 3, 1994, she nevertheless maintained her friendship with Anderson, visiting him on a number of occasions at the Hospital.

Thereafter, Anderson, while still an inpatient at the Hospital, and Zane decided to get together on September 26, 1994. Specifically, Anderson arranged to procure a day pass from the Hospital to visit his doctor. Zane was to meet Anderson at the Hospital and to drive him to his physician's office. After the appointment, Anderson offered to help Zane locate an apartment in the area. However, upon meeting her, Anderson drugged Zane, kidnapped her and repeatedly assaulted her physically and sexually for the next two to three days.

In her complaint against the Hospital, Zane alleged that Anderson's assault was a result of the negligent care, supervision, and treatment rendered to Anderson by the Hospital and that the Hospital failed to warn her about Anderson or to protect her from Anderson.

During the pre-trial stage of the litigation, Zane served the Hospital with a request for the production of "any and all psychiatric records pertaining to the defendant, Ronald E. Anderson." The Hospital rejected the request asserting that the records were confidential and not subject to disclosure pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act. In response thereto, Zane filed a motion to compel.

On April 25, 1997, Judge Albert Sheppard of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied the motion to compel, however, the court ordered production of certain portions of the documents. The Hospital requested reconsideration of the court's order. Thereafter, on May 6, 1997, Judge Sheppard entered a second order providing that the Hospital must produce, for in camera inspection, all documents concerning the history Anderson gave to the Hospital, including his date of birth and social security number.² The Hospital again sought reconsideration, which was denied by the court, however, the court certified the issue to the Superior Court for consideration pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b)(interlocutory appeals by permission). On November 21, 1997, the Superior Court rejected the Hospital's interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order.

The Hospital did not produce Anderson's records. Zane moved for sanctions against the Hospital for its failure to comply with Judge Sheppard's order. By order dated March 10, 1998, Judge Nitza Quinones Alejandro denied the demand for sanctions against the Hospital and also denied Zane's request for compliance with the previous discovery orders.³

On May 4, 1998, the Hospital moved for summary judgment. On June 28, 1999, Judge Howland W. Abramson granted the Hospital's motion for summary judgment, based in part on the fact that due to Judge Quinones Alejandro's order, Zane was prevented from establishing an essential element of her claim—that the Hospital knew or should have known of Anderson's violent propensities.⁴

Zane appealed to the Superior Court raising two issues: (1) whether Judge Alejandro's March 10, 1998 order improperly contravened Judge Sheppard's order; and (2) whether summary judgment was properly granted. The Superior Court concluded that Judge Alejandro's order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Thus, the court vacated Judge Alejandro's order, as well as the lower court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Zane v. Friends Hospital et al., 770 A.2d 339, 340-41 (Pa.Super.2001).

We granted the Hospital's petition for allowance of appeal to our court, limited to two issues.⁵ The issues can be summarized as whether under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, Judge Alejandro was required to follow Judge Sheppard's prior order compelling the Hospital to produce documentation regarding Anderson for in camera inspection, in light of the confidentiality provision of 50 P.S. § 7111, and whether under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, Judge Alejandro was required to follow Judge Sheppard's order in light of the confidentiality provision found at 42 Pa. C.S. § 5944.

We begin our review of this matter with consideration of the coordinate jurisdiction rule. One of the distinct rules that are encompassed within the "law of the case" doctrine⁶ is the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge may not alter resolution of a legal question previously decided by a transferor trial judge. Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1995); see also Riccio v. American Republic Insurance Co., 550 Pa. 254, 705 A.2d 422, 425 (1997). More simply stated, judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other's decisions. Id.; Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 556 A.2d 827, 831 (1989).

The reason for this respect for an equal tribunal's decision, as explained by our court, is that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is "based on a policy of fostering the finality of pre-trial applications in an effort to maintain judicial economy and efficiency." Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331. Furthermore, consistent with the law of the case doctrine, the coordinate jurisdiction rule serves to protect the expectations of the parties, to insure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in proceedings, to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring finality to the litigation. Id.

This general prohibition against revisiting the prior holding of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction, however, is not absolute. Departure from the rule is allowed in "exceptional circumstances" when there has been a change in the controlling law or where there was a substantial change in the facts or evidence. Id. at 1332. Of import for this appeal, an exception is permitted where "the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed." Id. The purpose for this limited exception is largely self-evident. To accede to a coordinate judge's order that is clearly erroneous would be not only to permit an inequity to work on the party subject to the order, but would allow an action to proceed in the face of almost certain reversal on appellate review. Moreover, the requirement that the prior holding also create a manifest injustice serves as a significant curb on the exception so that it would apply to only those situations in which adhering to the prior holding would be, in essence, plainly intolerable.

In sum, while a judge must in most circumstances defer to the prior decision of another judge of coordinate jurisdiction, he or she is not required to do so in the limited and exceptional situation in which, inter alia, the prior judge's order is clearly erroneous and would result in a manifest injustice. With the general rule regarding orders of judges of coordinate jurisdiction in mind, as well as the circumscribed "clearly erroneous" exception thereto, we turn to consideration of the arguments of the parties.

The Hospital argues that Judge Sheppard's order directing in camera inspection of Anderson's records was clearly erroneous as it was in violation of the confidentiality provision contained in the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7111, as well as the statutory provision regarding confidential communications to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944. Furthermore, the Hospital maintains that if followed, Judge Sheppard's order would have created a manifest injustice. Therefore, according to the Hospital, Judge Alejandro did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule when she refused to enforce the order to disclose information contained in Anderson's medical records and the Superior Court erred in vacating her order and vacating the granting of the Hospital's motion for summary judgment.⁷

To determine whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule was violated, we will first consider whether Judge Sheppard's order compelling review of Anderson's records was clearly erroneous and created a manifest injustice in light of the confidentiality provision of the Mental Health Procedures Act. As the issue before us involves discerning the meaning of this statute, we are guided by the principles of statutory construction contained in the Statutory Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1901-1991.⁸

The Statutory Construction Act sets forth the purpose of statutory interpretation and...