Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc. v. Logan

• Decision Date: 18 March 1965
• Docket Number: Nos. 3273-3305,s. 3273-3305
• Citation: 400 P.2d 482
• Parties: ZANETTI BUS LINES, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellant (Defendant below), Pacific Intermountain Express Company, a Nevada corporation, and Nellie Horton, Administratrix of the Estate of Joe E. Weimer, Deceased (Defendants below), v. Roy G. LOGAN et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 482

400 P.2d 482

ZANETTI BUS LINES, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellant (Defendant below), Pacific Intermountain Express Company, a Nevada corporation, and Nellie Horton, Administratrix of the Estate of Joe E. Weimer, Deceased (Defendants below), v. Roy G. LOGAN et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs below).

Nos. 3273-3305.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 18, 1965.

January, Gilchrist & Blunk, Denver, Colo., Swainson & Swainson, Cheyenne, W. Page Keeton, Austin, Tex., Harold Scott Baile, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Galicich & Hamm, John M. Anselmi, Rock Springs, Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Nelson & Jackson, Venta, Bath & Murray, Rock Springs, for appellees.

Before PARKER, C. J., and HARNSBERGER and McINTYRE, JJ.

Mr. Chief Justice Parker delivered the opinion of the court.

These appeals grow out of thirty-three actions for injuries occasioned in a multiple-vehicle accident, twenty-nine of the cases being for personal injuries and four for wrongful death. All thirty-three suits were consolidated for trial on the issue of liability, the only question raised in the appeals. The defendants were the administratrix of the Estate of Joe E. Weimer, driver of a Buick automobile, Pacific Intermountain Express Company, and Zanetti Bus Lines, all made defendants on the theory of liability as joint tort-feasors. The jury returned verdicts in favor of all claimants and against Zanetti and Weimer's administratrix, from which Zanetti appealed, but in favor of P.I.E. and against the claimants, who have brought separate appeals, considered in another decision.

The accident occurred about 5:20 p. m., February 3, 1961, on U. S. Highway 30, some five and one-half miles west of Rock Springs. Three of the vehicles concerned were proceeding in an easterly direction, Weimer's Buick, followed by a Zanetti bus driven by Soltis, and this followed by a second Zanetti bus driven by Bucho. The fourth vehicle, a P.I.E. truck, was approaching from the opposite direction, going westerly. It was snowing slightly, the highway being extremely icy in the area of the accident and for some three or three and one-half miles west. Weimer experienced some difficulty in the Buick's control, the car fishtailing and later going across the highway in front of the oncoming truck, occasioning a collision with it. The truck thereafter proceeded to its wrong side and in front of the Bucho bus, from the crash of which all of the plaintiffs' injuries occurred. Meanwhile, the Soltis bus had been able to proceed easterly on its own side of the highway and avoid a crash. With respect to Zanetti, plaintiffs charged negligence of Bucho in driving at a dangerous, excessive, and unlawful rate of speed without regard to the icy condition of the highway; failure to maintain a proper lookout; disregarding or failure to observe Weimer's automobile; following more closely than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances and existing traffic laws; and other incidental negligence.

The questions raised in the appeals relate to four alleged errors:

1. The trial court's instructing the jury that violation of § 31-108(a), W.S.1957, was evidence of negligence and a circumstance to be considered in determining whether or not Zanetti was negligent;

2. The overruling of Zenetti's motion for a directed verdict;

3. Refusal to give two of Zanetti's requested instructions; and

4. Refusal to grant motion for mistrial, which was based on the fact that one of the bailiffs had provided the jury with a dictionary during its deliberation.

Appellant's principal thesis is that the negligence of the driver of the Buick was the sole proximate cause of both collisions; that the jury evidently concluded the truck driver was rendered helpless to avoid the first collision; and that the jury would, except for the errors of the court, probably have reached a similar conclusion about Zanetti's alleged negligence. It is contended that the Bucho bus was not 'following too closely' another vehicle in violation of the statute, but even if it was the second collision was not the kind that the statute was designed to guard against or that a reasonable man would have attempted to guard against by being further to the rear. In the development of this argument, it is contended that it was not the proximity of the Bucho bus to Soltis' which brought about the second collision but rather the proximity of the Bucho bus to the collision truck and that for these reasons there was between Weimer's Buick and the P.I.E Appellant concedes that the speed of the Bucho bus at the time of the initial collision may have been regarded as in excess of what was reasonable and proper but argues that the excessive part of the speed could not have been the proximate cause of the second collision because the crash would not have been avoided even though the bus driver had been proceeding at a proper rate of speed.

no breach of duty as to the exercise of proper care.

POINT I

Substantial argument is directed at the alleged error of the court in giving Instruction No 10: ¹

'On February 3, 1961, the laws of Wyoming provided as follows:

"31-108. Following too closely.--(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway."

In developing such thesis, appellant contends (a) from all the evidence in the case the Bucho bus was not acting in violation of the statute; (b) the duty of Bucho not to drive too closely to the vehicle in front of him in such a following situation was to guard against other kinds of accidents, not the risk or hazard of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction swerving over into the wrong lane of the highway between his bus and the one in front of him; and (c) it was the proximity of the Bucho bus to the Buick and the truck immediately prior to the collision between the two latter vehicles, rather than its proximity to the Soltis but, that must be regarded as the factual cause of the collision resulting in the damage here in issue.

Much of discussion on this subject is predicated upon the principle that the violation of a legislative enactment is irrelevant to an issue of negligence when the accident which occurred cannot be regarded as the kind that the measure was designed to guard against. In support of the principle, reference is made to the leading case of Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874), wherein the court held that there was no liability for loss of sheep washed overboard during a storm merely because of violation of sanitary measure requiring separate pens. Other authorities are cited on the point, including some purported dicta in Kalman v. Western Union Telegraph Company, Wyo., 390 P.2d 724. For the purpose of discussion at this time, the principle contended for may be conceded since the determining factor in this aspect is not the propriety or validity of the rule but rather its applicability. Can we say that the legislature by the provisions of § 31-108(a) intended to guard against only certain risks and hazards? Some cases are cited where a court has taken such a view of certain laws, but none are analogous to the case before us, most of them dealing with matters where there would be no disagreement between reasonable men that the violation of the statute was wholly unrelated to the claimed injury. Appellant does call attention to 62A McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, c. 71, Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1129, p. 489 (1960), where the historical note, concerning a portion of a statute identical to § 31-108(a), states, 'The rule is an important safeguard against rear-end collisions,' and goes on to discuss another subsection somewhat similar to Wyoming's § 31-108(- '* * * said section was enacted for the protection of every person or vehicle which would reasonably be afforded a measure of protection by the enforcement of the terms thereof. Nothing contained in the section would indicate any intention to restrict its application. 'The purpose of statutes regulating adn effecting automobile traffic on the highways is the promotion of the safety of the public.' Dinger v. Burnham, 360 Mo. 465, 228 S.W.2d 696, 699. * * *' Binion v. Armentrout, Mo., 333 S.W.2d 87, 90.

b), not in issue here. Under statutes of this latter type are cited Greathouse v. Mitchell, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 738, and Christman v. Weil, 196 Md. 207, 76 A.2d 144, in each of which cases the court indicated that subsection (b) was intended to facilitate passing and might be restricted accordingly. Whether or not our counterpart of this subsection would admit of such an interpretation need not here be discussed since it is not in issue. Suffice to say that we approve the following interpretation of a statute identical in all pertinent aspects to § 31-108(a):

There is further reason why we would be reluctant to circumscribe the trial court by preventing it from instructing as it did:

'* * * where the statute does set up standard precautions, although only for the protection of a different class of persons, or the prevention of a distinct risk, this may be a relevant fact, having proper bearing upon the conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances, which the jury should be permitted to consider. * * *' Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 203 (3 ed.).

This leads us to a consideration of appellant's assertion that 'It was the proximity of the following bus to the Buick car and the truck immediately prior to the collision rather than its proximity to the bus in front that must be regarded as the factual cause of the collisions that were to follow.' We approach a consideration of this problem without the conviction which appellant's counsel seem to have that § 31-108(a) is directed only to the vehicle immediately in front of the driver. A more reasonable interpretation would be that the driver should not follow too closely any...