Zapata v. Burns

Decision Date17 May 1988
Docket Number13031,Nos. 13014,13027,13040 and 13042,13029,13025,s. 13014
Citation542 A.2d 700,207 Conn. 496
PartiesRosa E. ZAPATA, Administratrix (ESTATE OF Luis A. ZAPATA), et al. v. J. William BURNS, Commissioner of Transportation.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Richard A. Silver, Stamford, and Richard A. Bieder, Bridgeport, with whom were David P. Burke, Greenwich, Gerald E. Fogarty, Catherine C. Ziehl and, on the brief, Jay H. Sandak, Stamford, Alexander J. Holland, Greenwich, Carey B. Reilly and Michael P. Koskoff, Bridgeport, for appellants (plaintiffs).

William B. Rush, Bridgeport, with whom were Thomas F. Morgan, Norwalk, and, on the brief, Sharon A. Cregeen, Bridgeport, for appellee (third party defendant Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton).

Karen P. Blado, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Engineers in Private Practice, Inc., et al., as amici curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., ARTHUR H. HEALEY, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

HULL, Associate Justice.

These consolidated cases arise out of the collapse, on June 28, 1983, of a suspended span of the Mianus River Bridge on the Connecticut Turnpike (I-95) in Greenwich. The dispositive issue is the constitutionality, under both the state and federal constitutions, of General Statutes § 52-584a which bars actions against architects and engineers seven years after substantial completion of a project, irrespective of whether a claim has arisen by that time. 1

As a result of the collapse of the bridge, three people were killed and three were injured, resulting in these actions for damages against the state of Connecticut. In each case the state impleaded Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS), the architectural design firm for the bridge, seeking indemnification for any judgment which might be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the state. TAMS had designed the bridge and provided supervision and inspection of its construction pursuant to an agreement with the state dated June 24, 1954. The state approved the design of the bridge and accepted it on June 18, 1959, as a part of the state highway system.

After the state impleaded TAMS, each plaintiff filed a substitute complaint, in the alternative, against the third party defendant TAMS, adopting and restating the identical allegations made by the state in its complaint against TAMS. Each of the complaints in the alternative against TAMS sought monetary damages against it "[i]f defendant, J. William Burns, Commissioner of the State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation, is not legally responsible to plaintiffs." The actions against the state were concluded upon the plaintiffs' acceptance of the respective offers of judgment by the state pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-144. 2 On May 30 1986, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by TAMS as to all complaints in the alternative filed by the plaintiffs, on the ground that the causes of action were brought more than seven years after the substantial completion of the Mianus River Bridge and were therefore barred by the relevant statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584a. The judgment rendered on TAMS' motion for summary judgment is the subject of the plaintiffs' appeals in this case.

After the plaintiffs accepted the state's offers of judgment, the state amended its pleadings to assert a subrogated claim against TAMS pursuant to § 13a-144, seeking damages for the amounts paid to the plaintiffs. On August 14, 1986, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The state appealed on the sole ground that the trial court erred in refusing to submit its claim of absolute public nuisance to the jury. This court found no error. State v. Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, 204 Conn. 177, 527 A.2d 688 (1987). The question of the constitutionality of § 52-584a was not involved in that appeal.

On this appeal the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in granting TAMS' motion for summary judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-584a without an uncontroverted showing that at least one half the members of its partnership were licensed in Connecticut; (2) in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that summary judgment could not enter in TAMS' favor based on General Statutes § 52-584a because that statute violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to equal treatment under article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution; 3 (3) in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that summary judgment could not enter in TAMS' favor based on General Statutes § 52-584a because that statute violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to equal protection under article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution 4 and the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; 5 and (4) in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that summary judgment could not enter in TAMS' favor based on General Statutes § 52-584a because that statute violated the plaintiffs' right to redress under article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. 6 The last three issues were raised in the trial court, and ruled on adversely to the plaintiffs in a well reasoned memorandum of decision granting TAMS' motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs. TAMS raises as alternate grounds for sustaining the judgment the following issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for personal injuries and wrongful death where the state is, by statute, subrogated to the rights of the plaintiffs to maintain such actions; and (2) if the plaintiffs and the state share the right to maintain a cause of action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, whether the plaintiffs are precluded, under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel, from litigating the same issues and claims that have been adjudicated in the litigation prosecuted to conclusion by the state.

We need not address these alternate grounds since we find no error in the court's judgments granting summary judgment for TAMS. In view of the important public policy questions raised by the plaintiffs' constitutional claims it is preferable for us to address the merits of these claims directly.

I

First, however, we must address the plaintiffs' first claim of error. The plaintiffs claim that TAMS failed to establish that it qualified as a firm of architects or engineers within the meaning of § 52-584a and therefore was not entitled to the protection provided by that statute. They claim that the statute bars actions against only those licensed as such in the state of Connecticut and that TAMS failed in its proof of this matter, leaving genuine issues of material fact which precluded the granting of its motion for summary judgment. The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the entitlement to recovery as a matter of law lies with the moving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984); Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 281, 464 A.2d 57 (1983).

The plaintiffs argue that § 52-584a extends only to those individuals who qualify under Connecticut law as architects and engineers. 7 Connecticut statutes predating § 52-584a to the present time have provided that no person may practice architecture or engineering in Connecticut without a license from the state. General Statutes §§ 20-290 and 20-302. Finally, General Statutes § 20-298a, 8 which became effective in 1965, requires that at least one half of the partners or principals in any partnership of architects and engineers shall be registered architects. TAMS counters that Robert Abbett, a registered Connecticut engineer, signed a contract with the state on TAMS' behalf to perform engineering services on the Mianus River Bridge, and that the contract plans for the bridge were also signed by Abbett and bear his professional engineer's seal.

We need not reach the question, however, of whether there was a genuine issue of material fact which should have precluded the granting of TAMS' motion for summary judgment. Section 20-298a became effective in 1965, eleven years after TAMS signed a contract to do design work for the bridge and six years after the bridge work was accepted by the state. The plaintiffs cite no authority and make no reasoned argument why § 20-298a should apply retroactively to TAMS. Further, the statute is concerned only with the manner in which architects and engineers may form partnerships and is not involved in any way with the licensing of either profession. At the legislative hearing on the statute, Carmine Lavieri, appearing for the Connecticut Chapter of the American Institute of Architects and the Connecticut Society of Architects, stated:

"Now with respect to [House Bill No.] 2626, this bill came about because the Attorney General has issued rulings in the past to the Architectural Examining Board and to the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors to the effect that architects cannot be in partnership with anybody else but architects; engineers cannot be in partnership with anybody but engineers, on the basis of the way the statutes now exist.

"There are many situations where it seems desirable for architects and engineers to form a joint partnership or perhaps a joint venture for one particular project. Many of the other states have this provision, and this bill was put in to accomplish that purpose." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1965 Sess., p. 109.

The plaintiffs, once again, offer no authority or logical reason why this statute should be grafted on to § 52-584a. There is no merit to this claim of error.

The plaintiffs' complaints in the alternative against TAMS were filed in 1986, twenty years beyond the date of substantial completion of the bridge. Therefore, unless § 52-584a is unconstitutional in one or more of the aspects claimed by the plaintiffs, the trial court was correct in granting TAMS' motion...

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