Zapata v. Seal

• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2020-CC-01148,2020-CC-01148
• Citation: 330 So.3d 175
• Parties: J. Benjamin ZAPATA and Amanda Zapata v. Stephen Wayne SEAL, Diversified Well Logging, Inc. and Navigators Insurance Company
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

330 So.3d 175

J. Benjamin ZAPATA and Amanda Zapata
v.
Stephen Wayne SEAL, Diversified Well Logging, Inc. and Navigators Insurance Company

No. 2020-CC-01148

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

September 30, 2021

GRIFFIN, J.^*

We granted this writ application to examine the interplay between two provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in the context of partial summary judgment. The specific issue presented is whether a trial court, having granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ failure to timely file an opposition, may later vacate that judgment when the plaintiffs produce an expert affidavit based on evidence that was previously available in advance of the original hearing. For the reasons that follow, we find the trial court was within its discretion in vacating its prior ruling.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying action arose out of a motor vehicle accident in which J. Benjamin Zapata was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Stephen Wayne Seal and owned by Diversified Well Logging, Inc. (collectively "DWL"). Mr. Zapata and his wife (asserting loss of consortium claims) filed suit against DWL and its insurer alleging both new injuries and aggravation of preexisting lower back injuries sustained in a prior motor vehicle

330 So.3d 177

accident. Dr. Olawale Sulaiman, who performed lower back surgery on Mr. Zapata after the subject accident, opined in his deposition that he does not causally relate that surgery to the subject accident. DWL filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss the Zapatas’ claim that the lower back surgery was necessitated by the accident.

The Zapatas moved to continue the hearing from June 25, 2018 to September 4, 2018. In the interim, on July 13, 2018, Mr. Zapata underwent an examination by Dr. Mohammad Almubaslat. On August 23, 2018, twelve days before the hearing, the Zapatas filed an opposition attaching a July 13, 2018 report by Dr. Almubaslat to support the assertion that the subject accident aggravated Mr. Zapata's preexisting lower back injuries and necessitated the surgery. DWL filed a reply arguing that because the opposition was untimely, the attachments should be stricken and the Zapatas’ counsel precluded from presenting oral argument.¹ At the hearing the trial court agreed with DWL and granted partial summary judgment in its favor ("the September 2018 judgment").

On September 21, 2018, the Zapatas filed a motion to reconsider or, alternatively, a motion for new trial. DWL opposed arguing that a motion for new trial was procedurally improper under La. C.C.P. art. 1915. The trial court denied the motion observing that a party can only request a motion for new trial on a final judgment.

On June 18, 2019, the Zapatas filed a motion to vacate the September 2018 judgment. Attached in support was an affidavit by Dr. Almubaslat executed on May 8, 2019. DWL opposed on the grounds that it would be improper for the trial court to disregard the time limitations set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B) and consider evidence that was previously available to the Zapatas in July 2018, prior to the original hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment. The matter was taken under advisement.

The trial court vacated its prior ruling and, in written reasons, observed the September 2018 judgment was not designated as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). The trial court further stated that at the time of DWL's motion for partial summary judgment, the affidavit of Dr. Almubaslat was not available as he was unable to review and sign the affidavit prior to the hearing. The trial court concluded that the Zapatas’ motion to vacate was authorized by La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) and found a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the issue of medical causation based on the "newly submitted affidavit of Dr. Mohammad Almubaslat."

DWL's initial request for supervisory review was not considered as it failed to attach a copy of the trial court's judgment.² DWL subsequently filed a new, conforming writ application. The writ was denied.

DWL's writ application to this Court followed, which we granted. Zapata v. Seal , 20-1148 (La. 12/8/20), 305 So.3d 863.

DISCUSSION

The issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in vacating its prior ruling granting partial summary judgment in favor of

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DWL on the issue of medical causation. A motion to vacate is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Narcise v. Jo Ellen Smith Hosp. , 98-2417, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/10/99), 729 So.2d 748, 753. A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if its decision is based on an erroneous interpretation or application of law. See Kem Search, Inc. v. Sheffield , 434 So.2d 1067, 1071 (La. 1983). Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Benjamin v. Zeichner , 12-1763, p. 5 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 197, 201. The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo , using the same criteria that governs a trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Samaha v. Rau , 07-1726, pp. 3-4 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882-83 ; Narcise , supra .

Partial judgments, including partial summary judgments, are governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1915.³ When a court renders a partial judgment as to less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination there is no just reason for delay. La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). "In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to the rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2). Thus, it is "well-settled that prior to final judgment a [trial court] may, at its discretion and on its own motion, change the result of interlocutory rulings it finds to be erroneous." Vasalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 01-0462, p. 5 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.3d 331, 334.

Summary judgment procedure is governed by La. C.C.P. art. 966 et seq . Specifically, La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2) provides that "[a]ny opposition to the motion and all documents in support of the opposition shall be filed and served in accordance with Article 1313 not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing on the motion."

DWL argues the trial court improperly disregarded the time limitations of La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2) in considering the affidavit of Dr. Almubaslat which was based upon his examination and report – evidence available to the Zapatas at the time the summary judgment opposition was due. See Buggage v. Volks Constructors , 06-0175 (La. 5/5/06), 928 So.2d 536, 536 (per curiam) ("time limitation established by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B) for the serving of affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is mandatory"). DWL thus asserts that, in the absence of new evidence previously unavailable in advance of the original hearing, the trial court abused its discretion by interpreting La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2) to permit it to vacate the September 2018 judgment. See Narcise , 98-2417, p. 8-11, 729 So.2d at 752-54 (vacating partial summary judgment based on deposition and affidavit of expert, retained after the ruling, which established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact not present at the time the motion was decided).

The Zapatas counter that, as the September 2018 judgment was not designated as final, the unambiguous language of La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2) provides that it was subject to revision at any time prior to the rendition of a final judgment. Notably, the grounds for such revision are not delimited

330 So.3d 179

in the article. Thus, DWL's attempt to graft on to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2) requirements that are contained in La. C.C.P. art. 1972 for seeking a motion for new trial is without merit. See Keeslar v. McHugh , 44,641, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/30/09), 24 So.3d 933, 935-36 (finding no error in trial's court decision to revise and overturn prior grant of non-final partial summary judgment despite no new evidence being introduced). We agree.

The plain language of La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2) provides that, absent determination and designation as a final judgment, a partial summary judgment adjudicating less than all of the claims at issue "may be revised at any time prior to the rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." See La. C.C. art. 9 ; Louisiana Mun. Ass'n v. State , 04-0227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836-37 ("interpretation of a statute starts with the language of the statute itself"); Vasalle , 01-0462, p. 5, 801 So.2d at 334. The trial court's astute rulings illustrate how this provision may be harmonized with the time limitations of summary judgment procedure. See Louisiana Mun. Ass'n , 04-0227, p. 36, 893 So.2d at 837 (further observing courts must give effect to all provisions of a statute and not render an interpretation that makes any part...