Zarzycki v. United Technologies Corp., 3:96-CV-1782 (GLG).
| Decision Date | 18 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:96-CV-1782 (GLG).,3:96-CV-1782 (GLG). |
| Citation | 30 F.Supp.2d 283 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Edward ZARZYCKI, Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., Hamilton Standard Division, Defendant. |
David S. Rintoul, Rintoul & Rintoul, West Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.
Edward J. Dempsey, United Technologies Corp., Hartford, CT, Felix J. Springer, John P. McLafferty, Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, CT, for defendant.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, defendant United Technologies Corporation, Hamilton Standard Division ("Hamilton Standard") moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we GRANT defendant's motion (Doc. # 47).
Plaintiff Edward Zarzycki worked for Hamilton Standard for approximately thirteen years until he was laid off in November 1992. Before the layoff, plaintiff had been assembling and testing jet fuel controls, which are carburetors for helicopters and engines. In September 1995, plaintiff was recalled by Hamilton Standard for a different job, with a different job code and job ladder. Specifically, there was an opening in the job category of an "Assembly & Test Technician II" for a position as a starter tester which involved testing the starters of jet engines.1 Although plaintiff was offered the job, he was aware that as a condition to being hired he was required to take and pass a medical examination.
In connection with the recall, plaintiff underwent a-routine medical examination which was conducted by staff at defendant's medical center. He completed a "Preplacement Assessment Examination" questionnaire in which he stated that he once had a herniated disc and back surgery. He had injured his back in July 1992 while working for defendant, and subsequently had surgery to repair a herniated disc. He was seen by his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Aris D. Yannopoulos, several times afterwards including a visit in August 1995 due to a recurrence of back and leg pain.
As part of the exam, the staff checked his blood pressure, took x-rays, and tested his urine, blood, hearing, and pulmonary functions. He then saw Joanne Sanborn, a physical therapist, who examined his back and extremities to check his stretching and bending abilities, among other things. She recommended placing plaintiff on a thirty to thirty-five pound lifting restriction. Next, plaintiff was given a general checkup by Dr. Walter J. Wiechetek (commonly known as "Dr. Wick"). He gave plaintiff the following restrictions: "1) limit lifting to 10-15 lbs. without assistance; 2) no repetitive lifting or bending, no pushing over 40 lbs.; 3) no prolonged standing; [and] 4) avoid exposure to jet fuel." Def.'s Mem. Ex. K. On October 6, 1995, Dr. Wiechetek conferred with plaintiff's doctor, Dr. Yannopoulos, who agreed with these restrictions.
Dr. Wiechetek's restrictions were forwarded to Thomas Bradley, Operations Manager at Hamilton Standard, the manager for whom plaintiff would have worked after the recall. Based on these restrictions, Bradley determined that plaintiff could not perform the requirements of the starter tester position. He then notified the Human Resources department that he had no work available for plaintiff within the restrictions. Plaintiff in turn was informed that he would not be offered the position because of the medical restrictions.
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 6, 1996. In the single count of his Third Amended Complaint, he alleges a violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117. He claims that defendant discriminated against him because they refused to hire him during the recall based on his disability and based on Dr. Wiechetek's restrictions. On June 12, 1997, this Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, which we converted to a motion for summary judgment, because we found that plaintiff was not precluded by a collective bargaining agreement from pursuing his statutory ADA claim in federal court. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on alternate grounds claiming that plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, that plaintiff was not disabled in September 1995 and thus is not entitled to the ADA's protection, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the ADA claim because plaintiff failed to follow the grievance procedures and did not arbitrate his discrimination claim.
A court may grant summary judgment only if it determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact based on a review of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must construe the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Although the Second Circuit has approved the use of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985), it has cautioned against granting summary judgment in an employer's favor because intent is often an issue. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit has since reaffirmed its limited approach to summary judgment in discrimination cases. See Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir.1998); McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135-37 (2d Cir.1997). Summary judgment, however, remains appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact. McLee, 109 F.3d at 135. Indeed, the Second Circuit has approved the its use in cases brought under Title I of the ADA where the plaintiff did not meet the threshold burden of proving that he or she had a disability. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir.1998); Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1998).
Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Title I, plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) his employer, Hamilton Standard, is subject to the ADA; (2) he has a disability within the ADA's meaning; (3) with or without reasonable accommodation, he could perform the essential functions of the job; and (4) he was not hired because of his disability. See Reeves, 140 F.3d at 149-50; Ryan, 135 F.3d at 869-70. We first turn to the issue of whether plaintiff was disabled in September 1995.
According to the ADA, disability means "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). In his Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff claims that he suffers from a permanent 15% disability of his back due to a lumbar disc injury,2 and that in September 1995 this condition substantially limited him in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, walking, standing, lifting, bending, and working. Plaintiff also asserts that in September 1995 he was treated by Hamilton Standard as having such a substantially limiting impairment. Defendant denies these allegations.
To determine whether plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of subsection (A) of section 12102(2), we follow the three-prong analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). Under this test, plaintiff must prove each of the following elements: first, that he suffered from a physical or mental impairment; second, that he has identified a major life activity as defined by the ADA; and third, that his impairment "substantially limited" that major life activity. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 2202; Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir.1998).
The implementing regulations3 provide that a physical impairment includes any physiological disorder affecting the musculoskeletal system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). The Second Circuit has held that back injuries involving a "chronic low back syndrome with left leg sciatica with increasing symptomatology" and a "chronic degenerative disk disease of [the] neck and lower back" are physical impairments because they affect the musculoskeletal system. Colwell, 158 F.3d at 639, 642. This Court has also held that a 10% permanent partial disability of the back is a physical impairment. Rochford v. Town of Cheshire, 979 F.Supp. 116, 119 (D.Conn.1997) (Dorsey, C.J.). Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that plaintiff had a physical impairment in September 1995 based on his back injury and the permanent 15% disability of his back.
In his Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that his lumbar disc injury substantially limits him in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, walking, standing, lifting, bending, and working. All of these are considered per se major life...
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