Zaun v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , Docket Nos. 1941-71

• Decision Date: 03 June 1974
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 1941-71,1942-71.
• Citation: 62 T.C. 278
• Parties: RICHARD A. ZAUN, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTLOIS JEAN ZAUN, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT
• Court: U.S. Tax Court

62 T.C. 278

RICHARD A. ZAUN, PETITIONER

v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTLOIS JEAN ZAUN, PETITIONER

v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

Docket Nos. 1941-71

1942-71.

United States Tax Court

Filed June 3, 1974.

Richard A. Zaun and Lois Jean Zaun, pro se.

Robert D. Grossman, Jr., for the respondent.

Timely deficiency notices were mailed to petitioners and they filed their petitions before the expiration of the 90-day period specified in sec. 6213(a), I.R.C. 1954. They received oral notice of the mailings prior to the expiration of such period but did not receive the written notices until after such expiration, which nevertheless was within the applicable period for assessment. Held, despite some confusion as to petitioners' ‘last known address,‘ the timely filing of the petitions was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court and petitioners' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are denied.

OPINION

TANNENWALD, Judge:

Separate deficiency notices were mailed to Richard A. Zaun and Lois Jean Zaun, who at all times pertinent resided together as husband and wife, on or about December 18, 1970. The notices were addressed to each of them at Post Office Box 7126, Ludlum Branch, Miami, Fla. 33155. This was the address shown on Mr. Zaun's tax return for the calendar year at issue herein. Mrs. Zaun did not file a return for that year. Mr. Zaun and Mrs. Zaun each forwarded a petition to the Court in an envelope bearing the postmark date of March 18, 1971, the 90th day after the date of the mailing of the notices of deficiency. This was the last day of the period specified in section 6213(a).¹

The principal substantive issue involved herein stems from an involuntary conversion of property in 1964, claimed by respondent to have belonged to petitioners, and a jeopardy assessment issued by respondent on April 27, 1964, together with an accompanying termination of petitioners' taxable year under section 6851. No deficiency notices were issued by respondent in accordance with section 6861(b), but such failure has no bearing on the validity of the deficiency notices involved herein. Esther Melnick Teitelbaum, 40 T.C. 223 (1963). The jeopardy assessment was subsequently abated and practically all of the funds seized pursuant thereto were subsequently refunded. Thereafter, Mr. Zaun filed a timely 1964 return and, on applications by Mr. Zaun, respondent granted a series of extensions of time to reinvest the proceeds of such conversion in accordance with the provisions of section 1033 and the regulations thereunder. See sec. 1.1033(a)-2(c)(3), Income Tax Regs. The last extension expired on January 31, 1970, so that the deficiency notices involved herein were timely under section 1033(a)(3)(C).

Petitioners' motions to dismiss rest upon the proposition that, in the course of the various proceedings relating to the jeopardy assessment, its abatement, the refund, and the granting of extensions of time, respondent was put on notice that ‘the last known address' of each of petitioners (see sec. 6212(b) (1) was 337 Gonwood Circle, Valdosta, Ga., and that consequently the notices of deficiency herein should have been sent to that address. We see no need to detail the dates and addresses utilized by Mr. Zaun in his written communications to the Internal Revenue Service nor in the written communications from the Internal Revenue Service to Mr. and Mrs. Zaun. The most that can be said on the basis of the facts as alleged by the petitioners is that there was confusion as to their ‘last known address.’ There is nothing in the record to show that respondent was ever clearly put on notice as to any change in petitioner's address for tax purposes from that shown on Mr. Zaun's return. In this connection, we note that the last extension of time within which to replace the converted property, to wit, from ...