Zavala v. Citicorp Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 73 Civ. 3960.,73 Civ. 3960.
• Citation: 426 F. Supp. 241
• Parties: Juan ZAVALA and Kolyba Corp., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. CITICORP SERVICES, INCORPORATED, a New York Corporation, and First National City Bank, a National Bank, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

426 F. Supp. 241

Juan ZAVALA and Kolyba Corp., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. CITICORP SERVICES, INCORPORATED, a New York Corporation, and First National City Bank, a National Bank, Defendants.

No. 73 Civ. 3960.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

December 22, 1976.

Shea, Gould, Climenko, Kramer & Casey, New York City, for plaintiffs; Milton S. Gould, Richard F. Czaja, New York City, of counsel.

Shearman & Sterling, New York City, for defendants; Henry Harfield, Charles A. Beach, New York City, of counsel.

BONSAL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Juan Zavala and Kolyba Corporation commenced this action against defendants Citicorp Services, Incorporated ("CSI") and First National City Bank ("Citibank") seeking damages alleging that the defendants caused Banque National de Paris ("BNP") to breach its contract with Zavala under which BNP would sell to Zavala $30,000,000 of First National City Bank travelers checks over a period of three years at a favorable rate. The case was tired to a jury and, following a five-day trial, the jury returned the following special verdict:

                                   SPECIAL VERDICT
                  1. Was there a contract between BNP and the
                     plaintiff Juan Zavala entered into on or
                     about July 1971 in Paris under which BNP
                     agreed to sell to Zavala $30,000,000.00
                     of traveler's checks of the First National
                     City Bank over a period of three years at
                     a reduced rate of 0.225% of the face value
                     of the checks purchased by Zavala?                     ---
                                                                     Yes     No
                        If your answer is "No", your verdict
                         will be for the defendants. If your
                         answer is "Yes", please answer
                         Question 2
                   2. Did the defendants Citicorp Services, Incorporated
                      and First National City Bank, knowing
                      of the contract between Zavala and BNP, knowingly
                      cause BNP to terminate the contract
                      with plaintiff Zavala on September 19, 1972?              ---
                                                                        Yes      No
                          If your answer is "No", your verdict
                           will be for the defendants. If your
                           answer is "Yes", please answer
                           Question 3
                

                   3. Did plaintiffs Zavala and Kolyba Corporation
                      sustain damages by reason of the termination
                      of Zavala's contract with BNP? If so, state
                      the amount below
                

Defendants now move pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) to set aside the verdict and for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants notwithstanding the verdict or, if the foregoing is denied, for an order pursuant to Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 granting a new trial upon the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Plaintiffs have cross-moved for an order correcting two alleged errors in the trial transcript. Plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent of correcting page 125 line 7-8 to state the amount as "one hundred fifty to one hundred eighty thousand dollars."

In a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Court must determine "whether the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable men could have reached." Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970); see, e.g., Brady v. Southern Railway Company, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943); O'Connor v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 308 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.1962); see also 5A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 50.072 at 2356 (2d ed. 1975). Where there is conflicting evidence or insufficient evidence to make a one-way verdict proper, judgment n.o.v. should not be awarded. 5A Moore's supra at 2356.

Moreover, where the majority of the evidence is circumstantial, the inferences to be drawn are properly left to the jury and the Court is not free to reweigh the evidence and "set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable." Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 536 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963, 86 S.Ct. 559, 15 L.Ed.2d 472 (1966), citing Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944); see also Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946); Lebrecht v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 402 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.1968). It is also insufficient to allege that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. When facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, "a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear." Lavender v. Kurn, supra at 653, 66 S.Ct. at 744.

Here, the issues disputed are the defendants' knowledge of the oral contract between Zavala and BNP and the defendants' knowing interference with that contract. On the basis of the evidence introduced at trial and under the applicable French law on contracts as charged to the jury, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants knew of the oral contract...