Zavareh v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ.
| Decision Date | 17 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-02033-APG-PAL |
| Parties | SAHAR ZAVAREH, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION o.b.o. UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This case arises from a dispute over whether officials at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas ("UNLV" or the "University") appropriately denied plaintiff Saliar Zavareh's ("Zavareh's") application for graduation from the Water Resource Management ("WRM") graduate program upon the University's decision that she had not fulfilled the program's academic requirements.
On October 25, 2012, Zavareh filed her complaint in Nevada state court. (Dkt. No. 1-2.) She named as defendants:
The Court refers to all defendants collectively as "Defendants" and to all the individual defendants as the "Individual Defendants."
In pertinent part, Zavareh alleges as follows. In February 2010, UNLV offered her admission into the WRM Master's program. She alleges that she accepted this offer by enrolling, paying tuition, and foregoing other opportunities of employment and education, thereby forming a contract between her and the University. The terms of the contract, she alleges, were established by the UNLV bylaws and the 2009-2011 graduate catalog.
Upon matriculation, UNLV appointed Smith as her graduate advisor. Sometime during 2010-2011, UNLV eliminated the Environmental Studies Program and denied tenure status to Smith. Zavareh then obtained Booker as her new graduate advisor and had to "reform her committee halfway through completion of her degree requirements." (Compl. ¶ 24.) By that point, she claims, she had already detrimentally relied upon the coursework authorized by Smith, including a three-unit course through the University of Ohio in India. During the period when she selected her coursework with Smith, the WRM department chair (Nicholl) was away on sabbatical.
Upon Nicholl's return, Zavareh alleges he "intentionally interfered in the academic independence, evaluation, decisions and relationships between [her] and her advisor and hercommittee." (Compl. ¶ 27.) She alleges that Nicholl campaigned her thesis committee to have her fail her thesis defense and that he denied her application for graduation without timely notice or any stated reason for such action. She alleges that Nowicki attempted to recuse himself from her thesis committee at the last minute to preclude a quorum. Then, Rodriguez, in collusion with Nicholl, allegedly denied her application for graduation a second time. Korgan allegedly represented that Smith withheld his approval of her thesis, such representation being impossible because Smith was allegedly terminally ill and unavailable on medical leave. Although she was denied graduation, her thesis was nonetheless approved. (Dkt. No. 15 at 2.)
Zavareh appealed the University's decision to deny her graduation application. She claims she was denied a "timely, transparent, neutral, and meaningful appeal" because (i) she "did not have notice of the adverse position against her by Nicholl, Rodriguez, Nowicki and Booker [;]" (ii) she did not obtain written notice of the grounds for the denial; (hi) Nicholl, Nowicki, Rodriguez, and Booker interfered with her attempts to appeal, developed post-hoc rationales for their actions, and imposed additional "onerous" coursework for her (referring, presumably, to an additional three-unit course); (iv) she was presented with a "Contract for Defense" with requirements only applicable to those who fail a thesis defense; (v) there were no written procedures for the graduate appeal committee; (vi) the appeal committee's outcome against her was predetermined; and (vii) there were problems of ex parte communication, witness tampering, and undue influence over the appeal committee members.
She pleads two claims for relief under federal statute: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 () and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (conspiracy). She also pleads several state law claims: breach of contract, contract- and tort-based breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of due process under the Nevada Constitution. She seeks equitable relief in two forms: an injunction preventing UNLV from changing her "status" during the pendency of this case and a declaration that she has completed the requirements for her graduate degree. She seeks damages for losttuition, lost employment opportunity, lost future wages, lost reputation, and various forms of emotional distress.
On November 27, 2012, Defendants removed the case to this Court. On January 8, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion and allows Zavareh 14 days to amend her complaint to attempt to state a claim under federal law.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), a plaintiff has Article III standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief only if she demonstrates a likelihood of suffering the same injury in the future. "[P]laintiffs must demonstrate a 'credible threat' exists that they will again be subject to the specific injury for which they seek injunctive or declaratory relief." Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983)). To have standing for equitable relief then, Zavareh must demonstrate that she is likely to suffer the same alleged injuries in the future: denial of her graduation application and a meaningless appeal process. Because she is still a student in the same graduate program at UNLV and apparently still desires the Master's degree which UNLV denied (or else she unlikely would not be seeking a declaration that she has completed the degree requirements), she has met the threshold standing requirement for equitable relief. There is at least a "credible threat" that UNLV will again deny her graduation application and that she will be subject to the same graduate appeals process.
Standing to seek monetary damages does not require comportment with Lyons. See Lnjan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In light of Defendants' failure to object to Zavareh's standing to seek monetary damages and her sufficient pleading of an "injury in fact"fairly traceable to Defendants' conduct, Zavareh also has standing to pursue monetary damages. See id.
A properly pled complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CRV. P. 8(a)(2); Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain[] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
District courts must apply a two-step approach when considering motions to dismiss. Id. at 679. First, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences from the complaint in the plaintiff's favor. Id.; Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2013). Legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to the same assumption of truth even if cast in the form of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Brown, 724 F.3d at 1248. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 663. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has "alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When the claims have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be...
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