Zebroski v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 22 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:03-cv-00853-LPS CAPITAL CASE,1:03-cv-00853-LPS CAPITAL CASE |
| Parties | CRAIG ZEBROSKI, Petitioner, v. DAVID PIERCE, Warden, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center at Smyrna, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Edson A. Bostic, Karl D. Schwartz, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Wilmington, DE
David Ruhnke, RUHNKE & BARRETT, Montclair, NJ Attorneys for Petitioner
Gregory E. Smith, Elizabeth R. McFarlan, STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, DE
Maria T. Knoll, STATE OF DELAWARE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Wilmington, DE Attorneys for Respondent
February 22, 2016
Wilmington, DE
Pending before the Court is an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") filed by Craig Zebroski ("Zebroski" or "Petitioner") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (D.I. 90) At issue is whether this Court may review claims that were procedurally barred from consideration in Delaware state court. More specifically, the Court addresses two issues: (i) whether Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5) necessarily requires state courts to consider and apply federal law (i.e., the "independence" inquiry), and (ii) whether Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rules 61(i)(2) and 61(i)(5) were firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of Petitioner's procedural default (the "adequacy" inquiry).
For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Rule 61(i)(5) does not necessarily require state courts to consider and apply federal law. The Court also concludes that Rules 61(i)(2) and 61(i)(5) were firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of Petitioner's procedural default.
In reaching this decision, the Court is not making any conclusions as to whether the Delaware courts' application of its procedural rules was sufficiently "independent and adequate" to preclude federal review over Petitioner's claims. Further briefing will be needed to resolve these potentially difficult questions. For this reason and others, the Court has no occasion either to grant or deny Zebroski's Petition at this time.1
Petitioner's case came before the Delaware Superior Court on a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief. See State v. Zebroski, 2013 WL 5786359, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept 30, 2013). The Superior Court dismissed each of Zebroski's claims.2 According to the Superior Court, each claim was procedurally barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). See id. at *5. Rule 61(i) establishes four procedural bars:
(1) the motion was untimely; (2) the grounds for relief were not properly asserted previously in a postconviction proceeding; (3) the grounds for relief were not presented in the proceedings leading to final conviction; [and] (4) the claim has been or should have been formerly adjudicated in a previous proceeding.
Id. at *1 (citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4) (repealed 2014)).3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. See Zebroski v. State, 2014 WL 2048117 .
Prior to this most recent round of litigation in the Superior and Supreme Courts, this Court had stayed proceedings on the Petition and held them in abeyance pending completion of the state court proceedings. (See D.I. 113; see also D.I. 90) Among the issues raised by Petitioner in the operative Amended Petition is whether the Delaware Supreme Court's 2014 decision was based on "independent and adequate" state procedural bars and, if so, whether those bars affect the availability of federal court review of the merits of his habeas claims. After consulting with the parties, the Court directed that they brief "the independence and adequacy of the procedural bars contained in Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and Delaware Supreme Court Rule 8." (D.I. 127)4
In his briefing, Petitioner asserts that state courts cannot apply Rule 61(i)(5) without relying on or incorporating federal law. Hence, in Petitioner's view, Rule 61(i)(5) is not independent of federal law and thus cannot serve as a procedural bar to merits review in federal court.
Rule 61(i)(5) provides an exception to the procedural bars described in Rule 61(i)(1)-(3). Rule 61(i)(5) states:
The bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (repealed 2014). Petitioner contends that the exception described in Rule 61(i)(5) is predicated on a constitutional violation and, thus, that any consideration or application of the rule necessarily implicates and depends upon issues of federal constitutional law. (See D.I. 128 at 5-8) Similarly, Petitioner asserts that the state courts' application of Rule 61(i)(5) incorporated and relied upon federal constitutional law. (Id. at 13-14)
Petitioner further argues that Rules 61(i)(2), (i)(4), and (i)(5) are not adequate to bar federal merits review. (Id. at 17) According to Petitioner, "Delaware courts have not applied the 'interest of justice' and 'miscarriage of justice' exceptions to the procedural bars in Rule 61 with the consistency needed for the exceptions to qualify as 'firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed.'" (Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991))) Petitioner adds that even if the state courts generally applied the rules in a consistent fashion, they did not do so in this case. (See D.I. 128 at 22)
Finally, Petitioner presents a claim that was denied by the Delaware Supreme Court based on the Court's view that the issue was not "fairly raised" in Delaware Superior Court.5 See Zebroski, 2014 WL 2048117, at *2. Petitioner explains that he filed a motion (D.I. 128 at 39; see also D.I. 129-12 at A638-41) Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court's "refusal to apply plain error review on appeal was an inadequate application of a procedural rule and therefore not a bar to federal review of the claim." (D.I. 128 at 39)6
On January 7, 2015, the Court heard argument on the aspects of the Petition that had to that point been briefed. (See D.I. 133 ("Tr.")) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court asked the parties to try to agree on the questions presented that the Court should answer (Tr. at 75), but they were unable to do so (see D.I. 134, 135). Instead, each side submitted its own proposal for how the Court should characterize the issues before it.
Petitioner put forth five questions for the Court to answer:
(See D.I. 135 at 1-2) Respondent, by contrast, argued that the Court should resolve only a more general threshold question: "Whether the exception contained in the then-existing Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5) vitiates the independence and adequacy of the procedural bars contained in Rule 61(i)(1)-(3)." (D.I. 134 at 1)7
The Court understands Respondent's single question essentially to encompass Petitioner's first three questions, excluding Petitioner's reference to Rule 61(i)(4). Both parties have been fully heard on these three issues, in the form of briefing and oral argument. Given Respondent's repeated statements that it is not asserting Rule 61(i)(4) as a procedural bar to a merits review of the relevant claims, the Court concludes that it need not address theindependence and adequacy of Rule 61(i)(4) in order to move forward in this case.8 Therefore, in the Discussion below, the Court answers the three questions as posed by Petitioner, excluding Petitioner's reference to Rule 61(i)(4).9
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Among the limitations on federal jurisdiction is the "well-established principle of federalism that a state decision resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is immune from review in the federal courts." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). This principle applies to federal habeas proceedings, see id; see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989), and is often implicated when a state court denies relief based on procedural grounds, see Harris, 489 U.S. at 260-61 ().
Generally, a state court decision is "independent" unless it "fairly appears that the statecourt rested its decision primarily on federal law." Id. at 261 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991). Generally, a state court procedural rule is "adequate" "only if it is firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed." Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-434 (1991)). In assessing adequacy, the Court must "determine whether the state rule itself provides guidance regarding how the rule...
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