Zechiel v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 12 October 1932 |
Docket Number | No. 4704.,4704. |
Parties | ZECHIEL et al. v. FIREMEN'S FUND INS. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
William W. Hammond, C. Severin Buschmann, Leo M. Gardner, and Chester L. Zechiel, all of Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant.
Burke G. Slaymaker, of Indianapolis, Ind. (Slaymaker, Merrell & Locke, of Indianapolis, Ind., of counsel), for appellee.
Before ALSCHULER and EVANS, Circuit Judges, and WILKERSON, District Judge.
EVANS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The two questions determinative of the appeal are:
(1) Does the complaint state the facts upon which appellee relies for its attack upon the order appointing the receiver?
(2) May a defendant in an action brought against him by a receiver of a copartnership, upon leave of the court which appointed the receiver in another action at the instance of a contract creditor, challenge the validity of the receiver's appointment?
Both of these questions we answer in the negative.
(1) The complaint in the instant case does not disclose the facts upon which appellee relies to support its demurrer. The court can not assume from the statement that "he was appointed as receiver * * * in an action by Lewis Meier & Company, a corporate creditor, against said Edward Traugott and Harry Sussman, * * *" that Lewis Meier & Company was a simple contract creditor rather than a lien or judgment creditor. For in construing the above allegation, we are required to look also to the first clause of the sentence which reads that he "is the duly qualified and acting receiver of the partnership assets of Edward Traugott & Company, * * *." Reading the two clauses together, the court must, as against a demurrer, construe them to mean that Lewis Meier & Company was such a creditor as could institute the receivership proceedings against the partnership. Among the numerous decisions which have passed upon and construed language similar to that before us, is the case of Spinney v. Hall et al., 49 Ind. App. 502, 97 N. E. 571, 572. There the court said:
Other decisions to the same effect are: Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U. S. 233, 9 S. Ct. 279, 280, 32 L. Ed. 686; Commonwealth v. Chase, 127 Mass. 7, 13; Lethbridge v. City of New York, 59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 486, 15 N. Y. S. 562; Rockwell v. Merwin, 45 N. Y. 166, 167; Bowden v. Jacksonville Electric Co., 51 Fla. 152, 41 So. 400, 7 Ann. Cas. 859; Edwardson v. Garnhart, 56 Mo. at page 86; Albright v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 22 F.(2d) 832 (D. C.); 19 Corpus Juris, at page 833.
In Robertson v. Perkins, supra, the rule is stated thus:
(2) Inasmuch as counsel for appellant have conceded, or at least written their briefs on the assumption, that the Lewis Meier & Company was a simple contract creditor which brought its action to obtain a judgment and which, before judgment, secured the appointment of appellant as receiver of the partnership, it is deemed advisable to also dispose of the second question. By so doing we may avoid the possibility of a second appeal.
In disposing of this question, it becomes necessary to examine the Indiana Statute (Burns' Ind. Stats. 1926, § 1300) and the decisions of the appellate courts of Indiana thereon. The parties agree that the Marion Superior Court was a court of general equity jurisdiction — a court whose original jurisdiction was concurrent with the Circuit Court of said county.
Disposition of this second question turns upon the determination of two further questions: (a) Is the order appointing a receiver of an individual by an Indiana court of equity upon an action of a simple contract creditor absolutely void? (b) Does the fact that the debtor defendants composed a copartnership differentiate the case?
The legal question presented is one of jurisdiction.
It is, as it must be, under the authorities, assumed that orders appointing receivers upon the application of a simple contract creditor, no other facts appearing, are erroneously entered and will be vacated and set aside on appeal. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77, 85, 43 S. Ct. 480, 483, 67 L. Ed. 871; Davis v. Hayden, 238 F. 734 (C. C. A. 4); Hogsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 101 A. 941; Slow v. Ohio Valley Roofing Co., 198 Ind. 190, 152 N. E. 820; State v. Union Nat. Bank of Muncie, 145 Ind. 537, 44 N. E. 585, 57 Am. St. Rep. 209.
In the case of Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, supra, the Supreme Court said:
This observation applies to receivers of corporations as well as to receivers of individuals.
In the case of corporations, however, the courts have quite generally held that the debtor corporation may waive the taking of the judgment and the return of an execution thereon unsatisfied. In re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 109, 28 S. Ct. 219, 52 L. Ed. 403; Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 380, 14 S. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113; Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, 10 S. Ct. 604, 33 L. Ed. 1021; Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 43 S. Ct. 454, 67 L. Ed. 763; First Nat. Bank of Medford v. Stewart Fruit Co., 17 F.(2d) 621 (D. C.); McAtamney v. Commonwealth Hotel Const. Corp., 296 F. 500, 505 (D. C.); Enos v. New York & O. R. Co. (C. C.) 103 F. 47; Maxwell v. McDaniels, 184 F. 311 (C. C. A. 4). For a somewhat limited application of this statement, see Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, at page 52, 48 S. Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed. 457.
The Supreme Court in Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 109, 28 S. Ct. 219, 224, 52 L. Ed. 403, said:
No good reason can be observed (save one that goes to the form rather than to the substance of equity jurisdiction) for distinguishing between individuals and corporations so far as the effect of their consent to the appointment of a receiver goes. Nevertheless there are numerous cases based either upon judicial precedent or local state statutes which make the distinction between these two entities. Such cases hold orders appointing receivers of individuals at the instance of unsecured creditors even though the debtor consents to be erroneous. Davis v. Hayden, 238 F. 734 (C. C. A. 4); Hogsett et al. v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 101 A. 941; Maxwell v. McDaniels (C. C. A.) 184 F. 311; First Nat. Bank of Medford, Or., v. Stewart Fruit Co. (D. C.) 17 F.(2d) 621; State v. Union Nat. Bank of Muncie, 145 Ind. 537, 44 N. E. 585, 57 Am. St. Rep. 209; Steinbrenner Rubber Co. et al. v. Duncan, 86 Ind. App. 218, 155 N. E. 625. Other Indiana cases differentiating between the appointment of a receiver for a corporation and for an individual and denying the power of appointment in the case of an individual are: Slow v. Ohio Valley Roofing Co., 198 Ind. 190, 152 N. E. 820; State v. Superior Court of Marion County, 195 Ind....
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